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Abstract 
This thesis examines the interrelations between risk and management control systems in 
inter-firm alliances—specifically, how risks influence the choices and construction of 
management control systems, and how these management control systems subsequently 
affect the articulation and evolution of risks. The research issues are examined by using 
the theoretical perspective of a three-stage experimentation process under the actor-
network theory. Data were collected from two international joint ventures in the 
Chinese automobile industry through formal and informal interviews, observations and 
review of internal and external documents. 
This study found that risk and inter-firm alliances continuously and mutually construct 
each other through management control systems. On the one hand, management control 
systems contribute to the articulation of risks in inter-firm alliances by identifying the 
source of risk, generating risk perception, rationalising and objectifying risk perception, 
and producing knowledge on risk. On the other hand, different management control 
systems are initiated, crafted, selected, formalised and negotiated as the outcome of the 
partner firm’s efforts to experiment with solutions to address risks. 
These findings contribute to the accounting and management control literature by 
demonstrating that risk management in inter-firm alliances is not a static phenomenon. 
Instead, risk and management control systems in inter-firm alliances are (re)constructed 
through an ongoing experimentation process that involves interactions among firms in 
crafting and testing solutions to risks. In this ongoing experimentation process, 
management control systems are not only used to manage risks, but also contribute to 
the articulation of new risks. This thesis also extends prior research by highlighting how 
personal ties may play a critical role in the risk management of alliance relationships. 
Overall, this thesis demonstrates the practice of forming and deploying multiple 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
1.1 Introduction 
This thesis examines how management control systems (MCSs)1 are implicated in the 
process of articulating risks in inter-firm alliances. Specially, it analyses the processes 
through which risks are articulated and experimented with, and how MCSs may be 
implicated in these experimentation processes. In doing so, this thesis argues that risk 
and MCSs continuously and simultaneously act on each other through iterative and 
complex processes, involving a network of relations between heterogeneous entities and 
practices in the everyday business of inter-firm alliances. Exploring and explaining how 
risks and MCSs may affect each other in inter-firm alliances requires processual 
analysis. As such, this thesis adopts a field study method. This chapter highlights the 
background, motivation and specific research questions of this thesis. 
This chapter is organised as follows. Section 1.2 provides the background and 
motivation of this thesis. In particular, this section outlines how risk in inter-firm 
alliances and MCSs for risk management of inter-firm alliances were studied in prior 
accounting literature, and how existing views on risk and MCS inter-firm alliances may 
limit our understandings of the complex dynamics of risk, and the implications of this 
for MCSs. This section also highlights the research questions that were pursued in this 
thesis. Section 1.3 discusses how the rest of this thesis is organised. 
1.2 Background and Motivation 
Recent research suggests that a significant amount of risk exists in organisations, which 
challenges their ongoing management and survival (Mikes 2009; Power 2004; 
Wahlstrom 2009). Empirical evidence also confirms a large number of organisational 
failures and recognises risks as a significant contributing factor (Power 2009). For these 
reasons, risks have become an important management issue (Hutter & Power 2005; 
Power 2009). One strategy that organisations have adopted to manage risks is using 
inter-firm alliances.2 These organisations believe that, by entering inter-firm alliances, 
                                                          
1 Appendix 1 lists and defines the major concepts related to this thesis, including risk, MCSs, risk 
management models and practices, inter-firm alliances, material devices and inscriptions, and accounting 
inscriptions. 
2  Inter-firm alliances are generally defined in the literature as a voluntarily initiated cooperative 
arrangement between organisations (Das & Teng 1998, 2001, 2002). Inter-firm alliances are different to 
2 
they are able to share risks with or fully transfer risks to their partners. This approach to 
risk reduction or elimination has been a key stimulus for the formation of inter-firm 
alliances (Das & Teng 2001; Gulati 1995). Consequently, risk consideration is critical 
in forming inter-firm alliances. 
While inter-firm alliances are used as one important strategy to manage risks, research 
has also suggested that inter-firm alliances are significant sources of risks (Das & Teng 
1998; Dekker 2004; Muthusamy & White 2005). For example, ‘inter-firm alliances are 
purported to engender two general types of risk: relational risk and performance risk’ 
(Anderson et al. 2015, p. 36). These risks are said to be both related and unrelated to 
individual partner firm’s efforts (Das & Teng 1999). That is, in seeking to manage risks 
through inter-firm alliances, organisations simultaneously create risks. This causes a 
paradox — that risk management is also risk creation. This paradox is interesting 
theoretically and empirically because it raises questions about whether the use of inter-
firm alliances do manage risks or create risks, and whether the efforts of managing risks 
may end up with the risk management of nothing (Power 2009). Thus, this thesis 
focuses on the complex dynamics of risk and risk management, and how MCSs are 
implicated in these dynamics. Specially, it seeks to explore and analyse the processes 
through which risks are articulated and managed, and how MCSs may be involved in 
these processes. 
While prior accounting literature has engaged with issues of MCSs in inter-firm settings, 
it has focused much attention on the design and choice of ‘optimal’ MCSs for the 
effective management of these relationships (Anderson & Dekker 2005, 2009; Das & 
Teng 1998, 2001; Dekker 2004; Ding, Dekker & Groot 2013; Van der Meer-Kooistra & 
Vosselman 2000). These prior studies have not engaged adequately with the complex 
and paradoxical nature of risks in inter-firm alliances, or considered how MCSs may be 
related to these risks. This is the main focus of this thesis. In particular, this thesis was 
motivated by the following four main factors. 
First, prior research has not adequately engaged with the complex dynamics of risks in 
inter-firm alliances. Most prior research has treated risks as theoretical phenomena ‘out 
there’ that can be measured outside the daily operations and management of inter-firm 
alliances. In particular, the management control literature has drawn on theory to make 
                                                                                                                                                                          
traditional market transactions or bureaucratic organisations because they involve repetitive transactions 
between two or more organisations, where all partner firms jointly make decisions about the daily 
operation and management of the inter-firm alliance. 
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predictions about possible events, conditions of occurrence and consequences of risks in 
inter-firm alliances (Das & Teng 2001; Dekker 2004). This has led to the belief that 
risks and their consequences can be precisely described and anticipated, thereby 
creating the tendency for management control researchers to predetermine different 
types of risks and their contingencies a priori to the activities and events, as practised in 
the daily operation of inter-firm alliances (Das & Teng 1998, 2001; Dekker 2004; de 
Man & Nadine 2009; Ireland, Hitt & Vaidyanath 2002; Van der Meer-Kooistra & 
Vosselman 2000). These studies have argued that predetermined risks are those that 
ought to occur in inter-firm alliances’ practices. For example, Das and Teng (1998) 
employed transaction cost economic theory to conceptualise relational risk as the event 
of shirking, distorting information and stealing one’s partner’s skills. They used this 
theory to propose the conditions that lead to the occurrence of relational risk (such as 
opportunistic partners, specific assets and transaction uncertainty) and anticipate the 
consequences of relational risk (such as hurting one’s partner’s interest and reducing 
both partners’ confidence in each other). In a similar manner, Dekker (2004) drew on 
organisational theory to articulate the notion of coordination risk to describe ineffective 
cooperation between partners, which may affect the alliance’s ability to create value. 
Dekker further suggested that the occurrence of coordination risk is contingent on the 
condition of joint decision making and task performing between alliance partners. 
Although Das and Teng (1998), Dekker (2004) and other similar studies have enriched 
our knowledge about risks, predetermining risks through theoretical lenses may 
oversimplify the phenomena and underspecify its articulation processes in inter-firm 
alliance practices. In this sense, Mahama and Ming (2009) and Power (2009) argued 
that risks are empirical phenomena that do not pre-exist, but emerge through practices 
of relating and interacting. Renn (2010) also argued that risks make no sense if they can 
be predetermined independently of practical activities. This is because risks are the 
consequences and triggers of the practices of interacting, and the choices made through 
such interactions (Mahama & Ming 2009). Thus, as empirical phenomena, risks cannot 
be predefined or categorised a priori. Rather, risks should be understood as being 
articulated through arrays of activities that may interact and relate with each other. 
Given that practical activities vary across time and space, risks may be articulated and 
practised differently in different inter-firm alliance settings. For example, what is 
articulated as risk at the stage of forming an alliance may be different to risk during the 
operation of the same alliance, as new activities emerge in the network relations. Thus, 
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risks may change and evolve during the ongoing processes of alliances. This implies 
that risks are neither static nor the properties of certain events or settings in inter-firm 
alliances. Rather, risks are dynamic and articulated by practitioners as they encounter 
certain events in their everyday practices. Therefore, to understand the complex nature 
of risks in inter-firm alliances, it is important to understand how a variety of practical 
activities interact with each other to generate the outcome of certain entities, activities 
or relationships labelled under the term ‘risk’. It is also important to follow the 
dynamics of interactions between practical activities, as they may become conduits for 
the evolution of risks. 
Second, in studying risks, prior research has focused exclusively on risks in inter-firm 
alliances (Das & Teng 1998, 2001; Dekker 2004). That is, prior research has tended to 
assume that risks in inter-firm alliances are a phenomenon that only appears after the 
formation of inter-firm alliances, thereby creating the impression that risks in inter-firm 
alliances are purely caused by activities and events that occur after alliances are formed. 
For example, relational risk and coordination risk are conceptualised on the basis of the 
‘cooperative relationship’ between partner firms, while performance risk is 
conceptualised around the ‘unsatisfactory performance’ of alliances (Das & Teng 1998, 
2001; Dekker 2004). The cooperative relationship between partner firms and 
performance of alliances are activities that can only be discussed after alliance 
relationships are formally established. However, Shields and Shields (1998) highlighted 
the importance of studying the antecedents of a particular phenomenon in order to 
improve appreciation of that phenomenon. Thus, drawing on Shields and Shields (1998), 
this thesis examines how risks may be articulated at different stages of inter-firm 
alliances. 
Third, with the belief that risks and their conditions of occurrence can be determined a 
priori to activities practised in inter-firm alliances, prior research has had the tendency 
to prescribe and pre-design MCSs that ‘should’ be used to manage those predetermined 
risks in a very structural and constrained manner (Das & Teng 1998, 2001; Dekker 2004; 
Langfield-Smith 2008; Mjoen & Tallman 1997; Nooteboom, Berger & Noorderhaven 
1997). For example, to control relational risk, researchers have advocated the use of 
control mechanisms, such as shared ownership of specific investments, outcome 
controls, behaviour controls and informal controls (Das & Teng 1998, 2001; Dekker 
2004; Langfield-Smith 2008; Mjoen & Tallman 1997; Nooteboom, Berger & 
Noorderhaven 1997). Prior research has also suggested that control mechanisms—such 
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as partner selection, legal contracts, outcome controls, behaviour controls and 
information contracts—should be used to mitigate the risks associated with coordination 
failures (Dekker 2004; Ireland, Hitt & Vaidyanath 2002). Das and Teng (1998) 
suggested that performance risk can be managed with exit provisions, licensing, 
recurrent contracts and assigning key managers to alliances. These studies have tended 
to presume fixed properties, structural forms and functions for MCSs in risk 
management. However, anchoring MCSs with fixed positions may limit our 
understandings of how MCSs are articulated and can perform in the practice of risk 
management of inter-firm alliances. This is partially because risks may evolve in the 
practice of operating and managing inter-firm alliances; thus, MCSs used to manage 
risks may also change and perform differently as risks evolve. Therefore, in the inter-
firm alliance context, it is important to free MCSs from theoretically predefined 
positions and examine how they articulate, develop and perform over time in practice. 
Fourth, in determining the relationship between risks and MCSs, prior research seemed 
to model this relationship in a linear and unidirectional manner. That is, prior research 
has had the implicit assumption that MCSs are always enacted to control or manage 
risks. For example, Das and Teng (2001) and Van der Meer-Kooistra and Vosselman 
(2000) argued that using certain MCSs is negatively associated with the occurrence and 
consequences of risks. These studies implied that appropriate design and choice of 
MCSs will be effective in managing different types of risks in inter-firm alliances. 
However, some existing research has suggested that, while MCSs may be used to solve 
certain problems, they may simultaneously create disorder or uncertainties (Chua & 
Mahama 2007; Vinnari & Skærbæck 2014), which implies that the relationship between 
risk and MCSs may be complicated. Thus, it is important to examine the complex, 
interactive and iterative relationship between risks and MCSs, rather than focusing on 
the linear model of this relationship. 
This thesis seeks to fill the gap in the prior literature by exploring the following overall 
research question:  
How do risks and MCS affect each other in inter-firm alliances?  
To address this overall research question, this thesis examines three interrelated sub-
questions: 
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1. How is the concept of risk articulated in the practice of enacting and managing inter-
firm alliances? 
2. How does the articulation of risk influence the choices or construction of MCSs in 
inter-firm alliances? 
3. What are the effects of enacting MCSs as part of risk articulation processes in inter-
firm alliances? 
Given that the research questions of this thesis examine the processes and practices 
through which risks are articulated in inter-firm alliances, and how MCSs may be 
related to or affect such processes, a practice theory was needed. Thus, actor-network 
theory (ANT) was drawn upon to provide a theoretical lens for the study. More 
specially, Callon, Lascoumes and Barthe’s (2009) notion of collective experimentation 
with matters of concern was adopted as a theoretical framework to address the research 
questions of this thesis. Given that this theoretical framework has a processual focus, a 
qualitative field study approach was used, which involved collecting data from 
interviews, document reviews and observations. Data were collected from joint ventures 
(JVs—one form of inter-firm alliances) and NVivo was used to analyse the data. The 
results indicated the following: 
 risks and risk management models (inter-firm alliances and MCSs) were 
continuously articulated as the outcome of an ongoing experimentation process 
 risk and MCSs co-constructed each other in the dynamics of inter-firm alliances 
 managing risk in one JV may lead to the creation of new risks in the same or a 
different JV 
 multiple JVs were formed with different rationalities as a response to local 
conditions, thereby creating a JV portfolio to deal with the continuous evolution 
of risks 
 personal reciprocal behaviour (based on personal guanxi and ‘face’) plays a 
significant role in rescuing alliance relationships between partner firms. 
1.3 Organisation of the Thesis 
The remainder of this thesis is set out as follows. Chapter 2 presents a review of the 
extant literature, which comprises four major parts. The first part critically reviews how 
the concept of risk is studied and examined in prior literature. In particular, it reviews 
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research that studies risk as a theoretical and empirical phenomenon. The second part 
examines prior research that studies inter-firm alliances as a solution to and source of 
risk. The third part critically reviews extant accounting literature that focuses on the 
design and choice of MCSs for the risk management of inter-firm alliances. 
Chapter 3 presents the analytical framework informing this thesis. This framework 
focuses on one emerging area of ANT that examines the process of economisation 
through a three-stage experimentation process. This chapter discusses the implications 
of this emerging area of ANT for understanding the constructivist nature of risks in 
inter-firm alliances, and the implications of that for MCSs. This framework requires 
examination of heterogeneous actors and activities, as well as their interactions with 
each other, as practised in the daily operation and management of inter-firm alliances. 
Chapter 4 discusses the qualitative field study approach adopted by this thesis to address 
the research questions of this study. It describes the reasons for adopting a qualitative 
field study. This research examined one focal JV and five other JVs that were relevant 
to the focal JV, and this chapter discusses the background of these six JVs. This chapter 
also describes the methods and procedures used to collect and maintain data, and how 
these data were analysed. 
Chapters 5, 6 and 7 present the results of the data analysis. The results indicate that risks 
and MCSs are continuously (re)constructed through three interconnected rounds of 
experimentation process, which are yet subject to further experimentation when the 
researcher left the field. Chapter 5 presents analyses and discussions of the processes 
and practices through which risks were articulated, and the implications of this for 
MCSs in the first round of the experimentation process. This round of experimentation 
was centred on constructing a proposal to form a medium-duty engine JV between two 
firms, labelled ‘Cino’ and ‘Delink’. Following ANT, this chapter analyses: 
 how risks were articulated as the outcome of making sense of a matter of 
concern that Cino encountered in its daily operations 
 how these risks led to the proposal to form an engine JV between Cino and 
Delink 
 how new risk concerns and management control models (partner selection and 
JV contract) to mitigate these risk concerns were hypothesised 
 how the enactment of the engine JV created new matters of concern. 
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In doing so, this chapter highlights the various interacting practices between 
heterogeneous actors (such as partner firms, MCSs and accounting inscriptions) that 
facilitated the experimentation process. Appendix 3 presents the details of the 
heterogeneous actors and how they interact with each other. 
Chapter 6 continues the analysis of Chapter 5 by discussing the processes and practices 
involved in the second round of the experimentation process. This round of 
experimentation focused on constructing the proposal to form a JV portfolio with non–
Delink related local firms in the Chinese market. In particular, this chapter highlights 
how new risks were articulated as the result of enacting and operating the medium-duty 
engine JV, and how these new risks led to the development of the proposal to form a JV 
portfolio with non–Delink related firms as a risk solution. This chapter also discusses 
the consequences (the creation of new matters of concern) that resulted when the JV 
portfolio model was operationalised. This chapter delves into the interactions, struggles 
and compromises between heterogeneous actors that emerged when experimenting with 
risks and solutions to these risks. This chapter also discusses how the accounting 
inscriptions and devices and other inscriptions performed in the experimentation 
processes. Appendix 3 presents the heterogeneous actors involved and how they interact 
with each other. 
Chapter 7 continues Chapter 6 to discuss the processes and practices involved in the 
third round of the experimentation process. This third round of experimentation centred 
on constructing a proposal to form an after-treatment system (ATS) JV between Cino 
and Delink. This chapter demonstrates how the enactment and operationalisation of the 
JV portfolio created its own problems, which led to constructing a proposal to form an 
ATS JV between Cino and Delink, and the articulation of new risks and revised MCS 
models to deal with such risks. In doing so, it shows how the heterogeneous actors 
continuously interacted with each other to facilitate the experimentation process (see 
Appendix 3). This chapter also discusses how the enactment and operationalisation of 
the ATS JV and respective MCS models created uncertainties and problems. 
Following the three empirical chapters, Chapter 8 summarises the thesis. This chapter 
reviews the major conclusions that link the themes emerging from the analysis. Overall, 
this study found that risks and MCSs continuously and mutually constructed each other 
throughout the three rounds of the experimentation process, which centred on 
constructing a proposal to form the engine JV, JV portfolio and ATS JV. On one hand, 
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management control actions contribute to the articulation of risks in inter-firm alliances 
by identifying the source of risk, generating risk perception, rationalising and 
objectifying risk perception, and producing knowledge on risk. On the other hand, 
different management control models are initiated, crafted, selected, formalised and 
negotiated as the outcome of partner firms’ efforts to experiment with solutions to 





Chapter 2: Literature Review 
2.1 Introduction 
This chapter reviews the literature relevant to the research questions examined in this 
thesis. Section 2.2 reviews prior research that examined risks as a theoretical and 
empirical phenomenon. Section 2.3 reviews studies that suggested that inter-firm 
alliances are both solutions to and sources of risk, and discusses the effects of risks on 
inter-firm alliances. Section 2.4 focuses on accounting studies that examined risk and 
MCS design choices for risk management in inter-firm alliances. This section also 
reviews accounting studies that provided alternative views on risk and MCS, mainly in 
the non-inter-firm alliance context (such as intra-organisations and government 
enterprise). Section 2.5 presents the chapter summary. 
2.2 The Concept of Risks 
Prior research has engaged with risk by associating it with unanticipated negative 
variations to people’s expectations or normal thinking (March & Shapira 1987; Miller, 
KD 1992; Miller & Leiblein 1996). In particular, risk is conceptualised as the 
probability of the occurrence of some imaginable event or action that causes negative 
outcomes for people. Ciborra (2006, p. 1340) argued that ‘risk calculus requires to take 
into account all possible values of accounting variables in the future, attributing to each 
of them a probability distribution’. According to these researchers, risk should have 
three features. First, risk is argued to have a probability feature. Risk is used to describe 
the probability of occurrence of certain or a series of events or actions. The probability 
is generally estimated based on certain statistical instruments by considering 
observations for past events, which is used to project the occurrence of the same or 
similar events in the future. Thus, probability estimates whether certain events may 
occur. Second, to say that an event is risky, researchers have suggested that these events 
should be identifiable. This is because risks are used to delineate the possible 
occurrence of some imaginable events or actions. These events are imaginable because 
they (or similar events) have occurred in the past, or they are thinkable based on 
feelings, experiences or conventions. Finally, risks are always associated with negative 
outcomes that events inflict on people. These are negative outcomes that people do not 
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expect to experience, which may go against their expectations and make them sacrifice 
some resources (such as money). 
Based on this conceptual definition of risks, prior research has sought to study risks as a 
theoretical phenomenon that can be isolated from a set of interacting and relating 
practices that lead to risks. In particular, prior research has tried to predetermine what 
risks ‘should’ occur in the real world, and attempted to prove the ‘existence’ of these 
risks in practice. In predetermining risks, prior researchers have articulated risks as 
hypothetical cases by compiling conjectures on the probability, events and 
consequences of risks, based on their calculations, feelings, expectations, predictions 
and past experiences that seem to have certain logic. These hypothetical cases of risks 
are considered by these researchers as what ‘should’ occur in practice. 
To facilitate this conceptualisation of risks, prior research has drawn on a set of 
theories—such as agency theory, transactions cost economic theory and organisational 
theory—to derive hypotheses about risks. In particular, prior research has borrowed 
these theoretical ideals and assumptions to predetermine risks in a very constrained 
form outside practice. For example, some researchers have drawn on agency theory to 
predetermine risks as the event of agents’ self-interested behaviours that may sacrifice 
the benefits of the principal, when there is information asymmetry and conflict of 
interests between the principal and agent (Leland 1996; Zsidisin & Ellram 2003). 
Transactions cost economic theory has been largely used by prior research to theorise 
risks as the occurrence of high transaction costs, taking into consideration transaction 
characteristics (such as transaction frequency and asset specificity), transaction 
environment characteristics (such as potential alternative parties in the transaction and 
market uncertainty) and transaction party characteristics (such as limited rationality and 
opportunistic behaviour) (Brouthers & Brouthers 2000; Van der Meer-Kooistra & 
Vosselman 2000; Williamson 1979, 1989). Similarly, organisational theory has been 
used to conceptualise risk as the event of failing to achieve predetermined outcomes 
when there are coordination problems between the units in organisations or among 
parties in inter-firm settings (Dekker 2004; Fisher 1995; Osborn & Hagedoorn 1997). 
Once these hypothetical cases of risks had been theorised, they were tested with 
empirical cases. This method of studying risks has largely influenced our 
understandings of risks in inter-firm alliances in the existing accounting literature. 
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While predetermining the events, conditions of occurrence and consequences of risks 
enriches knowledge about risks (at least from theory), research in social science and 
sociology seems to suggest that risks are empirical phenomena (Beck 1992; Douglas 
1992; Lupton 1999; Mahama & Ming 2009; Miller, Kurunmaki & O’Leary 2008; 
Power 2009, 2013). These researchers have challenged the treatment of risks as 
theoretical phenomena by arguing that risks can only be initially understood through the 
practices of interacting and relating, before using theories to make sense of them. For 
example, Lupton (1999, p. 29) argued that ‘a risk object … is not a static, objective 
phenomenon, but is constantly constructed and negotiated as part of networks of social 
interaction and the formation of meaning’. Lupton’s (1999) claim resonates with 
Mahama and Ming (2009), who argued that the concept of operational risk is elusive 
and problematic, and research efforts should focus on how certain events and activities 
become constructed under the name of ‘operational risk’. Through a case study of an 
‘unauthorised trading event’ at National Australia Bank, Mahama and Ming (2009) 
found that, through continuous practices of discussing and debating—involving the 
media, the bank’s top management and regulatory bodies, and the mobilisation of three 
entities (experts, public fear and similar historical events) in these practices—the 
‘unauthorised trading event’ became framed as risk. The researchers argued that risks 
are the outcomes of interactions among entities that people encounter or interact with in 
their daily life. In other words, risks do not exist before interactions and relations, but 
emerge through the practices of relating and interacting. Thus, it is imperative to 
examine the set of interacting and relating practices that lead to the construction of risks, 
rather than ‘standing above’ such practice and pretending that the ‘fancy risks’ are 
exactly the risks that will arise in practice. The logic is simple: how can we understand 
risk as empirical phenomenon if we do not examine the set of interacting and relating 
practices in people’s daily lives that lead to these risks? 
As empirical phenomena, risks are also said to be dynamic in nature. If it is accepted 
that risks are the outcomes of a set of interacting and relating practices, risks are subject 
to constant change with the emergence of new activities, or changes in existing 
activities in practice. As Lupton (1999) stated, activities in practice are not static, but 
dynamic. For example, unpredictable, new and surprising activities continue emerging 
and affecting people’s daily life. If all natural disasters and human-made accidents were 
known in advance or predicted accurately, there would be no or little damage associated 
with these events, as it would be possible to take precautionary procedures to avoid or 
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mitigate the consequences of such events. Unfortunately, in practice, activities are 
evolving and changing all the time, sometimes with unpredictable directions or patterns. 
The dynamic nature of activities occurring in practice may alter how these activities 
interact among themselves or with other entities, thereby altering existing knowledge or 
generating new knowledge about risks. For example, Beck (1992) showed how 
understanding risk as ‘something given by God’ has changed to viewing risk as a 
human-made danger, in association with the modernisation process. Similarly, Power 
(2004) argued that the public’s concerns about primary risks to health (financial and 
physical) could be transformed to secondary risk (such as reputation) with the 
emergence of the public’s expectations to manage intangibles. The point here is that 
risks should be understood as a dynamic and temporal assemblage, the meaning and 
identity of which are fluid and subject to change. Given the practice and dynamic nature 
of risks, it is imperative to understand risks as empirical phenomena when studying 
risks in inter-firm alliances. 
2.3 Risks and Inter-firm Alliances 
Risks are ubiquitous in almost every aspect of people’s real life. The term ‘risk’ was 
traditionally used to describe natural disasters (such as earthquakes and tsunamis) due to 
non-human forces. The German sociologist Ulrich Beck expanded the usage of the term 
to refer to unpleasant consequences created by people’s own actions. In particular, he 
focused on studying risks in the context of the industrial revolution, and argued that 
society has become more risky because of human-induced technological developments, 
such as the invention of nuclear, chemical and genetic technology. Thus, people are 
exposed to risks (such as possible damage to their wellbeing) associated with these new 
technologies invented and used by themselves ((such as the leak of nuclear power). 
Since Beck’s expansion of the term ‘risk’ to encompass human-induced risks, 
increasing events are viewed and described in terms of risk. For example, 
‘environmental risk’ is used to describe unpleasant environmental damage caused by 
human activities, which may have consequences on human’s wellbeing (Davidson & 
Freudenberg 1996; Van der Oost, Beyer & Vermeulen 2003). In finance, ‘risk’ is used 
to describe the chance that there will be variations between expected and actual returns 
associated with a particular investment (Altman & Saunders 1998; Crouhy, Galai & 
Mark 2000; Jarrow, Lando & Turnbull 1997). ‘Information technology risk’ refers to 
the probability of failing to protect information from unauthorised access and uses 
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(Aubert, Patry & Rivard 2005; Bahli & Rivard 2003; Benaroch 2002). More recently, 
‘risk’ has been used to describe public concerns about the credibility of regulators and 
government agencies’ management activities (such as the Enterprise Risk Management 
Framework) that are supposed to create social wellbeing (Power 2004, 2009). With the 
word ‘risk’ being employed for different purposes in various disciplines, it has become 
an increasingly common term in people’s daily lives. 
Due to the increasing pervasiveness of risk in people’s lives, researchers have started to 
study risk in organisations comprised of individuals and the interactions and relations 
between those individuals (Mikes 2009, 2011; Miller, Kurunmaki & O’Leary 2008; 
Power 2004, 2007, 2009). These organisation researchers argue that more and more 
organisations are at risk, and that risk has become an organising principle for 
organisations. They advocate that the study of risk should be expanded from a 
traditional focus on the meaning of risk to exploring various methods that can be used to 
address, mitigate, avoid or manage such risks. Indeed, risk consideration has been 
incorporated in the strategies, objectives, corporate governance, regulations and even 
daily management of organisations in both public and private sectors (Christian & 
Tobias 2103). As Power (2004, p. 24) argued: 
Claims for the benefits of risk management are numerous. In financial services 
organizations, risk management has enabled a new focus on asset and earning quality. 
In the corporate sector more generally, risk management has become perceived as 
integral to business strategy and to value creation. Risk management has been shifted 
from a back-office, transaction-veto defensive role into a fundamental part of the 
business model. Risk officers and chief risk officers have been created as champions 
of risk management. In the public sector, risk management is becoming part of the 
way organizations challenge themselves in the absence of market mechanisms. And 
in all these settings it is widely accepted that the managed taking of risks is essential 
to progress and the creation of value—with the exception of extreme enthusiasts for 
the precautionary principle. 
Among the various methods that organisations use to manage risks, inter-firm alliances 
are said to be one important strategy. 
2.3.1 Inter-firm alliances as strategies for managing risks 
Inter-firm alliances are generally defined in the literature as voluntarily initiated 
cooperative arrangements between organisations (Das & Teng 1998, 2001, 2002). Inter-
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firm alliances are different from (i) traditional market transactions between 
organisations that involve one-off buy or sell transactions and (ii) bureaucratic 
organisations where all management and operational decisions are purely and 
completely made by a single organisation. Rather, inter-firm alliances generally involve 
repetitive and iterative transactions between two or more organisations, in which all 
partner firms jointly make decisions regarding the daily operation and management of 
the alliance. Inter-firm alliances can have ‘a variety of co-operative arrangements, 
including direct investment, JVs, supplier relationships, technology licensing, 
technology exchange, research and development agreement, and so on’ (Das & Teng 
1998, p. 827). 
Researchers have considered inter-firm alliances a critical strategy for managing risks 
for two main reasons. First, inter-firm alliances help organisations diversify risk (Nueno 
& Oosterveld 1988; Osborn & Baughn 1990). By entering inter-firm alliances, 
organisations commit to joint operations of certain activities with others. Undertaking 
joint operations allows organisations to share the resources needed, and the benefits and 
consequences of alliance-related activities. This is said to reduce the risk that 
organisations may face when they operate alone. For example, it is argued that inter-
firm alliances may be a good way to reduce the high transaction costs that can occur in a 
market transaction (Hennart 1988; Williamson 1985). Teece (1992) contended that risks 
can be diversified and spread via cooperation, as partner firms can commit jointly to the 
innovation process and share potential losses from failed efforts. 
Second, inter-firm alliances are said to enhance organisations’ capability to deal with 
risks (Das & Teng 1998; Gulati 1995; Hagedoorn 1993; Nooteboom, Berger & 
Noorderhaven 1997; Teece 1992). It is argued that, by entering inter-firm alliances, 
organisations have access to unique resources that are unavailable if they operate alone 
(such as technology, local knowledge, marketing skills, government suasion, 
management competence, research and development [R&D] capability, final resources, 
physical location and loan capital). Pooling unique resources in alliances is said to 
create a resource reservoir from which resources can be drawn to enhance organisations’ 
ability to deal with uncertain situations (Das & Teng 1998; Kought 1988; Osborn & 
Baughn 1990; Teece 1992). For example, Das and Teng (1998) argued that combining 
unique resources from different partner firms can create synergy, which may enhance 
the partners’ ability to anticipate, withstand and deal with risks. 
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Overall, these previous researchers suggested that, by entering inter-firm alliances, 
organisations are able to share, reduce or minimise risks. As Castells (2000, p. 187) 
argued, ‘cooperation and networking offer the only possibilities of sharing costs, and 
risks, as well as keeping up with constantly renewed information’. 
2.3.2 Inter-firm alliances as sources of risks 
While inter-firm alliances are considered one important strategy to manage risks, it is 
argued that they are simultaneously a significant source of risks (Anderson & Dekker 
2009; Das & Teng 1998; Dekker 2004; Ring & Van de Ven 1992, 1994). Researchers 
have argued that, by forming inter-firm alliances, organisations are exposed to risks 
both related and unrelated to their alliance partners. This is because the relationship 
between partner firms and the conditions under which alliances operate are dynamic and 
unpredictable. As such, partner firms are unable to anticipate ex-ante all possible 
changes or future conditions that could occur in the actual operation of inter-firm 
alliances. Thus, it is difficult for partner firms to take all possible precautions against 
unforeseen changes or future conditions associated with alliance operations. Thus, the 
use of inter-firm alliances is said to pose risks to organisations. 
For example, Ring and Van de Ven (1994) argued that inter-firm alliances are an 
inherently risky strategy because they are threatened by uncertainties related to the 
future state of alliances, and problems of adverse selection and moral hazard. In a later 
study, Das and Teng (1998) modified the risk terminology used by Ring and Van de 
Ven (1994). In particular, Das and Teng (1998, 2001) conceptualised two types of risks 
in inter-firm alliances: relational risk and performance risk. They defined relational risk 
as the possible default of partners. Given that cooperation is the core activity 
underpinning inter-firm alliances, relational risks are said to arise when one partner does 
not commit to cooperative activities, as agreed or expected by other partners. 
Performance risk is conceptualised as the failure to achieve alliance objectives, despite 
the best cooperation efforts between partners. Even if partners cooperate fully, 
performance risks may still exist due to lack of competencies and extraneous factors 
beyond partners’ control. Dekker (2004) moved beyond the economic focus of Das and 
Teng (1998, 2001) to add what he called ‘coordination problems’ in inter-firm alliances. 
By definition, coordination problems refer to the risk of partner firms’ failure or 
inability to execute tasks (especially when these tasks are complex and uncertain) that 
require collective efforts between them. While various forms of risks have been 
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proposed by prior studies, they all agreed that inter-firm alliances are significant sources 
of risks. 
Prior research has also suggested that risks may have significant consequences in inter-
firm alliances. It has been argued that risks may hurt partners, hinder the execution of 
joint tasks or activities, and lead to poor alliance performance or even the dissolution of 
alliances (Das & Teng 1998; March & Shapira 1987; Ring & Van de Ven 1994). For 
example, relational risk is argued to cause unintended leaks of partner firms’ intellectual 
property rights and private knowledge, add unfair costs to partners, incur costs to 
renegotiate alliance contracts, cause dissatisfaction between partners, dampen partners’ 
incentives to cooperate, and damage the quality of the products (Anbarci, Lemke & Roy 
2002; Berdrow & Lane 2003; Ellram 1990, 1993; Makhija & Ganesh 1997; Mohr and 
Sengupta 2002; Rokkan & Buvik 2003). Performance risks (lacking competence) may 
also make strategic objectives difficult to achieve, which may lead to the dissolution or 
failure of alliances (Das & Teng 2001; Gulati 1995). Contractor and Ra (2002); Dekker 
(2004); and Easterby-Smith, Lyles and Tsang (2008) argued that coordination risk adds 
substantial costs to partners and increases the probability of poor alliance performance. 
Collectively, these researchers suggested that, when forming inter-firm alliances, risks 
emerge that can create problems or have severe consequences on both the alliance and 
individual partner firms. This seems contrary to the purpose of forming alliances to 
minimise risks, and creates a paradox regarding risk in inter-firm alliances: if alliances 
are meant to manage risks, why do they simultaneously pose risks? This suggests that 
the relationship between risk and inter-firm alliances is complex and problematic, which 
highlights the importance of researching in more detail the risk management of inter-
firm alliances. 
When studying risks that exist in and have significant consequences for inter-firm 
alliances, most (particularly accounting) researchers have tended to treat risks in inter-
firm alliances as a post–alliance formation phenomenon. That is, prior research has 
assumed that risks in inter-firm alliance are purely a phenomenon caused solely by 
events, activities or conditions that occur after the formation of inter-firm alliances. For 
example, relational risk and coordination risk are conceptualised on the basis of the 
‘cooperative relationship’ between partner firms, while performance risk is 
conceptualised around the ‘unsatisfactory performance’ of the alliance (Das & Teng 
1998, 2001; Dekker 2004). The cooperative relationship between partner firms and 
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performance of the alliance are activities or situations that can only be discussed after 
the alliance relationship is formally created. 
Treating risk as a pure post–alliance formation phenomenon simplifies how risks can be 
studied in inter-firm alliances, by assuming away the possible effects of risk prior and 
leading to the formation of inter-firm alliances may have on risk in inter-firm alliances. 
Thus, understanding risks as a post–alliance formation phenomenon may not provide a 
comprehensive picture of risks in inter-firm alliances. The alliance literature has 
suggested that activities, processes and practices that exist before the formation of 
alliances have implications for the ongoing operations of alliances (Narasimhan & Nair 
2005). For example, the factors that lead to the formation of inter-firm alliances 
influence subsequent alliance performance. These factors can include buyers’ quality 
expectations about suppliers’ products or services, information sharing and trust 
between partner firms, partner firms’ market commonality and resource alignment, 
collective strength, inter-partner conflict and inter-dependencies between partner firms. 
These studies resonate with Shields and Shields’s (1998) argument about the 
importance of first understanding the antecedents of a phenomenon (such as 
participative budgeting), before emphasising the effects of that phenomenon on other 
variables. Based on the findings of these previous studies, this thesis argues that risk 
prior and leading to alliance formation may affect risks in inter-firm alliances. Thus, it is 
interesting to examine how risk leading to alliance formation might be connected to and 
affect risks in inter-firm alliances, and the effects of these risks on subsequent 
management actions. 
2.4 Risks and MCSs in Inter-firm Alliances 
Given the complex relationship between risks and inter-firm alliances, and the severe 
consequences that risks may bring to inter-firm alliances, accounting researchers have 
explored the design of MCSs to deal with risks in these alliances (Anderson & Dekker 
2005; Das & Teng 1996, 1998, 2001; Dekker 2004; Dekker & Van den Abbeele 2008; 
Ireland, Hitt & Vaidyanath 2002; Langfield-Smith, 2008; Langfield-Smith & Smith 
2003; Mjoen & Tallman 1997; Van der Meer-Kooistra & Vosselman 2000). With the 
view that risk is a reality that can be measured and predetermined outside a set of 
interacting and relating practices, prior accounting researchers on inter-firm alliances 
have aimed to design (what they call) the ‘optimal’ or ‘ideal’ MCS with certain 
theoretical logic (such as minimising transaction costs associated with alliance 
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operations) that is presumed to be appropriate to control problems that may arise in 
inter-firm alliances (Das & Teng 2001; Dekker 2004; Ring & Van de Ven 1992). These 
accounting studies have argued that these optimal or ideal MCS models should and 
would be used in the practice of managing risks in inter-firm alliances. The MCSs 
proposed in these studies include a set of management control packages, specific control 
mechanisms and cost and accounting information. 
Das and Teng (2001) proposed a conceptual management control model to manage 
relational and performance risk in inter-firm alliances based on two task characteristics: 
task programmability and outcome measurability. Task programmability is defined as 
the degree to which appropriate behaviours that should be taken to facilitate 
transformation process are known. Outcome measurability refers to the ability to 
measure outputs in a precise and objective manner. Based on their belief that the 
occurrence of relational risk is associated with low output measurability, and that 
performance risk occurs when task programmability is characterised as low, Das and 
Teng (2001) proposed a management control model to deal with these two risks. In 
particular, behaviour controls (such as explicit clauses) should be used to directly 
regulate the conduct of partners to mitigate relational risk when inter-firm alliances are 
characterised by low outcome measurability and high task programmability. In addition, 
outcome controls (such as close monitoring of performance) should be adopted to direct 
alliance managers’ attention to key performance measures in order to reduce 
performance risk when inter-firm alliances are characterised by low outcome 
measurability and high task programmability. Finally, social control (such as 
developing shared values, goals and beliefs) seems appropriate to attenuate both 
relational and performance risk when inter-firm alliances are characterised by low 
outcome measurability and low task programmability. Das and Teng’s (1998) MCS 
models are purely based on inferences, which have not been tested with empirical data. 
Van der Meer-Kooistra and Vosselman (2000) theorised three structural forms of MCSs, 
including market-, bureaucracy- and trust-based controls. They argued that the choice of 
these three structural forms of MCSs (to control inter-firm alliances) should depend on 
the characteristics of transactions, transaction environment and transaction parties. 
Market-based controls refer to control mechanisms that rely on publicly available 
information to manage the alliance relationship. Such controls rely on free information 
available from the market; thus, no specific control instruments need to be articulated. 
Typical examples of market-based controls include competitive bidding, non-detailed 
20 
contracting, competition-induced standards and compliance. When alliance transactions 
are characterised by high task programmability, low asset specificity, high repetition, 
high output measurability and transparent market information, alliance partners are able 
to switch to alternative transaction options without incurring too many costs. Under 
these alliance transaction characteristics, a market-based control pattern should be used 
to manage potential alliance-related problems (Langfield-Smith & Smith 2003; Van der 
Meer-Kooistra & Vosselman 2000). The ability of alliance partners to switch to other 
contracting parties in the market without incurring substantial loss (since no specific 
assets are invested in the alliance) (Caglio & Ditillo 2008; Spekle 2001) is said to 
restraint alliance partners from taking any opportunistic actions. In addition, partners 
can attain relevant information from the market, which reduces information asymmetry 
among alliance partners (Spekle 2001; Van der Meer-Kooistra & Vosselman 2000). 
This is believed to mitigate moral hazard associated with partner firms. 
Bureaucracy-based controls refer to control mechanisms—such as specified norms, 
standards and rules—that can be specified and formally enacted to regulate alliance 
transactions. These bureaucracy-based controls are structured around the stipulation of 
detailed information or agreements on predefined activities and outcomes. Typical 
examples of bureaucracy-based controls include detailed selection criteria, contracts, 
outcome controls, behaviour controls, rigid performance targets, performance 
measurement systems and hostage arrangements. A bureaucracy-based control pattern is 
believed to be the most appropriate MCS when alliance transactions involve high task 
programmability, moderate assets specificity, uncertainty and repetition. Moderate asset 
specificity makes alliance partners vulnerable to the risks of others’ opportunistic 
actions, which can be mitigated by norms and standards specified in contractual rules 
(Lee & Cavusgil 2006). When partners are interdependent, they are exposed to the risk 
of moral hazard problem (Lavie & Rosenkopf 2006; Wathne & Heide 2000). Moral 
hazard can be reduced by using contractual rules in which partners are forced to meet 
specified targets (Baiman 1990; Chong & Eggleton 2007). Contractual rules are said to 
enhance coordination by clarifying the joint tasks and relevant duties of each partner in 
order to overcome future uncertainty. 
Trust-based controls represent control mechanisms that are primarily based on trust to 
manage the alliance relationship. These control mechanisms are constituted based on 
mutual confidence and informal arrangements. Typical examples of trust-based controls 
include competence trust, contractual trust, goodwill trust, non-specific contracts, 
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socialising process, open book accounting and information sharing. Prior research has 
suggested that trust-based control models are structured to help partner firms obtain 
information about alliance transactions and to guide alliance-related activities, which 
should make the alliance relationship more predictable in order to help partner firms 
manage risks. According to Van der Meer-Kooistra and Vosselman (2000), a trust-
based control pattern should be effective in mitigating control problems when (i) 
transactions are characterised as having low task programmability, high asset specificity, 
low repetition and low output measurability and (ii) the transaction environment is 
highly uncertain (Langfield-Smith & Smith 2003; Lee & Cavusgil 2006). First, trust-
based controls help alliance partners signal their expectations and willingness regarding 
continuous cooperation with each other when alliances are facing high uncertainty (Van 
der Meer-Kooistra & Vosselman 2000). This is said to reduce the chances of partners 
engaging in opportunistic behaviours. Second, trust-based controls are said to activate 
interactions between partner firms, which helps partner firms learn from and adapt to 
each other. This is believed to enhance coordination between alliance partners (Baiman 
& Rajan 2002a; Coletti et al. 2005). Finally, trust-based controls may motivate partner 
firms’ open commitment to alliance-related activities and facilitate information flows 
between partner firms. This is said to reduce the likelihood of moral hazard (Gambetta 
1988; Sako 1992). 
To test their proposed MCS models, Van der Meer-Kooistra and Vosselman (2000) 
completed a case study of two JVs. In their first case, involving a JV between two 
Dutch oil companies, they found that the JV was characterised by high asset specificity, 
frequent transactions, environment uncertainty, and an intimate cooperative relationship 
between partner firms. They also find that bureaucracy-based controls were used in this 
JV because the JV used specified detailed rules and requirements to standardise and 
guarantee gas delivery, so that the risks of opportunistic behaviours and moral hazard 
were minimised. In the second case, Van der Meer-Kooistra and Vosselman (2000) 
found that trust-based controls were used in JVs whose transactions were characterised 
by lower repetition, higher uncertainty, and partners with more outsourcing experience. 
They argued that trust-based controls facilitated joint consultations and information 
sharing among partners, which could also reduce the risk of opportunistic behaviours 
and moral hazard. However, contrary to the authors’ expectation, the empirical cases 
revealed two additional characteristics of transaction parties—organisational culture and 
the partner firm’s history—that would affect the choice of their proposed MCS models. 
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Langfield-Smith and Smith (2003) extended Van der Meer-Kooistra and Vosselman’s 
(2000) study by considering the role of trust. They sought to link different types of trust 
with the three patterns of MCS models proposed by Van der Meer-Kooistra and 
Vosselman (2000). In order to make this link, Langfield-Smith and Smith (2003) drew 
from Sako’s (1992) trust framework, which classified three types of trust: contractual, 
competence and goodwill trust. Contractual trust represents partners’ perceptions of 
other partners’ willingness to honour an agreement. Competence trust refers to partners’ 
perceptions of other partners’ ability to sufficiently perform a particular role. Goodwill 
trust can be described as ‘the expectation that another will perform in the interests of the 
relationship, even it is not in the other’s interest to do so’ (Dekker 2004, p. 32). 
Langfield-Smith and Smith (2003) theorised the different types of trust to play different 
roles in fostering the functioning of three types of MCS modes—market-, bureaucracy- 
and trust-based controls—in alliance relationships. First, trust is not relevant under 
market-based controls because no specific control is required. This is consistent with 
Van der Meer-Kooistra and Vosselman’s (2000) view that alliance partners can choose 
to switch to other partners to mitigate the risk of opportunism, moral hazard and 
coordination problems at any stage of alliances. Second, in the process of selecting 
partners, given that detailed rules of behaviour and performance goals are established 
under bureaucracy-based control, trust is supposed to play a limited role. In the early 
stages of alliance relationships, the partners’ perceptions of competence trust and 
contractual trust are critical to developing bureaucracy-based control. Competence trust 
ensures that partners have the ability to perform relevant tasks, which is said to enhance 
cooperation for joint activities. Contractual trust enhances the chances that partners will 
honour an agreement that is specified in the alliance contract (Sako 1992), which is said 
to mitigate the risk of moral hazard and opportunistic behaviours. 
Third, a trust-based control pattern is proposed to be adopted when alliances are facing 
a high level of uncertainty, whereby a rigid alliance agreement cannot be elaborated. As 
such, the initial selection of partner firm is based on ‘perceptions of competence trust, 
contractual trust and goodwill trust, which arises through friendships, former 
contractual relationships, and reputation’ (Dekker 2004, p. 287). This is said to avoid 
potential opportunism, moral hazard and coordination problems through the selection of 
partners that have the ability and reliability to complete an alliance agreement, and 
willingness to exert efforts in the alliance. When partners enter an alliance agreement, 
each of the three types of trust may develop. Competence and contractual trust are 
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developed through consultation and communication among partners, and certification of 
activities and legal regulations, while goodwill trust evolves through interactions and 
reciprocal actions among partners. The development of goodwill trust enhances partners’ 
perceptions of integrity and dependability, which promotes frequent interactions, 
intense communication and personal consultation among alliance partners. Therefore, 
critical information flows through the whole alliance, which mitigates the risk of 
opportunistic behaviours and moral hazard (Das & Teng 2001). The development of 
contractual trust enhances partners’ feeling of accountability and responsibility to the 
alliance agreement, which mitigates opportunism and moral hazard (Sako 1992). The 
development of competence trust demonstrates partners’ ability to perform a particular 
role under a collaborative environment, which mitigates the risk of poor cooperation for 
joint activities (Sako 1992). The development of competence, goodwill and contractual 
trust is said to provide information about the environment and partners, and facilitate 
the flow of this information across partner firms, which enables partners to elaborate a 
more detailed alliance agreement. This helps enact trust- and bureaucracy-based control 
(Langfield-Smith & Smith 2003). 
Landfield-Smith and Smith (2003, p. 304) tested their hypothesised management 
control model in a case study of an outsourcing relationship, and found some evidence 
supporting their hypothesis. In particular, they found that MCS models gradually 
changed over the life of the outsourcing relationship, as contingent factors changed. 
Initially, they found that high uncertainty, high asset specificity, low output 
measurability and low task programmability led to the adoption of a trust-based control 
pattern. As the alliance relationship developed, they found that trust—particularly 
goodwill trust—developed through establishing mutual interest, building individual- 
and team-level trust, and joint dispute resolution. This ‘played a role in working with 
control mechanism to ensure control, and in allowing the operations to proceed in the 
absence of tightly specified rules’ (Landfield-Smith & Smith 2003, p. 304). Further, 
they found that the development of trust enhanced task programmability and outcome 
measurability through information sharing among partners, which fostered a shift from 
using a trust-based control pattern to a bureaucracy-based control pattern. Thus, 
Landfield-Smith and Smith (2003) concluded that there is a mutually supportive, 
cooperative and compatible relationship between trust and MCS models in controlling 
inter-firm alliances. 
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Dekker (2004) extended prior studies by explicitly highlighting two alliance 
problems—appropriation and coordination problems—and examining how MCSs 
should be designed to deal with these problems. The concept of appropriation problems 
is similar to the notion of relational risk proposed by Das and Teng (1998), which refers 
to the risk of one partner firm’s investment in the alliance being appropriated by others 
in a situation of uncertainty and information asymmetry. Coordination problems are 
defined as the risk of non-performance due to poor cooperation between partner firms 
when undertaking joint activities, despite the fact that both parties are willing to 
cooperate fully and not behave opportunistically. 
Further, Dekker (2004) proposed that formal control is able to address the appropriation 
problem and coordination problem. Formal control refers to the use of contractual 
obligations and formal organisational mechanisms for cooperation to regulate alliance 
outcomes and alliance partners’ behaviours (Ouchi 1979). Some cooperation criteria can 
be specified in these formal controls to ensure that alliance outcomes and alliance 
partners’ behaviour comply with predetermined objectives. In a study of a railway 
safety equipment alliance, Dekker (2004) found that board monitoring for alliance 
partners’ action diminishes information asymmetry among alliance partners, which 
reduces the chances of immoral behaviour. He also found that establishing specific 
performance goals with rewards motivates alliance partners to contribute efforts and act 
collectively with each other’s interests. This facilitates partners to achieve 
predetermined goals and attain fair rewards via their individual contributions, which 
enhances coordination and reduces the chances of opportunism. 
Dekker (2004) also theorised that informal control moderates the association between 
control problems and the use of formal control. Informal controls generally relate to 
non–legally binding activities or mechanisms (such as good intentions and oral 
communications) that cannot be formally enacted, but can stimulate alliance partners’ 
self-regulating behaviours (Ouchi 1979). Informal control is often argued to be based on 
trust (Adler 2001; Ring & Van de Ven 1992). Dekker (2004) explained the moderating 
role of trust in the relationship between control problems and the use of formal controls. 
First, trust does not have a direct effect on an increased or reduced need for the use of 
MCSs. It is ‘the magnitude of the transaction hazards that induces the use of formal 
control mechanisms’ (Dekker 2004, p. 34), not trust per se. Second, the use of MCS 
models to control alliance problems is contingent on the level of trust between partner 
firms. It is said that there should be a threshold (determined by the alliance’s transaction 
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hazards) that indicates how trust may affect the use of formal controls. Before reaching 
the threshold, trust is supposed to complement and support the development and 
functioning of formal controls. After the threshold has been reached, trust is argued to 
substitute the use of formal controls, as additional expansive formal control mechanisms 
would be unnecessary. 
Dekker (2004) tested his MCS models with an empirical case study of a strategic 
alliance involving the supply and innovation of railway safety systems. The case study 
supported most of his arguments on the relationship between control problems in 
alliances and the use of formal controls, and the role of informal controls in this 
relationship. Data collected from the case showed that managing coordination problems 
is one purpose of using formal controls, and trust (including capability and goodwill 
trust) moderates the relationship between control problems and the use of formal 
controls. Further, Dekker (2004) found that ensuring alliance stability and continuity is 
another purpose (besides appropriation and coordination problems) for using formal 
controls, which was not included in his MCS models. Finally, through the case study, 
Dekker (2004) found evidence for the use of specific management accounting—such as 
financial incentive systems, planning, budgeting, cost calculations and open book 
accounting—in the management of inter-firm alliances. 
Following Das and Teng (1998), Van der Meer-Kooistra and Vosselman (2000), 
Langfield-Smith (2003) and Dekker (2004), other accounting studies have researched 
specific management control mechanisms, with a particular focus on the optimal design 
or use of partner selection, contract, cost management intervention, open book 
accounting and possible interrelations between these mechanisms to control or manage 
risks in order to ensure alliance performance (Agndal & Nilsson 2009; Anderson & 
Dekker 2005; Cooper & Slagmulder 2004; Ding et al. 2013; Dekker & Van den 
Abbeele 2010; Ding, Dekker & Groot 2013; Langfield-Smith 2008). Anderson et al. 
(2015) focused on three intra-firm MCS management control frameworks: Simon’s 
(1995) levers of control framework, and Merchant and Van der Stede’s (2007) and 
Jensen and Meckling’s (1992) agency-based control framework. Anderson et al. (2015, 
p. 36) examined ‘the suitability of three such frameworks to be used as descriptors of 
the management controls that are employed by three large firms with extensive alliance 
activity’. The data obtained from their three case study alliances suggested that the three 
intra-firm management control frameworks were used by alliances to manage risks. 
However, the authors also noted that management control frameworks differ from each 
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other by having their own specificity to deal with certain types of risks in inter-firm 
alliances. In summary, prior accounting researchers have had the tendency to design 
‘optimal’ MCS models that ‘should’ be used to manage inter-firm alliances. This has 
significantly contributed to understandings of how risks may be controlled or managed 
through appropriate design and use of pre-specified MCS models. However, by 
prescribing ‘optimal’ MCSs that ‘should’ be used to manage risk in inter-firm alliances, 
prior research has tended to give fixed positions to MCSs. 
First, prior research has tended to specify a priori the structural forms of MCSs that can 
be used (at least theoretically) for risk management in inter-firm alliances. In doing so, 
it has assumed that different MCSs should have their own fixed properties, 
characteristics and functionality, which will not change and will have the same meaning 
in different alliances or different contexts of the same alliance. In addition, these pre-
specified MCS were assumed to perform their function in a uniform manner to manage 
risks in different alliance contexts. Any failures or unsatisfactory outcomes associated 
with the use of these MCSs for risk management in inter-firm alliances are generally 
ascribed to external factors (such as cultural or political reasons). However, some 
accounting researchers—particularly those who adopted a qualitative field approach to 
study accounting/MCS—have started to challenge the assumption of fixed position on 
accounting/MCS (Dechow & Mouritsen 2005; Miller 1992; Preston, Cooper & Coombs 
1992). In particular, these accounting researchers have argued that accounting/MCS are 
fragile because they are continually translated as they are practised in local contexts. In 
other words, the properties, structures, functionality and meaning of accounting/MCS 
are fluid because they are subject to ongoing changes. Thus: 
a management accounting system is never a ready-made package to be implemented, 
but rather a loosely coupled set of ideas and technologies that are constantly shaped 
and reshaped when they ‘travel’ from one setting to the next (Justesen & Mouritsen 
2011). 
At the same time, MCSs may generate unintended or varying effects as they encounter 
local activities during their ‘travel’. 
For example, Preston et al. (1992) studied the fabrication of budgets in the United 
Kingdom National Health Service. They demonstrated how, during the process of being 
advocated, the original initiative of management budgeting confronted recurrent 
challenges, resistance, uncertainty and attacks by various local and national actors (such 
27 
as clinicians and the general public). This led to controversies regarding how to redefine 
the initiative and undertake the design/redesign of the specific formula of management 
budgeting. In their study of the integration of management and control of two firms 
through enterprise resource planning (ERP), Dechow and Mouritsen (2005) did not 
view ERP as a fixed accounting technology with a pre-programmed unchanging essence. 
Rather: 
the technological features of ERP systems enable and constrain what can be modelled 
and made visible and the infrastructure of the technologies used to support the ERP 
system develop differential access to the ERP system. ERP systems are moldable but 
they fight back because programming choices for one item can return and make other 
items impossible. ERP systems are thus unruly (Justesen & Mouritsen 2011, p. 173). 
Both Preston et al. (1992) and Dechow and Mouritsen (2005) offered a new way of 
understanding accounting/MCS as a fragile assemblage, the uncertain fate of which is 
held in the hands of heterogeneous others. This manner of understanding MCSs 
challenges how the relationship between MCS and risk in inter-firm alliances is studied 
in prior accounting research. If it is accepted that risk is an empirical phenomenon that 
is dynamic in nature, then the identities, functions and meanings of MCSs could also 
change in the practice of managing these evolving risks, as embedded in the wider 
alliance context. 
Second, as noted earlier, most prior accounting research has presumed a unidirectional 
relationship between risk and MCSs in inter-firm alliances. In particular, they have 
assumed that MCSs are always designed and enacted to manage risks, even though 
MCSs may sometimes be conduits for risk in inter-firm alliances. With this assumption 
in mind, prior accounting research has had the tendency to treat MCSs as a ‘dead’ 
mechanism that can only be passively adopted to deal with so-called different types of 
risks that are characterised by different patterns/combinations of contingent variables. In 
other words, MCSs are treated as the mere outcome or selection choice in response to 
the appearance of a certain type of risks that are predetermined a priori. In this way, 
MCSs are ‘marginalized and subordinated to material, ideological, professional and 
political conditions or personal interpretations of accounting’ (Justesen & Mouritsen 
2011, p. 161). Interestingly, since the 1980s, some accounting researchers have called 
for study of how accounting/MCS is practised in the context in which it operates 
(Ahrens & Chapman 2007; Burchell, Clubb & Hopwood 1985; Hopwood & Miller 
1994; Mouritsen 1999). These researchers have argued that accounting cannot be 
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understood by isolating it from the context in which it operates because it shapes and is 
shaped by specific locales. One important message is that accounting/MCS is not a pure 
fixed or inactive object that is passively adopted by humans or organisations in 
particular contexts. Rather, accounting is an ‘active player’ that can influence and 
generate effects on local activities in which it is practised. 
For example, Miller (1990) showed how accounting enables governments to practise 
their programmatic ideas ‘at a distance’, as it is able to trace activities that are 
physically far away and make present absent things and people in the ‘centre of 
calculation’. Robson (1992) wrote that the power of accounting—particularly 
accounting numbers—to act ‘at a distance’ emanates from its materiality, combinability 
and relatively high degree of stability. In her ethnography of three Australian hospitals, 
Chua (1995) found that accounting, together with other inscriptions and rhetorical 
strategies, fosters an uncertain faith that links the multiple interests of different parties. 
Mouritsen (1999) showed how competing accounting calculations stage the 
conversation between managers on firms’ outsourcing decisions. In the context of inter-
firm alliances, Chua and Mahama (2007) clearly depicted how accounting recurrently 
interacts with the alliance contract, which dynamically alters the relationship between 
partner firms. Overall, these studies advocated the idea that accounting/MCS itself is an 
independent actor that is forced to act by others. Translating to the context of this thesis, 
this study believes that MCS is enacted not only to manage risk, but also to actively 
contribute to constructing risk, and MCSs and risk simultaneously participate in the 
construction of each other. This belief resonates with the finding of a recent study by 
Vinnari and Skærbæck (2014) that risk management itself creates uncertain outcomes. 
In summary, this thesis seeks to extend existing studies by exploring the complex 
interdependent relationship between risk and MCSs in inter-firm alliances at an 
empirical level, even though doing this may challenge some fundamental assumptions 
that sustain the findings of those previous studies. In this sense, a practice examination 
of the complex relationship between risks and MCSs in inter-firm alliances is required. 
2.5 Conclusion 
This chapter has reviewed the prior research that has treated risk as a theoretical 
phenomenon. While treating risk as a theoretical phenomenon has enriched our 
understandings of risk, this manner of studying risk tends to ignore the empirical nature 
of risk. This chapter has also reviewed studies that examined the empirical nature of risk. 
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In addition, this chapter has argued that people and society are becoming more aware of 
risks and as such risks are becoming prominent in people’s daily lives. This led 
researchers to start studying risks in organisations that are comprised of interactions 
between individual people. This chapter has reviewed studies that considered inter-firm 
alliances an important strategy for organisations to manage risk. It has also reviewed 
studies that argued that inter-firm alliances are simultaneously significant sources of 
risks. To deal with risks associated with inter-firm alliances, more and more accounting 
researchers have studied the ‘optimal’ or ‘ideal’ design of MCSs (including accounting 
system) that ‘should’ be used for the risk management of inter-firm alliances. This 
chapter also reviewed these studies. However, the review of some recent accounting 
studies (primarily in the non-inter-firm alliance context) suggested that accounting or 
MCSs are constructed, are emerging/changing and have the power to affect others, as 
they interact with a variety entities and activities in practice. Thus, this chapter argued 
that this manner of understanding MCS challenges the beliefs of accounting researchers 
involved in studying the design of ‘optimal’ MCSs to manage risks in inter-firm 






Chapter 3: Theory Development 
3.1 Introduction 
This chapter draws on ANT as the analytical framework of this thesis. It aims to discuss 
how an emerging area of ANT (the study of the process of economisation) can be used 
to understand how risks become articulated in inter-firm alliances. In doing so, this 
chapter also seeks to demonstrate how MCSs may be implicated in the process of 
articulating risks. This chapter is organised as follows. Section 3.2 explains the rationale 
of adopting ANT to explain the research questions of this thesis. Section 3.3 discusses 
the conceptual foundation of ANT, particularly focusing on its core elements derived 
from sociologists’ study of scientific knowledge in the making. Section 3.4 discusses 
how ANT has recently been employed to study the process of economisation. Section 
3.5 discusses the notion of matters of concern as the starting point for studying the 
process of economisation. Sections 3.6, 3.7 and 3.8 review the three stages of the 
experimentation process (from the macro to micro world, research collective in the 
micro world, and from the micro back to the macro world) and explain how these stages 
have implications for understanding risk and MCSs in inter-firm alliances. The final 
section concludes the chapter. 
3.2 Actor-network Theory 
Given that the focus of this thesis is examining the processes and practices through 
which risks are articulated in inter-firm alliances, and how MCSs may be related to or 
affect such processes, this study required a practice theory. ANT is a practice theory that 
adopts a constructivist approach to examine how certain realities are constructed 
through a set of interacting and relating practices. As a constructivist theory, ANT 
views reality (such as risk and MCSs) as a fragile assemblage that is (re)construed 
through a network of relations, rather than considering reality as something that exists 
‘out there’ and can be determined a priori. The researcher believed that this view of 
ANT would help answer the research questions of this thesis. 
ANT originally focuses on studying the social implications of science and technology. 
One essential aim of ANT is to study the practices and processes of how science and 
technology are constructed, deconstructed and re-constructed in scientists’ everyday 
work (Callon 1986, 1991; Latour 2005; Law 1991). This theory has been used in the 
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sociology of science literature to study scientific controversies in the making, scientific 
controversies’ closure, the control of human and non-human actants at a distance, and 
the role of mediators in translating others’ interests (Mahama 2000, p. 43). 
Although its original focus is the (re)construction of scientific knowledge, ANT has 
been increasingly drawn upon by accounting researchers to study: 
1. the emergence and construction of accounting (Jones & Dugdale 2002; Miller, P 
1990; Preston, Cooper & Coombs 1992; Robson 1991) 
2. accounting change (Chua 1995; Llewellynn & Northchott 2002) 
3. the use of accounting calculation to enable control at distance (Miller, P 1990, 
1991) 
4. the construction of space and time through accounting technologies (Dechow & 
Mouritsen 2005; Quattrone & Hopper 2005) 
5. the mediating role of accounting and other MCSs in drawing organisational 
boundaries and networks (Chua & Mahama 2007; Miller & O’Leary 2007; 
Mouritsen 1999; Mouritsen & Thrane 2006). 
This accounting research provides a solid support for this thesis to adopt ANT to 
explain how accounting and a set of other MCSs may be implicated in the practice of 
articulating risks in the everyday business of inter-firm alliances. 
3.3 The Conceptual Foundation of ANT 
ANT has its origins in sociological studies examining how scientific knowledge is made. 
Sociologists such as Latour, Callon and Law followed science in the making by entering 
laboratories to observe in situ scientific activities and practices as they occurred in the 
process of creating scientific knowledge. Based on their observations of how scientific 
knowledge is made, these sociologists argued that we should not impose a priori 
distinctions between human/social and non-human/nature. That is, we should not 
presume that humans who have brains and consciousness are the origins of all actions. 
Similarly, we should not treat non-humans as cold objects that can only be passively 
acted upon by humans. Rather, ANT theorists argue that human and non-human should 
be treated symmetrically because both have the potential to act. This does not simply 
mean that we should treat non-humans as if they have something similar to humans’ 
brains that allows them to act. Rather, Latour (2005, p. 76) argued: 
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ANT is not, I repeat is not, the establishment of some absurd ‘symmetry between 
humans and non-humans’. To be symmetric, for us, simply means not to impose a 
priori some serious asymmetry among human intentional action and a material world 
of causal relations. There are divisions one should never try to bypass, to go beyond, 
to try to overcome dialectically. They should rather be ignored and left to their own 
devices, like a once formidable castle now in ruins. 
This suggests that we should be open about how entities (regardless of whether they are 
human or non-human) can act in constituting certain realities. Thus, ANT encourages 
researchers to examine the multiple ways that entities may act in different practices. 
However, ANT theorists argue that the way an entity acts depends on its relations with 
others. That is, an entity makes no sense when it is isolated from others. For example, a 
lecturer makes no sense by himself or herself. The title ‘lecturer’ is only meaningful 
when there are students with whom the lecturer can share knowledge, a room and 
facilities (such as chairs, whiteboard, projector and eraser) that enable communication 
between the lecturer and students, and a university that organises the enrolments of 
students and assigns the lecturer to teach those students. The students, classroom and 
university together qualify a certain person as a lecturer, and equip this person with the 
capacity to teach. This implies that an individual actor, alone, may not necessarily be 
the source of action. Rather, an actor may be caused to act by others through certain 
relations. It is in this respect that ANT requires us to examine how a variety of entities 
may be interacting or relating to each other in different ways to produce different 
courses of action. 
Further, ANT does not separate the micro from the macro. Prior sociologists have 
sought to analyse social phenomena by dividing them into macro and micro phenomena 
based on certain scales. The social phenomena with large scales (such as the culture of a 
group of people) are classified as a macrocosm, while those with a small scale (such as 
individual action) are considered a microcosm. The macrocosm and microcosm are 
assumed to have different elements, and subsequently must be studied differently. This 
means that an analytical choice has to be made regarding macro or micro before 
researchers begin studying a particular social phenomenon. The macro and micro have 
long been treated as opposing each other, since the inception of social theory, and the 
study of one must be based on certain assumptions about the other. However, Latour 
(2005, p. 5) considered this division devastating to social theory: 
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It is tied to an order relation that goes from top to bottom or from bottom to up—as if 
society really had a top and a bottom—; it implies that the element ‘b’ being macro-
scale is of a different nature and should be studied thus differently from element ‘a’ 
which is micro-scale; it is utterly unable to follow how an element goes from being 
individual -a- to collective -b- and back. 
ANT theorists argue that focusing on a network of relations helps eliminate the a priori 
division between the macrocosm and microcosm. This is because the focus on relations 
between actors makes it possible to study how they are connected to each other to form 
a longer and tighter network, and how they are disconnected from each other to shorten 
and loosen the network. That is, instead of taking a position between the two seemingly 
opposing poles (macrocosm and microcosm), the focus on a network of relations allows 
us to examine how a given local entity extends its reaches to a global view through 
multiple connections, and how a certain global view reduces to a local entity through a 
variety of disconnections. Thus, the a priori divide between the macro and micro is 
replaced by ANT’s notion of relations. 
Finally, ANT theorists argue that there is no pre-existing reality (such as a culture as a 
phenomenon in a macrocosm) ‘out there’ in the world waiting to be discovered, 
measured or represented. Rather, the interactions between multiple entities make certain 
objects, activities, practices and processes (such as culture) appear real, but only 
temporarily. That is, ‘realities’ are the outcome of the interactions and relations between 
entities. ANT theorists avoid the assumption that realities predetermine their own 
constituents and organise how these constituents should interact in order to prove the 
existence of these realities. As Latour (1986, p. 273) argued, ‘society is not the referent 
of an ostensive definition discovered by social scientists despite the ignorance of their 
informants. Rather it is performed through everyone’s effort to define it’. ANT 
encourages us to study all possible activities and interactions between entities (such as 
controversies, debates, struggles, resistances, coordination and compromises) that make 
certain realities occur. 
The ANT view is that interactions between entities are ongoing processes because we 
cannot limit a priori the number of entities and how they act in their interactions with 
each other. Any entity is free to join or exit the interactions at any time and place, 
depending on its relationships with others. This suggests that we should not assume that 
any reality (as the outcome of interactions between entities), once formed, will be fixed 
forever. Rather, any reality is dynamic because it is always subject to changes. ANT 
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encourages us to examine how interactions between entities stabilise, for a certain time 
and in a particular place, and break apart at other times and places. 
3.4 ANT and the Study of Economic Transactions 
Although ANT’s original focus has been on scientific knowledge/realities in the making, 
recent researchers have used ANT to study economic transactions. In particular, Callon 
(1998, 2007) and his colleagues directed research attention towards studying the process 
of economisation. Economisation was defined by Caliskan and Callon (2009, p. 370) as 
‘the assembly and qualification of actions, devices and analytical/practical descriptions 
as “economic”’. In essence, the idea of the process of economisation requires 
researchers to deconstruct economy by tracing its origins and the processes through 
which those origins evolve, transform and are constituted as being ‘economic’. The 
study of economisation requires removal of the assumption that economy is an 
independent reality ‘out there’ that predefines its components and how these 
components should function in order to achieve presupposed economic outcomes. 
Rather, Callon, Lascoumes and Barthe (2009) defined ‘economy’ as the outcome of the 
interactions between all entities that are involved in their attempts to shape and define 
the economy. For example, economists (in academia) create economic theories that are 
enacted and tested by economists (in practice) in their everyday business. Subsequently, 
economists (in practice) note any variations from economic theories that inform 
economists (in academia) how to implement theories. Each of these entities (economists 
in academia and practice, economic theories and everyday practices) alone is unable to 
create the economy, but they work together to make the economy occur. 
Caliskan and Callon (2009) identified three possible entities (based on prior research in 
economics, economic sociology and anthropology) involved in the economisation 
process: institution, institutional arrangements and materiality. Institution refers to 
conventions, cultural values, norms and routines that are created by humans. The idea is 
that humans have limited capacity, and create institutions as theoretical prostheses to 
help them solve problems that they are otherwise unable to solve. For example, 
institution endows humans with extended ability to coordinate together, without which 
the process of economisation would be impossible. The arrangements between 
institutions contribute to generating economic behaviours. These arrangements enable 
the exchange of different institutions, which enables humans to compare, combine, 
calculate and evaluate. This allows humans to choose one institution that enables them 
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to act more efficiently and effectively, and thus behave ‘economically’. The exchange 
of institutions is not possible without materiality (such as techniques, standards and 
calculating instruments). In particular, the circulation of certain materiality from hand to 
hand enables humans to calculate and confer values to this materiality. Thus, 
institutions, institutional arrangements and materiality are interdependent and affect 
each other to make economisation possible. Thus, economisation ‘is a consequence of 
how competent and active people engage with specific things … and the intersection 
between the materialities of things and people’s skills and competencies, in the process 
of economic valuation’ (Caliskan & Callon 2009, p. 388). 
3.5 Matters of Concern 
To study the process of economisation, Callon, Lascoumes and Barthe (2009) suggested 
that the best starting point is what they termed ‘matters of concern’. They defined 
‘matters of concern’ as the situation of initial shock in practice, which seems unusual to 
people. In other words, matters of concern refer to objects, activities or events that are 
inconsistent with people’s plans or deviate from people’s normal thinking patterns. 
They are issues for which there is no precise knowledge about the nature, causes or 
potential effects, outcomes or consequences—that is, issues for which people do not 
have clear or full understanding. Given the lack of knowledge about matters of concern, 
there are no indisputable solutions to deal with them. This is said to create uncertainty 
about how matters of concern would affect people’s daily lives, for which people are 
concerned about. 
Callon, Lascoumes and Barthe (2009) argued that matters of concern are the focus of 
managing economic transactions because they trigger the articulation of economic 
problems and become the basis of constructing solutions to economic problems. For 
Callon, Lascoumes and Barthe (2009), all business problems start from matters of 
concern. Given that risk has been increasingly treated as a problem for contemporary 
business or economic organisations, it is reasonable to think that risks may become 
articulated due to matters of concern. To understand how risks become articulated due 
to matters of concern, it is important to know how organisations make sense of matters 
of concern when they arise. Callon Lascoumes and Barthe (2009) stated that making 
sense of matters of concern follows a process of experimentation. This process includes 
a three-stage translation involving: 
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1. reducing matters of concern in the macro world to simple entities or 
relationships in the micro world 
2. a research collective in the micro world that involves tentatively drawing 
connections between entities, and hypothesising certain relationship models 
3. returning the hypothesised relationship model back to the macro world to solve 
matters of concern. 
This three-stage experimentation process is an ongoing practice. Figure 1 depicts 
ANT’s notion of the ongoing practice of the three-stage experimentation process, and 
how this theoretical perspective of ANT helps explain the research questions of this 
thesis. This concept of experimentation gives a basis for understanding how risk 
becomes articulated and risk management solutions are constructed in economic 
transactions, such as inter-firm alliances. The following section specifically discusses 
the three-stage translation process of experimentation and how it may help explain the 
research questions of this thesis. 
 
Figure 1: Three-stage Experimentation Process Adapted from Figure 2.3 of Callon, 
Lascoumes and Barthe (2009) 
3.6 From Macro to Micro World 
According to Callon, Lascoumes and Barthe (2009), the first stage of experimentation 
involves reducing or simplifying the complex matters of concern that people encounter 
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in their daily lives (macro world) to certain entities/activities/relationships, and moving 
these simplified entities/activities/relationships into a virtual environment (the micro 
world) in which such matters can be handled. In the business context, it is inevitable 
that organisations will encounter matters of concern in their daily operations (the macro 
world), which their existing economic arrangements or management control 
mechanisms are unable to manage. When matters of concern arise in organisations’ 
daily operations, they would pose uncertain outcomes to organisations. That is, it is 
unknown how organisations will be affected by the matters of concern. This causes 
organisations to seek to understand the matters of concern. Given that there may be no 
precise knowledge about the matters of concern, organisations make the concern 
understandable and familiar by situating it in their own past history/experience, or 
relating it to something similar that they have seen or heard from others in their 
networks. This enables organisations to attribute matters of concern to 
entities/activities/relationships with which they are familiar. Although these 
entities/activities/relationships may not necessarily be exactly the same as the matters of 
concern, they at least allow organisations to develop some knowledge about the concern. 
In this process, some elements of the matters of concern may have to be eliminated, 
ignored or simplified by organisations because they would otherwise make the 
attribution process difficult or even impossible. 
Further, these entities/activities/relationships (simplified from matters of concern in the 
macro world) may be recorded in a two- or three-dimensional space through using 
inscriptions.3 For example, accounting numbers, written words, graphs and tables can be 
used to describe an organisation’s operations in different years. The combined use of 
accounting numbers and other inscription devices helps organisations depict and 
materialise entities/activities/relationships that are believed to represent matters of 
concern. Thus, entities/activities/relationships can be imitated, calculated, edited and 
manipulated (Callon 1998; Miller, P 1990, 1991; Robson 1992). At this time, the 
matters of concern that organisations encounter in their daily operations (macro world) 
are reduced to entities/activities/relationships at a manageable scale (micro world). 
                                                          
3 Inscriptions are material translations (through writing, recording, drawing and tabulating) of any entity 
that can be acted upon (Robson 1992). Inscriptions may take the form of (but are not limited to): 
photos, maps, graphs, filmed or electronically recorded traces, direct visual observations 
recorded in a laboratory notebook, diagrams, illustrations, printed samples, 3D models, 
ultrasound scans, or sonorous spectrums that are arranged and filtered by techniques enabling 
them to be visualized (Callon et al. 2009, p. 52). 
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3.7 Research Collective in the Micro World 
In ANT parlance, a research collective refers to the interactions among all relevant 
stakeholders in creating knowledge about the entities/activities/relationships that are 
reduced from the macro to micro world. When matters of concern are reduced or 
simplified to entities in the micro world, organisations are able to develop and create 
new knowledge about these simplified entities and relationship. Organisations attempt 
to relate these simplified entities and (if related in a certain way) analyse how the 
entities produce certain effects. Some of the effects may be perceived as a hindrance to 
organisations to achieving their objectives, and thus become articulated as problems. 
Organisations may simultaneously draw on some entities/events that they know about 
and relate these entities/activities/relationships to the causes, nature and consequences 
of problems. Through this relating process, organisations may start to consider some of 
the problems as being risky or posing dangerous outcomes to existing or future 
operations. This may lead organisations to form risk perceptions about the problems. 
This risk perception may be further rationalised by organisations, thereby turning the 
perception of risks into acknowledged fact. Organisations may simultaneously attach 
certain meanings and measures to such ‘risks’ in order to formalise them and make 
them describable. The tentative relationships between entities/events/activities come to 
represent a hypothesis about the existence of risks. As such, this thesis argues that risk 
is constructed as a sensible way of making sense of matters of concern that arise in 
organisations’ daily operations. 
Inscriptions participate actively in organisations’ efforts to articulate risks out of matters 
of concern. Inscriptions are material translations (through writing, recording, drawing 
and tabulating) of any entity that can be acted upon (Robson 1992). Inscriptions may 
take the form of (but are not limited to): 
photos, maps, graphs, filmed or electronically recorded traces, direct visual 
observations recorded in a laboratory notebook, diagrams, illustrations, printed 
samples, 3D models, ultrasound scans, or sonorous spectrums that are arranged and 
filtered by techniques enabling them to be visualized (Callon, Lascoumes & Barthe 
2009, p. 52). 
Inscriptions enable the reduction of matters of concern to a form that can be acted upon. 
Inscriptions also materialise matters of concern in visual forms (Robson 1992), which is 
particularly useful in simplifying complex activities, entities, phenomena and 
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relationships into solid forms that can be depicted in two- or three-dimensional spaces. 
Reducing matters of concern to entities and depicting these entities in two- or three-
dimensional spaces provides conditions for organisations to relate different entities in 
tentative ways, on the basis of which certain effects or patterns can be retrieved. These 
effects or patterns may become the object of discussion, which can trigger exchange of 
ideas and discussions among people to produce further knowledge on these effects. 
Inscriptions help circulate information/ideas among people, which is central to making 
sense of matters of concern. Inscriptions may carry information about certain entities or 
ideas from one person to others, without transforming its meaning, which makes it 
possible to exchange and create equivalence among multiple information/ideas (Callon 
1986; Chua 1995). Furthermore, in the process of carrying information/ideas from one 
to another, inscriptions may transform the meaning of such information/ideas. 
Accounting inscriptions are particularly relevant here. Accounting inscriptions allow 
various mathematical calculations to be completed and, through these calculations, 
information or ideas from different sources may be simplified and combined in certain 
formats, through which some surprising outcomes may be obtained (Briers & Chua 
2001). These surprising outcomes may become the basis of articulating problems and 
forming risk perceptions of organisations. 
Inscriptions allow representation, which is helpful in objectifying risk perceptions. 
Accounting inscriptions are pertinent here. By being able to translate and represent 
perceived dangers in numerical terms, accounting inscriptions (such as accounting 
numbers) provide ‘hard facts’ about the outcomes of such danger. This helps rationalise 
risk perceptions and makes the perceived risk describable. The inscriptions (particularly 
accounting) that participate in the practice of articulating risk remain an empirical issue 
to be examined. 
In articulating risks, organisations simultaneously construct possible solutions. To seek 
these solutions, organisations may call upon actors within or outside the organisation to 
discuss different economic arrangements that have the possibility to attenuate the 
articulated risks. Different economic arrangements may be assessed, tested and 
compared. Prior research has suggested that inter-firm alliances may be selected as a 
strategy for dealing with risks (Castells 2000; Hagedoorn 1993; Nooteboom, Berger & 
Noorderhaven 1997; Osborn & Baughn 1990; Teece 1992). Inscriptions are essential in 
helping organisations experiment with and select economic arrangements to manage 
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risks. Inscriptions allow organisations to determine the conditions and barriers to 
operating each economic arrangement, as well as simulating the consequences of each 
arrangement. This allows actors to demonstrate to others the logic of using a particular 
economic arrangement to manage risks. In addition, inscriptions can convert the 
consequences of different economic arrangements into equivalences that can be 
compared, so that a suitable arrangement can be selected. Through discussion among 
actors and mobilisation of inscriptions, inter-firm alliances may emerge as the solution 
to the articulated risks. ANT encourages researchers to study the discussion among 
different actors, and how inscriptions participate in these discussions and lead to the 
selection of inter-firm alliances, among a set of alternatives, as the solution to risks. 
In proposing inter-firm alliances as the potential solution for risk, organisations are 
simultaneously experimenting with possible relationship models that are expected to 
make the alliances work. Certain issues may be discussed and negotiated among parties 
in alliances, such as the process of selecting partner firms, how to define and distribute 
the roles and responsibilities of partner firms, the ways partner firms should cooperate 
with each other, potential conflicts between partner firms and ways to address conflicts, 
and possible mechanisms for structuring and governing the inter-firm alliance (Chua & 
Mahama 2007; Mouritsen & Thrane 2006). The discussions and negotiations among 
actors may enable development of a shared understanding on the above issues. This 
shared understanding becomes the basis of constructing a relationship model about the 
inter-firm alliance. Constructing the relationship models is one form of making 
hypothesis about how the alliances should operate. It is in this sense that the alliance 
model is not predetermined, but negotiated. 
MCSs play a central role in the process of constructing an inter-firm alliance model. 
They help: 
1. constitute an acceptable performance for inter-firm alliances 
2. design specific mechanisms to measure alliance performance 
3. synergise resources from partner firms and redistribute the synergised resources 
to alliance activities 
4. elaborate a budget for future alliance operations 
5. build reporting systems for the alliance and partner firms (Chua & Mahama 
2007; Mahama & Chua 2011; Miller & O’Leary 2007; Mouritsen & Thrane 
2006). 
41 
Although it remains an empirical issue to examine the variety of roles that MCSs may 
play, the point here is that MCSs contribute to constructing alliance models and provide 
a blueprint for how the alliance model will work. 
In articulating alliance models, organisations may inevitably encounter limitations or 
difficulties (Anderson & Dekker 2005; Chua & Mahama 2007). These limitations or 
difficulties may trigger another round of discussions among the actors enrolled in the 
network of inter-firm alliances. At the same time, actors and material devices may be 
enrolled in the discussions. The discussions may lead to the articulation of new risks 
and construction of some solutions, particularly to address the limitations, difficulties 
and new risks. MCSs may be one such solution and part of an alliance model for risk 
management. ANT examines how MCSs interact with other alliance practices in 
constructing the alliance model, and how MCSs are themselves constructed as the 
outcome in the efforts to build such a model. It should be mentioned at this point that 
these solutions (inter-firm alliances and respective MCSs) are crafted primarily based 
on organisations’ hypothetical expectations, and organisations believe that these 
hypothetical models, when enacted in the macro world/daily operations, should also be 
able to deal with matters of concern. 
3.8 From Micro Back to Macro World 
According to Callon, Lascoumes and Barthe (2009), after the theoretical models of 
inter-firm alliances and respective MCSs are experimented with and constructed in the 
micro world, they are brought back to the macro world. Support is organised for these 
theoretical models to be replicated, legitimatised and operated in the macro world. This 
requires interessement and enrolment of other entities (such as employees, government 
or technology) with which organisations are dealing, and from which the support for 
these theoretical models can be obtained. Latour (1987) argued that five strategies can 
be used to interest others. First, it can be shown that that these theoretical models 
consider the interests of the enrolment targets or make their objectives easier to achieve. 
Second, the enrolment targets’ interests/objectives can be replaced with new ones that 
align with those of these theoretical models. This is when enrolment targets’ preferred 
methods of achieving their goals are removed or become impossible. Third, the 
enrolment targets can be taken to a short detour. Instead of entirely displacing enrolment 
targets’ interests, they can be signalled that, ‘by inviting you to come to my way, I am 
not going to divert or replace your interests, rather trying to make it easier for you to 
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achieve your own goals’ (Latour 1987, p. 157). Latour (1987) argued that this 
enrolment strategy is only possible under three conditions: (i) the main road (for 
laypeople to achieve their goals) should be clearly cut off, (ii) the new detour should be 
well signposted, and (iii) the detour should appear short. Enrolment targets eventually 
return to their ‘main road’ after they finish the short detour provided by the economic 
decision makers. Fourth, enrolment targets’ goals and interests can be reshuffled. That 
is, a scenario can be created to make enrolment targets perceive a problem that cannot 
be addressed with their current knowledge and solutions. This increases their margin of 
manoeuvre when theoretical models are provided to them. In the last strategy, the 
theoretical models become indispensable. When reaching this point, every enrolment 
target is forwardly contributing to the spread and promotion of these theoretical models. 
In the process of organising support to enact inter-firm alliances and respective MCSs in 
the macro world to deal with matters of concern, resistance may simultaneously arise. 
That is, when organisations seek to implement the theoretical models of inter-firm 
alliances and respective MCSs in their daily operations, these models may not 
necessarily function as expected. This is because entities, events and activities in the 
macro world are more dynamic and uncertain than those that are simplified in the micro 
world (based on which theoretical models of inter-firm alliances and respective MCSs 
are constructed). It is argued that people, objects and activities in the real world are 
dynamic and, with respect to inter-firm alliances, it is possible that the interests of 
partner firms may change at any point, which may lead to actions that are not consistent 
with those hypothesised in the initial alliance contract. 
Callon, Lascoumes and Barthe (2009) argued that the relations between objects and 
activities in the macro world may be much more complex than those assumed in the 
micro world. In the macro world, objects and activities may be connected in a network 
of relationships in thousands of ways. The complex relations between objects and 
activities in the macro world complicate how hypothesised solutions (as constructed in 
the micro world) may be implemented in the macro world. In the context of inter-firm 
alliances, one partner firm may be unexpectedly connected to the other partner firm’s 
competitor, which may create problems in the operation of inter-firm alliances. ANT 
allows for the examination of the dynamism and complexity that may arise when 
enacting and operating inter-firm alliances and respective MCS models. The dynamism 
and complexity of the macro world challenges how inter-firm alliances and respective 
MCS models (as constructed in the micro world) may be enacted. These challenges may 
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generate new matters of concern, and thus trigger new experimentation processes with 
risk and MCSs. When these new MCSs are implemented in the macro world, this may 
again generate matters of concern that trigger another set of experimentation processes. 
This causes the experimentation process to be an ongoing practice. 
3.9 Conclusion 
This chapter has presented ANT as the theoretical framework to address the research 
questions of this thesis. It has discussed the reasons for adopting ANT as a theoretical 
framework, and discussed the conceptual foundations of ANT as follows: 
 the imposition of a priori roles to human and non-humans should be avoided 
 entities’ capacity to act depends on its relations with others 
 the separation of macrocosm and microcosm as an starting analytical point 
should be removed 
 reality is the outcome of interactions between the entities that are involved in 
making and defining the reality. 
This chapter has also argued that the recent attention of ANT has shifted from studying 
the production of scientific knowledge to the construction of economy. In particular, the 
construction of economy is the outcome of the process of economisation. To study the 
process of economisation, this chapter presented Callon’s (2007) notion of matters of 
concern and the three stages of the experimentation processes. This chapter indicated 
how matters of concern and the three stages of the experimentation process will help 
address the research questions of this thesis. In particular, this chapter focused on 
theorising how risks become articulated as the outcome of organisations’ efforts to 
make sense of matters of concern, how inter-firm alliances are constructed as the 
solution to risks, and how MCSs may be implicated in these processes when inter-firm 
alliance models are constructed and enacted in practice. Given that ANT is a practice 
theory that requires us to follow actors as they participate in the economisation process, 
this thesis adopted a methodological approach that allowed us to study the specific 
activities, processes and practices that create the articulation of risks and MCS in inter-
firm alliances, as well as the dynamics of risk and MCSs. The following chapter 
discusses the research methodology applied. 
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Chapter 4: The Field Study 
4.1 Introduction 
This chapter discusses the field study method employed in this thesis. In particular, this 
chapter discusses the suitability of employing the field study method to examine the 
research questions of this thesis, the processes of selecting the research sites, the 
multiple methods used to collect data in the field and the procedures used to analyse the 
data collected. This chapter is organised as follows. Section 4.2 describes the field study 
method employed in this thesis. Section 4.3 describes the details of the research sites. 
Section 4.4 explains how the data were collected in the field, while Section 4.5 
discusses the data analysis process. Section 4.6 concludes this chapter. 
4.2 The Field Study Method 
Ahrens and Chapman (2006) highlighted the importance of using an appropriate 
research method to address research aims and particular questions of interest. Given that 
this thesis sought to examine the processes by which risks are articulated and evolve in 
inter-firm alliances, and the role of MCSs in these processes, a qualitative field study 
method was used. A qualitative field study is defined as follows: 
(1) The researcher has direct, in-depth contact with organizational participants, 
particularly in interviews and direct observations of activities, and these contacts 
provide a primary source of research data. (2) The study focuses on real tasks or 
processes, not situations artificially created by the researcher. (3) The research design 
is not totally structured. It evolves along with the field observations. (4) The 
presentation of data includes relatively rich (detailed) descriptions of company 
contexts and practices. (5) The resulting publications are written to the academic 
community (Ferreira & Merchant 1992, p. 4). 
Researchers who adopt qualitative methodology understand the field based on the view 
that ‘social reality is emergent, subjectively created, and objectified through human 
interaction’ (Chua 1986, p. 615). This view is consistent with this thesis’s argument 
about risk. This thesis argues that risks are articulated as the outcome of interactions 
between heterogeneous entities, rather than being an objective reality ‘out there’ that is 
waiting to be identified, measured or portrayed with certain contingent variables. Thus, 
qualitative field study has value for addressing the research questions of this thesis. 
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Field studies allow researchers to closely engage with actors in the field, and see how 
these actors undertake their daily activities. This increases the chance of observing what 
actors are relating to, how they are interacting with each other, and how these 
relationships are brought about. As Ahrens and Chapman (2006, p. 7) highlighted: 
the field often draws the researcher into its interactions, unlike other context-rich 
domains such as historian’s archive or the worldwide web’s virtual record, for 
example. In the field, people engage with each other, objects, ideas, accounting 
systems and metrics, and occasional fieldworkers. 
The possibility offered by field studies of engaging closely with actors in the field was 
very helpful for addressing the research question of the thesis. Field studies allowed us 
to explore how a variety of actors interact with each other in specific ways to articulate 
risks, and how MCSs may be implicated in these processes. 
Further, field studies allow researchers to continuously engage with actors in the field 
(during the data collection period) to obtain rich data and information about the changes 
occurring in the field (Boudreau & Robey 2005; Chua 1995; Chua & Mahama 2007). In 
particular, field studies allow researchers to capture information about the causes, 
patterns and effects of changes in actors’ interests and preferences, and how these 
changes affect how these actors interact with others, which may cause further changes. 
In other words, field studies allow researchers to observe how actors undertake their 
daily activities and feel possible changes through time and space, instead of randomly 
capturing certain activities or phenomena in a particular time and space locale. This is 
pertinent to studying how risks evolve in inter-firm alliances, and the effect of this 
evolution on MCSs. 
In addition, field studies allow actors in the field to speak and act freely, without 
straying from the research aims and particular questions of interest. That is: 
Compared to other forms of research that involve interaction with humans, such as 
filed experiments and laboratory experiments, for example, qualitative field studies 
hold great potential for open-ended interaction between the researcher and the 
researched. The researcher has less control over the researched, but has the 
opportunity to learn from their unprompted actions … structured and unstructured 
data all underline the significance of the researcher’s theoretical work to prevent her 
from being overpowered by the volume and complexity of field data (Ahrens & 
Chapman 2006, p. 7). 
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Field studies’ potential to link structured and unstructured data makes this the most 
appropriate method for this thesis. It allowed the researcher to seek data for the main 
research questions, without posing a definitive and pre-set boundary on the data that 
needed to be collected from the field. This was particularly helpful in addressing the 
research questions of this thesis by avoiding predetermination of which risks and MCSs 
should exist in inter-firm alliances. 
Finally, Ahrens and Chapman (2006) argued that research questions, theory and data are 
intertwined. This suggests that theory should inform how data are collected, and data 
should reflect on and contribute to theory. As discussed in the previous chapter, this 
thesis used ANT to make sense of the research questions. Given that ANT is a practice 
theory that focuses on ‘actors in the doing of things’ in their daily activities, field 
studies allow researchers to engage with and follow actors as they articulate risks and 
construct MCSs in inter-firm alliances. Thus, using field studies is consistent with the 
essence of ANT, which makes field studies compelling for the present thesis. 
4.3 The Research Sites 
The qualitative field studies were conducted on international JVs. International JVs 
involve independent entities that are jointly owned by two or more partner firms, with at 
least one partner headquartered outside the venture’s country of operation (Geringer & 
Hebert 1991; Lyles & Salk 1996). Although there are many different forms of inter-firm 
alliances—including licensing, outsourcing, supply chains, equity swaps, JVs, mergers 
and acquisition—there are three reasons this thesis focuses on JVs as the context to 
examine the research questions (how risks are articulated and evolve in inter-firm 
alliances, and how MCSs may be implicated in these processes). First, JVs are a good 
context that exemplifies risk issues in inter-firm alliances. This is because JVs are one 
of the most common and popular forms of inter-firm alliances, contributing to almost 20% 
of all inter-firm alliances (Hagedoorn 1996; Hagedoorn & Duysters 2002). Second, 
risks in JVs are said to be high (Barkema, Shenkar & Bell 1997; Li et al. 1999; Tsang 
2002), which provides a rich context to study the research questions of this thesis. Third, 
most prior research examining the risk–MCS relationship in inter-firm alliances was 
conducted in outsourcing or supply chains. Thus, examining JVs adds to the accounting 
literature by providing evidence on the risk–MCS relationship in another type of 
alliance relationship. 
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The researcher targeted international JVs (with one Chinese firm and at least one 
Western firm as the partner firm) that were operating in China as the potential research 
sites. Prior research has suggested that risks in international JVs that operate in China 
tend to be higher than those in other countries because of the increasingly tough price 
competition; uncertain regulatory and tax environment; underdeveloped legal, corporate 
governance and other institutional systems; ease of losing intellectual property rights 
and trade secrets; and cultural distance when undertaking business (Beamish 2013; 
Child & Yan 1999; World Economic Forum 2000; Yatsko 1997). Thus, international 
JVs in China provide a rich context to study risk and MCSs. Further, there are a large 
number of international JVs in China, which allowed the researcher to carefully select 
research sites for this thesis. As Child and Yan (1999, p. 284) stated, ‘since 1992 China 
has ranked second only to the United States (US) as a host country for foreign direct 
investment, most of which has been implemented through international JVs’. Thus, 
China offers a particularly instructive location to study risk and MCSs in international 
JVs. 
The researcher initially contacted six international JVs in China as potential research 
sites (two from the automotive industry; one from the medium-duty engine industry; 
and one each from the medical, clothing and energy industries). The researcher 
negotiated with key contact people who were responsible for managing each of these six 
JVs about the possibility and extent to which the researcher could study their JVs. This 
led to the loss of three JVs (two automotive JVs and one energy JV) because the 
researcher was only allowed to conduct interviews with a limited number of personnel 
in these JVs due to security reasons. The researcher then had informal conversations 
with the key contact people of the remaining three JVs, after which the researcher had a 
basic understanding of these JVs (such as the size, revenue, history and partner firms of 
the JVs). For the clothing JV, the Chinese firm partner was purely responsible for 
manufacturing, while all the processes of researching and designing relevant products 
were undertaken by the foreign partner firm. This business structure was considered by 
the researcher as less informative about risk and MCSs because there were a limited 
number of joint activities between the partner firms in researching, designing and 
manufacturing products. Thus, the clothing JV was dropped. 
Both the medical and medium-duty engine JVs were appealing potential research sites 
that were considered able to provide rich context to the study. However, the researcher 
eventually selected the medium-duty engine JV as the research site because the 
48 
researcher had very good access to this JV. In the initial engagement with the key 
contact personnel in the medium-duty engine JV, the researcher was promised to be 
permitted to attend the partner firm and JV meetings, and to review confidential partner 
firm and JV internal documents. The key contact person promised to introduce the 
researcher to other personnel in the JV and partner firms, if required. 
Further, the researcher realised that, to fully understand risk and MCSs in the medium-
duty engine JV, the researcher might need to simultaneously study the partner firm and 
other five independent JVs that were connected to the focal medium-duty engine JV. In 
the initial engagement, the key contact person briefly discussed risk and MCS-related 
issues in the medium-duty engine JV. This led the researcher to believe that data about 
risk and MCSs in the medium-duty engine JV might be very rich, and the researcher 
would need a large amount of time and research funds to collect these data. The 
researcher believed that if time and research funds were devoted to collecting data from 
the medium-duty engine JV, it may not be possible to also collect data from the medical 
JV (the researcher had a limited number of years and constrained research funds to 
complete this thesis). Given the good access and potential rich data, the researcher 
decided to use the medium-duty engine JV as the primary research site.4 
Since the key contact person of the medium-duty engine JV was from the foreign 
partner firm, this thesis treated the medium-duty engine JV and foreign partner firm as 
the focal organisations around which data collection, structured analysis and discussion 
were organised. Thus, risk and MCSs in the medium-duty engine JV (discussed and 
analysed in next chapter) were explained from the foreign partner firms’ perspective. 
Overall, the medium-duty engine JV and foreign partner firm granted the researcher full 
access to their discussions, meetings and documents, and allowed the researcher to 
conduct interviews with them and their partner firms. To ensure the confidentiality of 
the information collected from the research sites, the researcher signed a confidentiality 
agreement with the foreign partner firm. To further protect the confidentiality of the 
participating companies and individuals, pseudonyms are used in this paper, instead of 
real names. For example, the medium-duty engine JV is called ‘DECIE’, while ‘Cino’ is 
                                                          
4 As discussed below, to fully understand the articulation and evolution of risk and the implications of this 
for MCSs in the medium-duty engine JV, the researcher needed to collect data from the foreign partner 
firm of the medium-duty engine JV, as well as one ATS JV that shared the same partner firms with the 
medium-duty engine JV. Thus, the research site of this thesis included the medium-duty engine JV, the 
ATS JV, and the foreign partner firm of these two JVs. 
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used to designate the foreign partner firm. The following subsections present the 
background of the foreign partner firm and its JVs in China. 
4.3.1 Cino 
Cino was founded in the early 1990s in the US as an engine company that manufactured 
and sold diesel engines. After almost a century of operation and expansion, Cino has 
now become a global leader that designs, manufactures, sells and services engines and 
related technology. It now has about 500 company-owned independent distributor 
facilities and more than 5,200 dealer locations in over 190 countries. Cino is now 
organised into four separate, yet complementary, business units: engine business, power 
generation business, component business and distribution business. The engine business 
manufactures and markets diesel and natural gas-powered engines for on- and off-
highway use. The power generation business provides power generation systems, 
components and services for standby power, distributed power generation and auxiliary 
power for mobile applications. The distribution business manages the global distribution 
strategy and channels for all lines of Cino’s products. The component business designs 
and manufactures four components of engines: filtration, turbo technologies, emission 
solutions and fuel systems (Cino Annual Report 2012). Thus, the component business 
itself consists of filtration business, turbo technologies business, emission solutions 
business and fuel systems business. Figure 2 summarises Cino’s business structure. 
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Figure 2: Cino’s Business Structure 
4.3.2 Cino’s connections with China 
Cino has been building connections with China since its formation in the US. The 
earliest contact between Cino and China is dated back to the 1920s. In the 1920s, the 
then director of Cino wrote a letter to the National Government of China about potential 
cooperation between Cino and the government. At that time, engines were the national 
industrial base and the Chinese national government was quite positive about Cino’s 
initiative. There had been intercourse between Cino and the Chinese national 
government since that time. In 1941, the US passed the Lend-lease Act, whereby the US 
would support China in its anti-Japanese war by providing military aid supplies. These 
supplies included patrol boats and army trucks that were equipped with Cino’s engines. 
At the end of 1944, one company—the Chang Truck Group (CTG)—wrote to Cino 
about the possibility of commercial cooperation. In particular, the company wanted to 
implement local production (in China) of Cino’s engines. In his reply to CTG, the 
director of Cino expressed strong interest in the local production proposal, and 
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willingness to establish factories in China after the anti-Japanese war. However, due to 
tense China–US relations, Cino’s director’s plan to establish factories in China could 
not be realised until 40 years later. As economic and trade relations between China and 
the US gradually recovered in the 1970s, some US-made medium-sized mining trucks 
equipped with Cino diesel engines were imported to China for mining use. This 
reopened the possibility of cooperation between Cino and Chinese firms. In 1975, the 
director of Cino visited Beijing with the aim of signing an after-sales service agreement 
with CTG, and further considering the possibility of expanding Cino’s business in 
China. As more trucks equipped with Cino diesel engines were imported to China and 
used in the mining industry in the 1970s, these diesel engines were widely recognised 
by local users. However, the high price of importation limited the total number of trucks 
that CTG could afford to purchase. As a result, CTG presented a proposal for 
technology import and local production of Cino’s engines. Cino positively responded to 
CTG’s proposal, which facilitated later cooperation between CTG and Cino. 
In 1981, Cino signed a licensing agreement with CTG to allow CTG to manufacture 
Cino’s heavy-duty diesel engines. The import and local production of Cino’s heavy-
duty diesel engines was one of the most important projects under ‘The Sixth Five-year 
Plan of China’ in the engine industry. One aim of The Sixth Five-year Plan of China 
was to expand international trade, effectively use foreign funds and actively import 
foreign advanced technology that was suitable for national needs to promote 
development of the economy and technology. As the overall performance of Cino’s 
diesel engines was widely recognised by Chinese customers, Cino’s key engine 
components also attracted some Chinese enterprises. In 1982, Wu Power Group signed 
a licensing agreement with Cino to manufacture Cino’s holt-branded turbocharger 
products. The two experiences of cooperation on licensing agreements (one with CTG 
to make heavy-duty diesel engines and one with Wu Power Group to make 
turbochargers) lay the foundation for cooperation between Cino and Delink.5 Due to the 
growth of Cino’s business in China and the frequent and close interactions with Chinese 
local stakeholders, Cino established Cino China Investment Co. Ltd to manage and 
control Cino’s China operations. It is worth mentioning that, after the formation of Cino 
China Investment Co. Ltd, all strategic decisions associated with JVs (such as the 
formation of JVs and selection of JV partners) were initiated by Cino and operated 
through Cino China Investment Co. Ltd. Thus, this thesis treats Cino and Cino China 
                                                          
5 Delink and Cino’s cooperation with Delink will be discussed in Section 4.3.3. 
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Investment Co. Ltd as an integrated single unit when dealing with JV-related business 
in China. For this rest of this thesis, ‘Cino’ is used to refer to this integrated unit. 
4.3.3 Cino’s cooperation with Delink 
Delink Motor Cooperation was one of Cino’s earliest and largest cooperation partner 
firms in China. Delink Motor Corporation was established in 1969 and had a wide 
coverage of business, involving researching, designing, manufacturing and selling 
whole serial commercial vehicle (light-, medium- and heavy-duty commercial vehicles), 
passenger vehicles, auto parts and components, vehicle manufacturing equipment and 
auto-related business. By the end of 2011, Delink’s assets totalled 29 billion US dollars 
and the company had 160,000 employees. The total sales revenue of Delink Motor 
Cooperation continued increasing from the 1990s and reached 50 billion US dollars in 
2011. Figure 3 presents the overall business structure of Delink Motor Cooperation. 
Note that the focal organisations under study are Cino and its JVs in China, and all 
Delink Motor Cooperation’s operations that involve cooperating with Cino are 
exclusively negotiated by Delink’s commercial vehicle company. For the rest of this 
thesis, ‘Delink’ refers to Delink’s commercial vehicle company, which makes business 
decisions associated with Cino on behalf of Delink Motor Corporation. 
It took two years from the initial contact between Cino and Delink to sign a licensing 
agreement between these two firms. In 1984, the former chief executive officer (CEO) 
of Cino visited Chinese Second Automobile Group (the former name of Delink) for 
potential cooperation opportunities. At that time, there were only two major commercial 
vehicle manufacturers in the Chinese market: Chinese First Automobile Group and 
Delink. While Chinese First Automobile Group and Delink were the two key groups 
that the Chinese government was supporting to make commercial vehicles, Chinese 
First Automobile Group was designated by the Chinese government to undertake the 
national responsibility of developing independent technologies. Thus, the Chinese 
government was reluctant to let Chinese First Automobile Group cooperate with foreign 
firms to make engines. This made Delink the only cooperative target if Cino wished to 




Figure 3: Delink’s Business Structure 
Further, at that time, Delink was transforming from making heavy-duty to medium-duty 
trucks. Given that Delink had no experience making medium-duty engines, they were 
eagerly seeking potential partners who could provide advanced and world-leading 
medium-duty engine technologies. In fact, Delink organised technology specialists to 
iteratively compare the overall performance of engines from five countries, including 
France, the US, Britain, Japan and Germany. Based on thorough investigations, Cino’s 
B series diesel engine was selected as the target for importation and learning. Delink 
even established a diesel engine plant to prepare for the forthcoming cooperation with 
Cino. Based on the mutual willingness for cooperation, in 1986, Cino signed a licensing 
agreement with Delink to manufacture B series medium-duty diesel engines. 
Cino has formed a total of 10 JVs in China with five Chinese local firms since it entered 
the Chinese market. Note that Delink Cino Engine (DECIE), the medium-duty engine 
JV between Cino and Delink, was the focus of this study. The researcher had initial 
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conversations with DECIE’s key contact person about to the extent to which other JVs 
were involved in the risk management of DECIE. This led to eliminating four of Cino’s 
JVs that were considered by the researcher irrelevant to the research questions of this 
thesis. Eventually, six of Cino’s JVs were kept as potential research sites, where data 
necessary to address the research questions would be collected. The details of these six 
JVs and possible relationships between these JVs are explained as follows. 
4.3.3.1 Cino’s JVs 
Cino has four JVs with Delink: Delink Cino Filtration (DECIEF), DECIEE, Cino East 
Asian Research Centre (CEARC) and Delink Cino ATS (DECIATS). 
DECIEF is a 50:50 filtration JV between Cino and Delink, which was established in 
1994 in China with an investment capital of 2 million US dollars and a total number of 
700 employees. DECIEF manufactures and sells air filters, fuel filters, lube filters, fuel 
water separators and coolant, which can be applied to a wide range of commercial 
vehicles, including on-highway heavy-, medium- and light-duty trucks; passenger 
vehicles; on-highway buses; mining, marine, agriculture, construction, oil and gas light-
duty automobiles; power generation, industrial and locomotive. DECIEF is the supplier 
company of DECIE, which supplies filters that can be used in engines made by DECIE. 
DECIE is a 50:50 engine JV between Cino and Delink, which was established in 1996 
in China with an investment capital of more than 1 billion US dollars and a total number 
of 2,500 employees. DECIE primarily produces Cino technology–based B, C, L and LK 
series of mechanical diesel engines; ISB, ISDe, QSB, ISLe, ISL, QSL, ISZ and QSZ 
series of completely electronically controlled diesel engines; and B, C and L series of 
natural gas engines. These engines can be widely applied in light-, medium- and heavy-
duty trucks; senior intercity buses; large and medium-sized buses; construction 
machinery; marine main and auxiliary generators; and other fields. DECIE is critical to 
Cino because the majority of Cino’s revenue earned in China comes from the sales 
revenues of DECIE. Delink is critical to DECIE because around 55% of DECIE-made 
medium-duty engines are supplied to Delink’s medium-duty commercial vehicles, 
which forms the largest portion of DECIE’s revenues. 
CEARC is a 50:50 JV between Cino and DECIE. Given that DECIE is a 50:50 JV 
between Cino and Delink, Cino effectively has a total 75% ownership in CEARC, and 
Delink has a 25% share in CEARC. CEARC was first established in 2006 and had four 
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subsequent development stages. These stages were completed in 2011 with a total 
cumulative investment capital of 61 million US dollars. After completing the four 
development stages, CEARC became Cino’s first engine R&D centre in China. CEARC 
also became second only to the US headquarters of Cino’s technical centre as Cino’s 
largest R&D institution in the world. In terms of the function of CEARC, this research 
centre undertakes R&D of all Cino’s localised engines and engine-related products 
made in China, which can be applied to commercial vehicles, engineering machinery, 
power generators, marine engines and other markets. Overall, the establishment of 
CEARC marked the expansion from pure manufacturing of Cino technology–based 
products in China to local R&D of products fit for the Chinese market.6 Thus, after the 
establishment of CEARC, all engines and engine-related products (such as filtration, 
turbo and after-treatment solutions) made in Cino’s JVs in China (DECIEF, DECIE, 
DECIATS and so forth) were also researched and developed locally in China. 
DECIATS is a 50:50 JV between Cino and Delink, which was established in 2010 in 
China with an investment capital of 5 million US dollars and a total number of 1,000 
employees. DECIATS makes diesel engine ATSs, which supports the full line of 
Delink’s commercial vehicles. In particular, ATSs made by DECIATS are supplied to 
DECIE. DECIE in turn assembles and integrates its engines and ATSs made by 
DECIATS, together with other engine components, to create a whole engine package 
that is sold to customers (such as Delink). 
4.3.4 Cino’s cooperation with Sanqu Automotive 
Sanqu Automotive (Sag) was formed in 2002 to manufacture heavy-duty military off-
road vehicles, heavy-duty trucks, medium-sized buses and classics, medium- and light-
duty trucks, and heavy-duty axles. Among all these products, Sag’s main product is 
heavy-duty trucks. Sag is a JV between Sag Group and Torch Automobile Group Co. 
Ltd, where Sag Group takes 49% share right and Torch Automobile Group Co. Ltd 
takes 51% share right. 
                                                          
6 CEARC has its own engine bench that has the ability to test full flow emission, pilot centre vehicle 
electronic control laboratories, applied mechanics and materials science laboratories, and a large number 
of advanced testing and development platforms. These platforms facilitate the R&D of engines and 
engine-related products. Prior to the formation of CEARC, all these R&D activities were undertaken at 
the US headquarters of Cino’s Technical Centre. That is, all core technology, design and development of 
engines and engine-related products to be manufactured in Cino’s China JVs were conducted and 
completed at the US headquarters, while Cino’s JVs in China were only responsible for (i) applying or 
modifying Cino’s completed product design to meet local customers’ specific needs and (ii) 
manufacturing the products. 
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Sag Group only has 49% share right in Sag, while the main operational, management 
and investment decisions are made by Sag Group according to the JV agreement 
between Sag Group and Torch Automobile Group Co. Ltd. In 2009, Sag sold a total of 
58,000 vehicles worth 2 billion US dollars within China. The company sold its products 
to 43 countries with a total exportation number of 12,000 units, achieving 4.5 billion US 
dollars in sales revenues. Overall, in 2009, Sag’s domestic heavy-duty truck sales 
ranked third and export sales ranked third in the Chinese heavy-duty truck industry. 
Sag’s large number of sales in the Chinese heavy-duty market, alongside the company’s 
spirit of making high-quality products and upgrading its products, led to the formation 
of a JV between Sag and Cino to make heavy-duty engines. 
Sag Cino Engine (SACIE) is a 50:50 JV between Cino and Sag, which manufactures an 
11-litre new generation of fully electronically controlled heavy-duty engines. SACIE 
has an annual production capability of 50,000 units of engines. These heavy-duty 
engines are supplied to Sag’s heavy-duty commercial vehicles. 
4.3.5 Cino’s cooperation with Futong 
Futong was formed in 1996 to manufacture and sell light- and heavy-duty trucks, buses, 
sport utility vehicles and agricultural machinery. Futong has total assets of more than 38 
billion US dollars, with a total of 40,000 employees. Futong sells its products to over 80 
countries and has R&D centres and manufacturing factories in 20 countries. In 2011, the 
total production and sales of Futong ranked highest in the world’s commercial vehicle 
industry. The brand value of Futong exceeds 83 billion US dollars, ranked fourth in the 
auto industry and first in the Chinese commercial vehicle market. Futong’s sales of 
light-duty commercial vehicles have been the highest in the Chinese market since 2002, 
which lay the foundation for the formation of a light-duty engine JV between Cino and 
Futong. 
Futong Cino Engine (FUCIE) is a 50:50 JV between Futong and Cino, which 
manufactures a 2.8- and 3.8-litre new generation of fully electronically controlled light-
duty engines. FUCIE began with an investment of 3.4 billion US dollars and has an 
annual production capability of 400,000 units, which is the largest manufacturing plant 
for light-duty diesel engines in China. The engines made by FUCIE are primarily 
supplied to the light-duty commercial vehicles made by Futong. 
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4.3.6 Overview of the relationship between Cino, Cino’s JVs and Cino’s three 
partner firms (Delink, Futong and Sanqu Automotive Group) 
Cino and its six JVs have multiple business relationships with each other. First, Cino 
supplies core engine and engine component technology to CEARC. Based on the 
technology supplied by Cino, CEARC leads further R&D processes, with the primary 
aim of designing products that suit the requirements of Chinese local partner firms. In 
addition, CEARC is responsible for providing comprehensive testing on the 
performance, emissions and transient responses of engines or engine components before 
formally producing the conceptual models of relevant products. 
Second, DECIE, SACIE and FUCIE are Cino’s 50:50 engine JVs with Delink, Sag and 
Futong, respectively. These three JVs introduce, apply and manufacture engines that are 
researched, developed and designed by CEARC. Medium-duty engines made by DECIE 
are primarily supplied to medium-duty commercial vehicles made by Delink and 
Delink-related companies. Heavy-duty engines (11-litre fully electronically controlled 
heavy-duty engines) made by SACIE are primarily supplied to heavy-duty commercial 
vehicles made by Sag. Light-duty engines (2.8- and 3.8-litre new generation fully 
electronically controlled light-duty engines) made by FUCIE are primarily supplied to 
light-duty commercial vehicles made by Futong. Besides the provision of technical, 
R&D and testing support to the three engine JVs, CEARC also provides support to 
Cino’s two component JVs (DECIEF and DECIATS). DECIEF and DECIATS in turn 
supply filtrations (ATSs) to the above three engine JVs. These filtrations (ATSs) are 
assembled into the ‘final engine’ in the three JVs, before these ‘final engines’ are sold to 
Cino’s partner firms. Figure 4 depicts the complex relationship between Cino, Cino’s 
six JVs and Cino’s three local Chinese partner firms. 
To summarise, DECIE was the initial focal research site that provided the context to 
study the research questions of this thesis. In the process of collecting and analysing 
data (as discussed later in this chapter), it became apparent that Cino and Cino’s five 
other JVs (DECIEF, CEARC, SACIE, FUCIE and DECIATS) were inevitably involved 
in the articulation and management of risks in DECIE. Thus, the research site eventually 
included Cino, DECIE and DECIATS. Studying these three research sites also allowed 
the researcher to obtain information about Cino’s other four JVs. The empirical chapter 
discusses the specific details of how and why these four JVs were formed, and how the 
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formation of these JVs related to risk and MCSs. The next section discusses the data 
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Figure 4: Relationships between Cino, Cino’s Multiple JVs and Cino’s Partner Firms 
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4.4 Data Collection 
This thesis adopted a processual approach for collecting data. As Pettigrew (1979, p. 
570) wrote: 
The longitudinal-processual approach to the study of organizations recognizes that an 
organization or any other social system may profitably be explored as a continuing 
system with a past, a present, and a future … A longitudinal-processual analysis is 
more likely to be interested in language systems of becoming than of being, of 
processes of structural elaboration rather than the precise description of structural 
forms, of mechanisms that create, maintain and dissolve systems of power (Pettigrew 
1973) rather than just attempt to codify distributions of power at one point in time. 
That is, instead of looking at the presence of risks and MCSs (such as the structural 
properties of the conditions of risk occurrence) at a particular time, this thesis collected 
data about specific activities and how these activities were related or unrelated to each 
other in the continuous process of constructing risk/MCSs and causing particular effects 
in inter-firm alliances. Thus, the data collection process was decomposed into three 
phases: the pre-alliance phase, formation and enactment of the alliances phase, and post-
formation phase. These three sequential phases of data collection do not suggest a linear 
account of the articulation and evolution of risk and MCSs, as the phases can be 
overlapping and iterative. This processual approach was adopted to enable the 
investigation of (i) the different and temporal emphasis placed on activities associated 
with risk and MCSs and (ii) how activities at one stage may affect or be affected by 
those occurring at other stages. 
The data collection process followed a loosely structured approach. The researcher set 
the structure of collecting data prior to the actual data collection process. Setting the 
structure of collecting data a priori ensured that the researcher would focus on 
collecting data that were pertinent to addressing the research questions of this thesis. 
However, if the researcher strictly followed pre-set structures to collect data, some 
emergent issues relevant to the research questions may have been missed, thereby 
leading to the loss of valuable data from the field (Mahama 2000). To avoid the loss of 
valuable data, the researcher was open to emergent issues that could appear during data 
collection. The researcher only followed in detail those emergent issues that were 
helpful in addressing the research questions. 
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The data required to address the research questions were collected from multiple 
sources. Collecting data from multiple sources is consistent with most prior and extant 
research that has adopted a field study method to study management accounting issues 
(Ahrens & Chapman 2007; Chua & Mahama 2007; Ferreira & Merchant 1992). Further, 
data collected from multiple sources can be corroborated with each other, which 
improves the validity of field data (Yin 1989). Yin (1989, p. 97) argued that: 
the most important advantage presented by using multiple sources of evidence is the 
development of convergent lines of inquiry … In this manner, the potential problems 
of construct validity also can be addressed because the multiple sources of evidence 
essentially provide multiple measures of the same phenomenon. 
Thus, using multiple sources of evidence can confirm whether the same construct is 
valid across different sources. For example, the researcher’s interpretation of risks in 
inter-firm alliances based on the interview results could be compared with risk recorded 
in the companies’ internal management reports. This comparison would allow the 
researcher to validate his or her own interpretations of risks based on these two sources. 
Thus, three methods were used for data collection: interviews, document reviews and 
observations. The interview and observation protocol was approved by The Australian 
National University Human Ethics Committee. The three methods used for data 
collection are discussed below. 
4.4.1 Interviews 
Before the formal data collection process, the researcher conducted six mock interviews. 
Three of the mock interviews were conducted with three academic colleagues. A semi-
structured interview protocol (see Appendix 4A) based on prior research was developed 
prior to the interviews, and used in the mock interviews. Feedback from the academic 
colleagues led to the wording of questions in the interview protocol being adjusted. The 
adjusted protocol was used in the other three mock interviews, conducted on three 
practitioners. These three interviewees were the CEOs or senior managers of three local 
Australian companies (two in the construction industry and one in the energy industry), 
who were responsible for managing at least one JV. The purpose of undertaking these 
three mock interviews was to let the researcher experience the real interview 
atmosphere, which helped the researcher better control the interviews conducted with 
participants in the research site. For example, during these three mock interviews, the 
researcher encountered a few scenarios where the interviewees unintentionally led the 
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interviews in directions that were not helpful in addressing the research questions. The 
researcher learnt about the conditions and reasons that led to the interviewees’ 
divergence from the research questions. In addition, the researcher considered possible 
strategies to overcome these problems. Some of these strategies were used in the later 
data collection process. The researcher’s supervisor also attended the three mock 
interviews with the practitioners, and gave the researcher suggestions about how to 
improve his interview skills. Overall, the mock interviews helped the researcher prepare 
the interview questions and improve his interview skills. 
The formal data collection process started with introductory interviews with the 
representative of the foreign partner firm (Cino) in DECIE (the medium-duty engine JV) 
and some other staff at Cino and the engine JV who were responsible for the daily 
management of DECIE. These interviewees had very good access to information about 
(i) the antecedents (e.g. historical events) that led to the formation of the JV, (ii) risks 
and MCSs articulated during and after the formation of DECIE, and (iii) the effects of 
enacting the MCS for risk management of the JV. Access to this information enabled 
the researcher to understand the articulation and dynamics of risks and MCSs that were 
perceived, interpreted and managed by these interviewees. To mitigate the effects of 
respondent bias or poor recall on the quality of data collected from the initial interviews, 
the data were corroborated with data collected from other interviewees and other 
sources (such as document reviews). 
In addition, the introductory interviews suggested the chronology of activities and 
relationships between these activities that might have implications for risks and MCSs 
in JVs. This allowed the researcher to target events and activities, observe relevant 
documents and negotiate access to those activities and documents. For example, by 
completing the introductory interviews, the researcher knew that the representative of 
Cino in DECIE had a routine meeting with the general manager of the JVs at the end of 
each year, in which risk issues about the JV were discussed. This led the researcher to 
negotiate access to those meetings in order to collect data about risks and MCSs. By 
talking to the informants, it was indicated that they followed the ‘A-review’7 document 
to assess risk and prepare MCSs for risk management in the JV. This led to the 
researcher’s subsequent negotiation with the company to study the A-review document. 
                                                          
7 The A-review document is a framework that provided a roadmap for Cino to select and process a 
business model, among a set of alternatives (including organic, acquisition, alliance, minority investment 
and supply contract), when Cino wished to start a new business to achieve growth. 
 63 
Further, the introductory interviews allowed the researcher to identify other key actors 
involved in the articulation and evolution of risks and MCSs in the JV. For example, in 
the introductory interviews, the representative of Cino in DECIE indicated the people 
who helped initiate and evaluate the possibility of forming the JV and enacting the JV. 
This helped the researcher identify a number of potential interviewees. In addition, the 
representative of Cino in DECIE helped refer the researcher to those key actors. For 
example, in the introductory interview with the representative of Cino in DECIE, the 
researcher was told ‘I will connect you with the general manager of DECIE and I think 
he is the person you must talk to’. 
Finally, the initial interviews were used to build trust between the researcher and the 
informants. Building trust helped remove the scepticism of the initial interviewees about 
the data being used for undesirable purposes, which encouraged the informants to freely 
divulge information. Building trust between the informants and researcher was achieved 
through: 
1. the researcher’s promise of only using the data collected for the purpose of 
completing the PhD thesis 
2. the researcher indicating the intention only to learn about risk and MCSs, as 
practised in the JVs, rather than to judge the appropriateness or correctness of 
the activities, procedures and processes mobilised for risk management in the 
JVs 
3. the development of personal friendships. 
Other interviews were conducted after the introductory interviews. The interview 
protocol prepared before data collection was used in these interviews. These interviews 
were undertaken for three reasons. First, by obtaining additional data from these 
interviews, the researcher was able to link the data collected from multiple interview 
participants. This enabled the researcher to provide a comprehensive analysis of the 
logic, processes, activities and consequences of articulating risks and MCSs in inter-
firm alliances. For example, the reasons the representative of the foreign partner firm in 
the engine JV undertook certain activities for risk management could be explained by 
the actions taken by the general manager of the JV. Second, these interviews were used 
to verify the researcher’s interpretation of the data collected from the document reviews 
and observations, which ensured the validity of the researcher’s interpretation. On all 
occasions, there was high convergence between the data collected from multiple sources. 
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Third, these interviews provided opportunities for the researcher to ask questions that 
could be helpful in addressing any ambiguities that arose during the observation and 
document review. 
A total of 50 interviews were conducted with personnel, including general managers, 
senior managers and employees of the JV, and managers of Cino. Twenty-nine of these 
interviews were formal interviews, in which semi-structured interview protocols were 
used. The length of the interviews varied from 30 minutes to two hours, with an average 
time of 50 minutes. Ten of these interviews were tape recorded, and all interviews were 
translated from Chinese to English, and transcribed soon after the interviews. Notes 
were taken on the other 19 interviews during the interview process, and memos and 
details of the interviews were recalled and written down within one week of each 
interview. The researcher also completed 21 informal interviews, most of which were 
unstructured. Memos were taken on some of these informal interviews, and key points 
were recalled and recorded within two days of each interview. Most of these informal 
interviews were undertaken (i) during coffee, lunch and dinner times with the 
interviewees or (ii) while travelling between the JVs sites and Cino’s head office in 
China (Cino’s head office in China and the JVs under investigation were located in 
different cities, and the researcher visited all these research sites, during which some 
interviews, document reviews and observations were undertaken for data collection). 
Table 1 presents a breakdown of the interviews. 
Table 1: Summary of Data Collection Activities 










Length of time  24 months 13 months 13 months  
Interviews Formal 16 6 7 29 
Informal 10 6 5 21 
Total 26 12 12 50 
Meetings, brainstorming 
and other informal 
occasions 
6 2 6 14 
Observation days 45 2 3 50 
Documents Internal 13 8 31 52 
External > 8 > 11 > 3 > 22 
Total  > 21 > 19 > 34 > 74 
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4.4.2 Observations 
Data were also obtained from direct observation. As indicated earlier, the initial 
interviewees directed the researcher to relevant research sites to observe the articulation 
and evolution of risks and MCSs in the JVs. Through these initial interviews, access to 
the research sites was simultaneously negotiated. The observed research sites primarily 
encompassed formal meetings. First, six formal meetings in Cino were observed. These 
meetings included: 
1. two formal meetings between personnel (such as executives and managers) in 
Cino, where performance problems and issues relating to the operation and 
management of DECIE were discussed 
2. two A-review meetings (details about A-review documents and meetings are 
discussed in the next chapter), where the potential problems, challenges, risks 
and MCSs in the daily operation of DECIE were discussed 
3. two telephone meetings between personnel from Cino’s US head office and 
Cino China on issues associated with preparing the A-review document to form 
DECIATS. 
Second, observations were made during two formal meeting between Cino and DECIE. 
The managers of Cino and general manager of DECIE were the key participants in these 
two meetings. Performance and issues associated with the operation and management of 
DECIE were discussed. Third, the researcher attended and observed two formal 
meetings between Cino and DECIATS. One of these two formal meetings was an A-
review meeting, where the progress and development of the A-review document 
associated with the formation of DECIATS were discussed. Risk and MCSs relating to 
the formation and operation of DECIATS were also discussed. The other meeting was a 
brainstorming session, which was attended by the general manager and chief financial 
officer (CFO) of DECIATS and personnel from Cino. Potential challenges (that 
provided the basis of articulating risk) in DECIE and possible management control 
solutions for these challenges were discussed in the brainstorming session. 
Besides attending formal meetings, the researcher was based in the focal research sites 
(Cino, DECIE and DECIATS) to observe how activities were undertaken and how 
things (relating to risk management) were done locally by different personnel. For 
example, the researcher observed the culture/customs of doing things by the personnel 
in the daily operation of the focal research sites. Any critical issues associated with risk 
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and MCSs in the JVs obtained from these observations were immediately recorded. The 
researcher was given an office desk and seat in an open area in the focal research sites, 
which facilitated the observation process. Simultaneously, the researcher ensured that he 
did not interrupt any work of the personnel (such as by asking questions) at any time 
during the observation. In the observation process, the researcher thought of some 
questions, which were written down and asked later in the interviews. Further, the 
researcher was invited to attend some company dinners and lunches, where observations 
were made. Critical issues regarding the risk management of JVs were immediately 
recorded after the dinners and lunches. 
Consistent with Latour and Woolgar (1979), no attempt was made to conceal the 
observational role of the researcher. Before each observation, all participants were 
notified by the key contact person about the presence of the researcher in the meeting. 
The researcher observed these meetings and possibly took notes during the meetings 
solely for the purpose of collecting data for this PhD thesis, and did not participate in 
the discussions of the meetings in any way. The purpose of attending the meetings was 
explained to the participants before each meeting began. Details and critical issues from 
the meetings were recalled and written down immediately during each observation. 
Overall, 14 formal meetings and 50 days of working in the key focal research sites 
provided the key arena from which data from observations were collected. 
4.4.3 Document review 
In addition to interviews and observations, the researcher reviewed documents as part of 
the data collection process. The researcher reviewed a total of 52 internal documents 
from the focal research sites. These internal documents included contracts, letters, 
minutes of meetings, brochures, administrative reports, reference guides, acquisition 
and alliance roadmaps, historical reviews, graphs, diagrams and writings from the 
interviewees, A-review documents and technical analysis process maps. The researcher 
received electronic copies of most of these internal documents. For a few documents, 
the researcher was only allowed to review them onsite. Notes were taken immediately 
when the researcher felt necessary, in the course of reviewing these documents. 
In addition, publically available documents containing information directly or indirectly 
related to risk management of the JVs were gathered and reviewed. These public 
documents included financial reports, prospectuses, press releases, newspaper articles, 
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magazine articles and online commentary articles. The researcher retrieved and 
reviewed more than 22 external documents. 
It was important to include document review as part of the data collection process. First, 
reviewing documents demonstrated the historical activities and processes through which 
risk became articulated in the JVs, and how the MCS could be affected. This provided a 
rich source to collect information about the antecedent, practices and effects of risk 
and/or the management of risks. Second, because some documents (such as the A-
review document) were inscriptions that played critical roles in articulating risk and 
MCSs in the JVs, reviewing these documents made clear to the researcher the strategies 
and practices that were mobilised in the risk management of the JV. Third, reviewing 
documents provided additional evidence that could be used to confirm the data collected 
from the interviews and observations, which could improve construct validity. 
4.4.4 Constructing a database 
The researcher maintained both electronic and hard copies of the data gathered from 
interviews, observations and document reviews. A hard copy of the data that were 
initially obtained in electronic form was made and stored in the researcher’s office. 
Similarly, data that were initially obtained in hard forms were scanned to obtain an 
electronic copy, which was maintained in three electronic disks. Maintaining these data 
in both electronic and hard copies allowed ‘a chain of evidence to be established such 
that external readers can follow the filed report to the evidence upon which the report is 
based’ (Mahama 2001, p. 111). In addition, these data were input and maintained in 
NVivo. NVivo is software that provides a database for evidence collected from the field. 
Evidence in NVivo can be arranged and compared in different ways, which facilitated 
analysis of the data collected from the field. The following section presents the 
processes through which the data were analysed. 
4.5 Data Analysis 
Data analysis was undertaken during and after the data collection process. Consistent 
with Mahama (2000), the data collected were analysed at within-case and cross-case 
levels. The data collected were first analysed on a case-by-case basis. Each complete 
case was classified as one context that included all three stages of the experimentation 
processes (from macrocosm to microcosm, collective experimentation, and return to the 
macro world), as guided by the theoretical framework discussed in the theory 
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development chapter. In total, the researcher identified three complete cases, which are 
discussed in more detail in the empirical results chapter. The analysis of each of these 
three cases was then combined at an aggregate level to describe and explain the 
phenomena that were investigated under the research questions of this thesis. This 
allowed the researcher to identify similarities and variations in the phenomena under 
examination across these three cases. 
During the data analysis process, the researcher organised the raw data collected from 
the field into major concepts that closely approximated the processes and practices 
identified in the field study that were pertinent to addressing the research questions of 
this thesis. To facilitate the data analysis, the researcher employed Patton’s (2002) 
three-stage coding framework. This framework involves breaking down the data into 
discrete parts, conceptualising the data, and re-organising the data in new ways. In the 
first stage, the researcher read line by line the interview transcripts, documents, and 
notes and memos recorded based on observations. Based on close examination of the 
raw data, the researcher generated a number of concepts that seemed to resemble the 
data. Most concepts were derived from the words and phrases used by the actors in the 
field. The researcher began generating concepts as soon as the data were collected from 
the interviews, observations and document review. The researcher continued revising 
existing concepts and developing new concepts as more data were collected from the 
field. After several iterations and comparisons between generated concepts, a total of 82 
concepts were produced. 
The researcher grouped these 82 concepts into 18 categories based on similarities. Each 
category was derived from and labelled according to the theoretical framework that 
informed this thesis. The grouping of different concepts was undertaken based on how 
closely different concepts were able to represent a certain attribute, property, dimension 
or element of a particular category (Patton 2002). For example, evidence from the field 
indicated that there were several different methods through which actors interacted with 
each other, including controversies, conversions, negotiations, communications, 
discussions, meetings, contacts, chats, encounters and showing. These different methods 
of interactions represented multiple ‘attributes’ of interactions, and were subsequently 
grouped into the category of ‘interactions’. 
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Generating and categorising concepts helped improve the validity of the categories that 
were used to resemble the data collected from the field at theoretical/abstract level. As 
Mahama (2001, p. 113) argued: 
The grouping of concepts into categories had the unintended consequences of 
providing an initial test of the applicability of the theoretical framework similar to 
what factor analysis or cluster analysis would do under quantitative analysis. In a way, 
it provides some form of factor loading where the categories serve as the constructs 
and the concepts become the factors. 
Similar to Mahama (2010), who found ‘loadings’ for all ‘constructs’ in his study of the 
constituting and stabilising of inter-firm alliances, the concepts generated from the field 
data loaded on all categories. These categories and concepts are summarised in 
Appendix 2A. 
In the second stage, the researcher connected the 18 categories (developed in the first 
stage) based on the paradigm developed by Strauss and Corbin (1990).8 Seven of the 
original categories were coded as phenomenon, three as causal conditions, five as 
intervening conditions, two as action/interaction intermediaries, and three as 
consequences (see Appendix 2B). 
The three focal research sites where the field data were collected (Cino, DECIE and 
DECIATS) represented the context. In each context, causal conditions lead to the 
occurrence of the core phenomenon under investigation. For example, given that one 
core research question of this thesis focused on examining the articulation of risks in 
inter-firm alliances, the articulation of risks in a JV (by Cino) was coded as a 
phenomenon, and the controversies between JV partner firms through which such risks 
become articulated were coded as a causal condition. In addition, inscriptions that were 
mobilised in articulating risks were coded as action/interaction intermediaries, although 
the specific inscriptions mobilised depended on the intervening conditions (the prior 
history of JV experience between partner firms) that facilitated or constrained their 
choice. This method of coding was widely used to draw relationships between other 
                                                          
8 The paradigm includes six elements: causal conditions, phenomenon, context, intervening conditions, 
actions and consequences. The paradigm encourages the researcher to explore the causes that lead to a 
particular phenomenon that is observed, the context in which that phenomenon is embedded, the actions 
taken or to be taken to deal with the phenomenon, the conditions facilitating or constraining these actions, 
and the results of these actions. Thus, the paradigm helped the researcher classify different categories into 
each of these six elements, so that a relationship between different categories associated with the same 
phenomenon could be established. This allowed the researcher to propose certain relationships between 
categories, and test and revise these relationships in other contexts. 
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categories regarding core risk and MCS phenomenon that were investigated in this 
thesis. 
It is worth mentioning that the second stage of coding not only helped draw 
relationships between different categories regarding the same core phenomenon, but 
also demonstrated variations between the same or similar phenomenon in different 
contexts or at different times. This is believed to increase the internal validity of the 
findings of this thesis (Yin 1989). 
In the third stage of coding, the researcher compared similarities and differences 
regarding core phenomenon observed in different contexts. These comparisons provided 
conditions to integrate a variety of relationships between categories into major themes 
around the core phenomenon under study. The comparisons were undertaken a few 
times, during which some relationships between categories (generated in the second 
stage of coding) were revised. Through these repetitive coding processes, three 
interrelated themes involving three rounds of experimentation on risk and risk 
management were developed. The first round of experimentation encompassed two 
years in the early 1990s, when China was experiencing its second stage of economic 
reform and open-up policy. During this period, the Chinese government began to 
encourage foreign companies to enter China and cooperate with local Chinese firms to 
undertake business. As such, for the first time, many Chinese firms had the opportunity 
to cooperate with Western firms, which resulted in a trend of learning about the West’s 
leading technology and management experience. The first round of experimentation 
centred on articulating risks under technology licensing agreements, and constructing 
the medium-duty engine JV and filtration JV with Delink. The second round of 
experimentation encompassed three years in the early 2000s, when China was 
experiencing rapid economic development. Economic development (such as 
constructing buildings and public infrastructure) could be seen in almost every aspect in 
China. The second round of experimentation involved articulating risks in the medium-
duty engine JV, and crafting a heavy-duty engine JV with Sag and a light-duty engine 
JV with Futong. The third round of experimentation occurred in 2012 and lasted for two 
years. During this period, China’s economic development was declining, as influenced 
by the global financial crisis. The third round of experimentation involved articulating 
new risks in the medium-duty engine JV, and constructing an ATS JV with Delink. For 
each round of experimentation, the three stages of the experimentation process (as 
discussed in Chapter 3) were identified and analysed. These three rounds of 
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experimentation were reviewed and validated with the field data. The three rounds of 
experimentation are summarised in Figure 5 and reported in detail in Chapters 5, 6 and 
7, respectively. 
It is worth mentioning that the three stages of the coding process did not occur in a 
sequential manner. For example, the first stage of coding was re-triggered when the 
researcher realised that there were still some gaps and unknown or poorly developed 
concepts in the process of undertaking the second stage of coding. The researcher 
moved back and forth between these three stages of coding processes before the 
eventual three themes were developed. 
 
Figure 5: Three Rounds of Experimentation 
4.6 Conclusion 
This chapter has presented the research methods employed in this thesis. It has 
demonstrated that using the field study method was appropriate because it enabled the 
collection of data necessary to use ANT (as the theoretical framework) to explain the 
articulation and evolution of risks and MCS. This chapter has described the three focal 
research sites (Cino, DECIE and DECIATS) at which data were collected, and the 
processes through which these sites were selected. This chapter has also provided an 
account of the multiple methods through which data were collected, including 
interviews, observation and document review, and discussed Patton’s (2002) three 
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stages of coding process that were used to analyse the data collected from the field. The 
following chapters discuss the findings of this thesis.  
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Chapter 5: Matters of Concern and the Emergence of an 
International JV 
5.1 Introduction 
This chapter presents an analysis of the matters of concern in a technology licensing 
agreement, the practices and processes through which these concerns became articulated 
as risks (leading to the formation of an engine JV between Cino and Delink), and how 
MCSs were implicated in these processes. This chapter is organised as follows. Section 
5.2 examines the processes through which an ‘unusual event’ in the technology 
licensing agreement led to the hypothesis of the existence of risks under the technology 
licensing agreement. Section 5.3 discusses how an engine JV was formulated as the 
solution to the hypothesised risks and risk concerns, and how MCSs were constructed 
therein. Section 5.4 analyses how the engine JV models, when enacted and operated, 
created a new problem. Section 5.5 discusses the findings, while Section 5.6 
summarises the chapter. 
5.2 Articulating an Engineering Problem as Risk 
Cino and Delink had been cooperating with each other in a technology licensing 
agreement for 10 years. At the end of the tenth year of cooperation, it was noticed that 
customer claims on engine repairs in the Chinese market were three times higher in 
number and twice as high in frequency as those received in the US. The engines sold in 
the Chinese market were made under the technology licensing agreement. Given that 
the core technology used in the engines made under this agreement and the equivalent 
engines made in the US head office were exactly the same, Cino expected that engines 
made in China should have similar performance and quality as those made in the US. 
As such, the high number and frequency of claims for engine repairs in the Chinese 
market were considered unusual to Cino, which became an issue for Cino. 
To make sense of the issue of the unusual number and frequency of customer claims for 
engine repairs, Cino undertook a technical inspection with the aim of diagnosing the 
causes of this issue. The decision to conduct a technical inspection was based on the 
fact that Cino had world-leading technicians, and it was believed that Cino’s technical 
strength would help discover the underlying reasons for this striking event. As 
explained by the director of Cino’s strategy department: 
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The easiest way for us to start with [diagnosing the unusual number and frequency of 
customer claims under the technology licensing agreement] was from the technical 
aspect … because it sounded like a technical problem, although we were not quite 
sure about what was going on there in China. The good thing was that we had 
experienced and qualified technicians and engineers that others did not have. You 
know, all our technicians and engineers received the most sophisticated and the best, I 
believe, training in the world. A large number of them had more than 20 years’ 
experience in engine service industry … I mean, they were really the elites in this 
industry. We strongly believed that they could give us an answer on this issue … That 
was the only and the best thing that we could do at that time. 
That is, the technical inspection was considered the best action Cino could take to begin 
investigating the unusual number and frequency of customer claims for engine repairs. 
Consequently, a technical team (comprising four engineers from the manufacturing 
department and four technicians from the quality control department of Cino’s head 
office) was sent to Delink’s manufacturing plant to diagnose possible reasons for the 
unusual number and frequency of customer claims for engines made under the 
technology licensing agreement. 
The technical inspection team examined the quality of engine materials and the 
assembling activities at Delink’s engine manufacturing site. They found that some 
major assembling jobs for engines were completed with manual labour. This 
manufacturing practice was compared to Cino’s general US practice, where similar 
assembling jobs were completed by machines or with the assistance of professional 
engineering instruments. For example, Delink completely relied on human labour to 
place a screw into the engine, according to certain installation positions. This meant that 
each job was done entirely based on the workers’ ‘feelings’, and there was no fixed 
standard to calibrate the tightness of the screws on the engines. This resulted in a 
situation where the tightness of screws on different engines had large variations, even 
though these jobs were completed by the same worker. In the US, the same task was 
completed by applying an electronic screw gun to ensure consistency in different jobs. 
Thus, the use of manual labour for assembling jobs was considered by the technical 
team to create a higher probability of engine performance differences than using 
machines. As such, the use of manual labour was problematised as an engineering 
problem that caused the unusual number and frequency of customer claims on engine 
repairs. The inspection team’s diagnosis of this engineering problem was recorded in an 
inspection report that was conveyed to Cino’s US head office. 
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Given that Cino had encountered this engineering problem for the first time, the 
company was unclear about the possible effects that might be caused by this problem. 
Thus, this problem became a matter of concern to Cino. To explore the possible effects 
of the problem, a research collective was constituted, comprising Cino’s marketing and 
sales director, CEO and CFO. Cino’s marketing and sales director had 30 years of sales 
and marketing experience in the automobile, food and finance industries. Cino’s CEO 
and CFO had good appreciation of the factors that could affect the company’s financial 
performance. The financial, marketing and sales expertise of actors in the research 
collective led them to focus on the commercial implications of the engineering problem. 
An experimentation process was undertaken through the combined use of inscriptions, 
personal feelings and past experience. The director of Cino’s marketing and sales 
department situated the engineering problem within his 30 years of work experience in 
the automobile industry. This led him to develop the feeling that Cino’s Chinese and 
global customers would attribute the failure of engines to Cino, even though the engines 
made under technology licensing were beyond Cino’s direct control. That is, if 
unresolved, the local engineering problem in the technology licensing agreement would 
have negative effects on Cino’s global reputation. 
To validate this feeling about the possible negative effects of the engineering problem 
on Cino’s global reputation, the marketing and sales director collected two inscriptions 
(historical documents and interview scripts) from two macro world actors (Cino’s past 
and existing regular US customers, respectively). First, the director of the marketing and 
sales department reviewed historical documents (a diagnostic report of past US 
customer complaints) with a particular focus on information relating to engine 
performance difference. Second, the sales and marketing director sent personnel to 
conduct informal interviews with Cino’s regular US customers in order to collect the 
customers’ opinions on the engine performance differences. The records in the historical 
documents and interview results were corroborated with each other, which suggested 
that customers, at least in US, strongly disliked engine performance differences. As 
noted by the director of Cino’s marking and sales department: 
By looking at the historical documents, it gives me a clear view on how customers 
reacted to engine performance difference in the past. Through the interviews, I am 
able to get first-hand information from our existing customers. This information is 
real data from our past and existing customers … you know, for engine service 
industry, customer satisfaction is always important and one of the priorities that we 
 76 
have to consider. Without the real record in the historical documents and the live 
customer feedback written in the interview script, my personal feeling is simply an 
assumption and I would not be confident in arguing my feeling out to others. 
The linking of historical documents and interview results helped the director of Cino’s 
marketing and sales department rationalise his feeling that the engineering problem 
would significantly damage potential customers’ confidence in Cino-branded engines in 
the Chinese market and possibly worldwide. The rationalised feeling of possible 
reduction of customers’ confidence became the basis of hypothesising the existence of 
potential damage to Cino’s global reputation. The potential damage on Cino’s local and 
global reputation resonates with the concept of ‘reputational risk’ proposed by Power et 
al. (2009). Power et al. (2009) use the concept of ‘reputational risk’ to describe the 
lowered trustworthiness or credibility of individuals’ or organisations’ as perceived by 
the public to which they are accountable. While this study shares similarity with Power 
et al. (2009) on the object of reputational risk, they are different on the source of the 
reputational risk. For Power, reputational risk is a secondary risk that only originates 
from management of another (first order) risk. If the concept of reputational risk was 
used in this study to represent the potential damage to Cino’s global reputation, it refers 
to the first order risk that is relating to a real local problem (poor quality engine 
product).         
In articulating reputational risk, Cino’s CEO and CFO simultaneously imagined the 
possible financial implications that may be caused by this risk. By drawing on their 
personal feelings and past experiences in the automobile industry, they conjectured that 
the consistent supply of high-quality and reliable engines was the main reason that 
customers chose to purchase Cino-branded engines. If customers lost confidence in 
Cino’s ability to make reliable engines, they were less likely to purchase Cino’s engines. 
This led the research collective to develop a hypothesis about the existence of possible 
negative financial effects on Cino’s Chinese and global business. 
Contrary to some prior research’s view that risks exist ‘out there’ and can be identified 
and measured, the above analysis indicates that reputational and financial risks were 
articulated. This view of risks is consistent with prior research that held a constructivist 
view on risks (Lupton 1999; Miller, Kurunmaki & O’Leary 2008; Rocher 2011). While 
prior research has argued that risk construction is purely a process occurring either in 
the macro or micro world, the above analysis extends prior research by presenting a 
specific practice (experimentation) in articulating risks. The experimentation process 
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disregards the distinction between the macro and micro world, and focuses on how the 
research collective connected the macro and micro world activities and actors to create a 
risk hypothesis. That is, risk was articulated as the outcome of an experimentation 
process, with the aim of making sense of the possible effects of an engineering problem 
on Cino’s global reputation and financial performance. This sense-making process was 
operationalised through the combined use of personal feelings and past experiences, a 
set of management control practices (technical inspection, linking inscriptions, referring 
to the company’s US practice, informal interviews and reviewing historical documents) 
and material devices (an inspection report, interview scripts and historical documents). 
Thus, management control practices—instead of managing risks as assumed in prior 
research (e.g., Anderson et al. 2015; Das & Teng 1998)—contributed to the articulation 
of risks. 
5.3 Emergence of an Engine JV Model to Solve the Engineering 
Problem 
The reputational and financial risks led Cino to experiment with possible solutions. For 
Cino, the best solution would include an arrangement that allowed Cino to have 
management control and monitoring power over the engine manufacturing processes. 
Obtaining management control and monitoring power was considered key to improving 
the quality of engines made under the technology licensing agreement, which would 
address the reputational and financial risk. Thus, a research collective was constituted to 
assess a possible economic arrangement that would achieve Cino’s management and 
monitoring aims. The research collective listed three possible solutions: direct 
intervention, direct investments and JVs. 
For the option of direct investments, Cino would have to establish its own 
manufacturing plant in China to build engines, so that the company could take charge of 
the engine manufacturing process. The operation of this option required the largest 
investment among the three alternatives. In addition, Cino had no experience of 
independently making sales in the Chinese market. As a result, the financial outcome of 
this option was uncertain. In addition, Chinese business law does not allow a foreign 
company to establish an independent manufacturing factory in the engine industry in 
China. According to Chinese business law, for foreign firms to create a JV that 
manufactures and sells engines in China, they need to work with at least one Chinese 
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local firm, and the foreign firm can hold a maximum of 50% of shares in the JV. As 
such, the use of the direct investment option was considered unfeasible. 
For the option of direct intervention, Cino would have to help Delink set up machines 
and equipment to replace the use of workers for some assembling tasks. Although Cino 
would attain one-off gain by selling the machines and equipment to Delink, this option 
was considered to give very limited management and monitoring power to Cino over 
Delink’s engine manufacturing process. Cino would still not have the authority to fully 
participate in Delink’s daily engine manufacturing processes. As such, it was uncertain 
how much the quality of engines made by Delink under the technology licensing 
agreement could be improved, so that the reputational and financial risk could be 
addressed. 
For the option of JV, Cino would need to make investments to form an independent 
manufacturing plant, and would need to participate in the daily operation of the 
potential JV. This was argued to give Cino greater management and monitoring power 
over the engine manufacturing process, compared to the option of direct intervention. It 
was also believed to offer a greater chance of helping Cino improve the quality of 
engines made under the technology licensing agreement. Further, although the JV 
option would need larger investments than the option of direct intervention, the 
formation of a JV would allow Cino to continue charging the technology licensing fees 
from Delink, and generate extra income by sharing revenues with Delink from the sale 
of engines (made in the JV). These two sources of income were considered sustainable 
and preferable to the option of direct intervention (where the revenue from selling 
machines and equipment to Delink would only be one-time gain). 
By considering the financial gains and the management and monitoring control power 
implication of the three alternative options, the research collective determined that 
forming an engine JV was the ‘optimal’ solution. Once the engine JV was hypothesised 
as the solution to address the reputational and financial risks under the technology 
licensing agreement, the focus of the research collective shifted to constructing a 
relational model for the JV, and selecting, negotiating and contracting with a potential 
partner firm. 
Selecting partner firms involved sourcing possible partner firms and assessing their 
suitability for partnering in a JV. Sourcing potential partner firms was guided by Cino’s 
business philosophy and potential partner firms’ willingness to cooperate. Cino had the 
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business philosophy of always cooperating with leading original equipment 
manufacturers (OEMs) to ensure as much engine sales as possible in the local market. 
This led to shortlisting two potential partner firms: Chinese First Automobile Group 
(known as FAW) and Chinese Second Automobile Group (now known as Delink). 
FAW and Delink were the two largest medium-duty commercial vehicle manufacturers 
and sellers in China. Cino contacted key personnel in FAW and Delink (separately and 
independently) to seek their opinions on the possibility of forming a JV. FAW had no 
intention of forming JV with Cino—it was entrusted by the Chinese central government 
to develop the Chinese automobile industry, and its focus was on independent R&D of 
engines. However, Delink showed strong interest in forming a JV with Cino, as it had 
the expectation of learning world-class engine technology. This interest in learning 
world-class technology helped Cino enrol Delink in its proposed engine JV network. 
Thus, Delink was targeted as the potential partner firm, and invited by Cino for further 
discussion regarding crafting an engine JV model. 
Cino’s executives formed a team to assess the suitability of Delink as the potential 
partner of the engine JV. The team focused on understanding how selecting Delink as 
the potential partner firm would help the proposed engine JV address the reputational 
and financial risk under the technology licensing agreement. This assessment process 
comprised four interconnected practices. First, a pre–JV formation audit was conducted 
by Cino, whereby an audit team of accounting, law, technology, information technology 
(IT) and quality control experts was sent to Delink to collect comprehensive 
information about Delink.9 This information was summarised and recorded in an audit 
report that was sent to Cino’s head office for further evaluation. Second, the team 
examined and discussed the financial liquidity and legal status of Delink in the Chinese 
market. They concluded that Delink was financially and legally healthy. Third, Delink’s 
sales volumes were collected from China Association of Automobile Manufacturers 
(CAAM),10 and compared to those of competitor firms in the Chinese medium market. 
This led to the perception that Delink had a dominant marketing position relative to its 
competitors in the Chinese medium-duty commercial vehicle market. This was 
                                                          
9 The information collected encompassed Delink’s production capacity, supply networks, engine R&D 
level, patented engine and related products, IT system, financial performance, market share, organisation 
structure, manufacturing plant, workers’ professional skills and personal safety. 
10 CAAM is a non-profit organisation that was established in 1987. One of its main functions is to collect, 
collate, analyse and disseminate technical and economic information about the automobile industry to the 
public. The organisation also tracks and understands technology development trends in domestic and 
foreign markets, and forecasts markets to provide information services to its member organisations. 
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considered critical to ensuring a reasonable number of Cino engine sales. Fourth, the 
perception of Delink’s dominant position in the Chinese medium-duty commercial 
vehicle market was corroborated with news reported by the local Chinese public media. 
This added validity to Delink’s perceived dominant market position. Thus, the 
suitability of Delink as a potential partner firm was determined not only by the financial 
relationship between Delink and Cino, but also by Delink’s connections with actors 
(Delink’s competitors in the Chinese market, CAAM and the public media). This 
resonates with Chua and Mahama (2007), who found that alliances’ practices are 
embedded in an ‘action net’ that is broader than the dyadic relationship between JV 
partners. 
In assessing the suitability of Delink as a potential JV partner, the research collective 
encountered two issues. The first issue was related to Delink’s traditional public 
ownership management system. Delink was 100% owned by the Chinese central 
government, and undertook social responsibilities. Delink had its own banks, hospitals, 
restaurants and schools, which provided services to Delink’s employees. Delink’s 
employees enjoyed internal discounted fees for the services provided by Delink, which 
were significantly lower than market prices. Delink was absorbing the cost of these 
internal discounted fees for services provided to its employees. In addition, under 
Delink’s existing costing system, utilities expenses unrelated to the engine 
manufacturing process per se (such as electricity expenses for heating in winter for 
employees) were allocated to engine production costs. The second issue was associated 
with Delink’s operational practices. In particular, the quality of welding masks used by 
workers did not meet the international standard, some workers did not wear welding 
masks at all in their daily work, and pirated software was widely used in Delink’s 
computers. As stated by the strategy manager in the engine JV: 
What Cino cared the most was the standardisation of the manufacturing process and 
workers’ personal safety. For example, it was not acceptable to Cino to use pirated 
computer software in the potential JV, while we [employees of Delink] were thinking 
about a different thing: why not the use cheaper copy that could perform exactly the 
same functions as that of a legal copy? Later, I realised that the US had a more well-
established legal system … I guess Cino was thinking ahead about any possible 
events and practices in potential JV that might cause risks to them. 
It was believed that Delink’s operational practices were likely to cause occupational 
health problems to the workers. 
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Delink’s public ownership management system and operational practices had never 
been used by Cino in its general practice in the US. This created ambiguity about how 
this public ownership management system and operational practices would affect 
Cino’s business, if applied in the proposed engine JV. Thus, Delink’s public ownership 
management system and operational practices became a concern to the research 
collective. 
To make sense of this concern, employees from Cino’s accounting and legal department 
were enrolled in the research collective, and a centre of calculation was established. The 
centre of calculation aimed to calculate the financial effects of Delink’s public 
ownership management system and operational practices on Cino-branded engines. To 
calculate the financial effects of Delink’s public ownership management systems, the 
research collective attained inscriptions from three actors in the macro world (the 
Chinese local automotive and US legal environment in which the proposed engine JV 
would be located). These three actors were Delink, CAAM and the US public media. 
From these three actors, inscriptions were collected that included historical cost data 
associated with Delink’s social responsibility, the sales price of competing medium-
duty engines available in the Chinese market, and the outcomes of similar legal cases in 
the US. These inscriptions were brought to the centre of calculation, which enabled the 
team to produce a new inscription: the estimated sales price of engines made in the 
proposed engine JV. The estimated engine sales price was much higher than that of 
most engines available in the Chinese market. This was considered to reduce the price 
competitiveness of engines to be made in the proposed engine JV in the Chinese 
medium-duty engine market. 
Further, the research collective attained inscriptions (newspapers and US regulations) 
that contained information about similar cases in the US. These inscriptions helped the 
research collective project the likely outcome if Delink’s operational practices were 
applied in the proposed engine JV. According to these inscriptions, Cino’s head office 
would incur a huge fine if one employee of the proposed engine JV was found to have 
an occupational health problem caused by using a poor-quality welding mask in the 
manufacturing process. In addition, if employees continued using pirated software in the 
proposed engine JV, Cino’s head office could face lawsuits with software developers, 
and incur penalties. This could lead to significant costs associated with such lawsuits. In 
addition, the use of poor-quality welding masks and pirated software would damage 
Cino’s reputation, particularly in developed countries. By using accounting calculation 
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inscriptions, the research collective developed a hypothesis about how Delink’s social 
responsibility and operating practices would pose risk exposure to the sales and 
reputation of the proposed engine JV, if applied in the engine JV. This risk exposure 
was considered to go against the original purpose of forming the engine JV, which was 
to address the reputational and financial risks associated with engines made under the 
technology licensing agreement. Thus, this risk exposure was unacceptable to Cino. 
While the research collective articulated risk concerns about the effects of Delink’s 
social responsibilities and operational practices on the proposed engine JV, they 
simultaneously sought possible solutions. Given that these risk concerns were 
unacceptable to Cino, the only solution was to remove Delink’s social responsibility and 
operating practices from the proposed engine JV. However, this would require consent 
from Delink. Cino was drawing on its world-leading engine technology and 
management experience to enrol Delink to accept its hypothesised model of removing 
social responsibility and operating practices from the proposed engine JV. Cino stated 
that it would not form an engine JV with Delink if Delink’s public management system 
and operating practices were applied in the proposed engine JV. This clear stance made 
Cino’s hypothesised model (removing social responsibility and operating practices from 
the proposed engine JV) become indispensable to Delink because Delink had a strong 
desire to import Cino’s world-leading engine technology to replace its obsolete engine 
technology. As a company owned by the Chinese central government, Delink had the 
historical responsibility of exporting Chinese-made commercial vehicles to other 
countries. The import of Cino’s world-leading engine technology was expected to 
increase the competitiveness of Delink’s commercial vehicles, which was helpful to 
Delink’s export business. Equally important, Delink was eager to learn advanced 
management and manufacturing experience skills from Cino. As explained by the 
engineering manager of the engine JV (a former engineer for Delink): 
In order to make the formation of the JV possible, Delink made a big concession with 
good faith of learning management experience and technology knowledge from Cino. 
Just after the formation of the JV, there were big personnel changes within Delink. 
Many old employees of Delink, particularly middle level managers, who worked for 
the original technology licensing agreement, were forced out of the JV. Instead, most 
employees in the JV were now Cino-appointed personnel. In addition, Cino-appointed 
personnel got promoted quickly in the JV, which made Delink-appointed personnel in 
the JV very unhappy. In order to achieve smooth transition to JV, Delink even sent 
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Minqi [one of the leaders of Delink Group] to the JV to repress the dissatisfaction of 
older employees of Delink in the JV. 
Thus, Cino’s mobilisation of its world-leading engine technology and management 
experience led to the successful enrolment of Delink in its proposed model without 
much contention. 
In summary, sourcing and shortlisting possible partner firms and assessing the 
suitability of a target partner firm formed an effective management control, which was 
believed (by the research collective) to ensure that the proposed engine JV would 
achieve the aim of addressing the financial and reputational risks associated with 
engines made under the technology licensing agreement. This resonated with Das and 
Teng (1998), Dekker (2004) and others who noted the importance of partner selection 
when managing risks associated with inter-firm alliances. While these prior studies 
focused on predefining the ‘golden rules’ that firms should always follow when 
selecting their alliance partners, the partner firm selection here was the outcome of an 
experimentation process. This experimentation process involved sourcing possible 
partner firms, testing the suitability of potential partner firms and enrolling targeted 
firms to make changes. This suggests that selecting alliance partner firms is not 
predetermined, but emerges as the outcome of an array of practical activities. 
The consideration of Delink as the potential partner firm laid the foundation for Cino 
and Delink to negotiate a theoretical JV contract model for the proposed engine JV. 
Cino made its proposed JV contract indispensable to Delink by mobilising its past JV 
operating experience. Cino had JV operating experience in other countries, while Delink 
had no such experience. This created an advantage for Cino and a problem for Delink, 
which let Cino dominate the negotiations to construct a theoretical JV contract model 
for the proposed engine JV. Indeed, Delink accepted most roles (to be enacted in the JV 
contract) proposed by Cino, without much contestable discussion. Most of the items 
proposed by Cino were immediately accepted by Delink during the negotiation between 
these two firms. These items covered issues relating to the partner firms’ responsibilities, 
share investment, engine JV’s board composition, reporting structure and budget for the 
pre–JV formation expenses. 
A total of seven items were agreed between Cino and Delink, which formed the basis 
for constructing the contract for the proposed engine JV. First, Delink would be mainly 
responsible for the manufacturing, marketing and sales activities for the potential JV, 
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while Cino would take the main role of researching and developing engine technology 
for the potential JV. Second, both parties would have an equal share in the potential 
engine JV. Third, a budget for pre-JV expenses would be jointly prepared by the partner 
firms, together with a formal control procedure for the approval and reimbursement of 
pre-JV expenses. Fourth, there were no specific requirements regarding the types of 
investment made by each partner firm, except that each party would make an equal 
amount of investment. Fifth, the JV board would have six members, among which three 
would be appointed by Cino, and three would be appointed by Delink. Sixth, the JV 
would adopt a dual reporting system. That is, the delegated employees would only need 
to report to the board members from the same partner firm, unless other arrangements 
were agreed between the partner firms—except for the annual board meeting, where 
basic accounting information (such as profits of the JV) would be shared between Cino 
and Delink. Seventh, there were discussions on staff appointments for key management 
positions in the potential JV. A Cino-delegated employee would take the general 
manager position. As a compromise, Delink would assign one of its employees as the 
deputy general manager position. A Cino-delegated employee would be appointed as 
the leader for manufacturing engines and controlling engine quality, while Delink 
would appoint one of its own employees to take charge of marketing and sales activities 
in the JV. Delink would appoint the accounting manager, while Cino would appoint the 
deputy accounting manager. They also agreed that other key management positions 
would be determined, if necessary, during the actual operation of JV. The agreements 
between Cino and Delink on these items provided the basis for drafting the engine JV 
contract. 
Interestingly, the agreement between Cino and Delink did not directly lead to the actual 
drafting and signing of the engine JV contract, but rather to a detour that hypothesised 
the formation of a filtration JV. This detour was initiated with the emergence of an actor 
in Delink’s business network. In the negotiations between Cino and Delink to draft a 
contract for the potential engine JV, Cino was informed that Delink was using Booth as 
the filtration supplier of engines made under the technology licensing agreement, and 
Delink was intending to continue using Booth as the filtration supplier in the proposed 
engine JV. Given that Booth was Cino’s major competitor in the Chinese market, 
Cino’s strategy director was very sensitive to the potential enrolment of Booth in the 
proposed engine JV. This led the research collective to focus on hypothesising how the 
enrolment of Booth in the proposed engine JV would influence the network relationship 
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between Cino, Booth and Delink. This sense-making process was facilitated through 
drawing on personal experience and open discussion between Cino’s executives. It was 
felt by most of Cino’s executives that there would be high probability of strategic 
cooperation (such as the formation of an engine JV) between Delink and Booth in the 
future, if the existing cooperative relationship between Delink and Booth was extended 
to the proposed engine JV. If the cooperation between Delink and Booth occurred, it 
would pose a large threat to the proposed engine JV between Cino and Delink. In 
addition, it was felt that, if Delink was able to acquire filtrations or filtration technology 
from Booth, it would reduce Delink’s dependence on Cino, and subsequently weaken 
Cino’s bargaining power in key management decisions during future operations of the 
proposed engine JV. 
Further, if the proposed engine JV was to procure filtrations from Booth, it would let 
Booth profit from Cino’s owned subsidiaries. It was felt that this would increase the 
overall competitive power of Booth in the Chinese market, which would indirectly 
weaken Cino’s competitive position. The potential danger of an uncooperative 
relationship between Cino and Delink and danger to Cino’s competitive position in the 
Chinese market became a risk concern to Cino if the proposed engine JV was to 
continue. 
The findings here show that risk concerns were hypothesised as the outcome of making 
sense of an unexpected problem (the use of Booth as the supplier of the proposed engine 
JV) that emerged in the process of crafting the engine JV model. This suggests that risk 
in inter-firm alliances can be articulated by hypothesising the proposed JV model, 
which can occur a priori to the actual formation and operation of inter-firm alliances. 
This finding adds to prior research (e.g., Das & Teng 1998; Dekker 2004) that treated 
risk in inter-firm alliances as a pure post–alliance formation phenomenon. Further, 
given that the engine JV model was proposed to address reputational and financial risk, 
the articulation of the risk concerns (in the process of crafting the engine JV model) 
suggests that new risks may be created as the unexpected outcome of organisations’ 
efforts to manage risks. This is consistent with Chua and Mahama (2007), Power (2007) 
and Vinnari and Skærbæck (2014), who argued that risk management may result in 
unexpected consequences or end up with risk management of nothing. 
The hypothesised danger associated with the potential enrolment of Booth in the 
proposed engine JV led the research collective to craft other possible solutions. One 
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solution was raised in the meetings of Cino’s executives—to discuss with Delink 
whether there was a possibility to form a filtration JV with Delink to supply filtrations 
to the engine JV. The logic was simple: forming a filtration JV with Delink to supply 
the filtrations to the proposed engine JV would help remove Booth from Delink’s 
business network, and build trust between Cino and Delink in the JV. The initiative of 
forming a filtration JV was significant to the proposal of forming an engine JV because 
it required much less initial investment. This was particularly important because Cino 
and Delink did not have much past experience with each other in jointly operating a JV. 
The research collective aimed to mobilise the operation of the filtration JV as a pilot test 
(a form of experiment) for the proposal to form an engine JV. As a result, the research 
collective suspended the crafting of an engine JV model, and redirected attention to the 
possibility of forming a filtration JV with Delink: 
The actual formation of an engine JV between Cino and Delink was a step-by-step 
process. I mean, both partner firms perceived the need for the formation of DECIE 
[the engine JV between Cino and Delink], but they were just not quite sure whether 
they should jump straight away to that spot. I guess, on the one hand, both partners 
had not yet got enough trust in each other. On the other hand, given that Delink was 
the central government–owned company, Delink had some concerns about the 
ownership of the state property after the JV was formed. Thus, the formation of the 
filtration JV emerged as a good transition for partner firms to build more trust in each 
other before the eventual formation of the engine JV (DECIE-appointed strategy 
manager in the engine JV). 
Cino used two tactics to successfully enrol Delink to form a filtration JV. First, Cino’s 
world-class technology and management experience in manufacturing filtrations were 
strong seduction to Delink. This was because, as aforementioned, Delink was eager to 
learn world-class engine and engine-related technology, as a company owned by the 
Chinese central government. Second, the proposal of forming a filtration JV was argued 
by Cino to better consider Delink’s interest. It was proposed by Cino that the potential 
filtration JV would be able to replace Booth to supply filtrations to the potential engine 
JV. Delink was told that filtrations made in the proposed filtration JV would pair better 
with engines made in the proposed engine JV because these products both used Cino-
based technology. The paring between Cino technology–based filtrations and engines 
was expected to increase the engine performance made in the potential engine JV. 
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The negotiations between Cino and Delink for the formation of a filtration JV 
progressed very quickly without much resistance or many obstacles. It was proposed 
that the theoretical management control model that initially hypothesised the potential 
engine JV (on items including responsibilities, share investment, board composition, 
reporting structure and pre-JV expenses) should be transplanted to the filtration JV. This 
led to the signing of a contract and enactment of the filtration JV. Cino and Delink 
strictly followed the theoretical management model, and both partner firms were 
cooperative with each other in trying to put filtrations into production. Within two years, 
the filtration JV had successfully launched the production of six or seven Fleetguard 
products, and a host of Delink-designed filtration products under non-exclusive licenses. 
The cooperative experience in operating the filtration JV built trust between Cino and 
Delink. This trust laid the foundation to launch the proposed engine JV between Cino 
and Delink. This resonates with Van der Meer-Kooistra and Vosselman (2000), 
Langfield-Smith and Smith (2003), Dekker (2004) and others, who found that trust is an 
important management control mechanism in developing and managing alliance 
relationships. However, this thesis extends prior research by discussing a different path 
that led to trust building in the inter-firm alliance. Van der Meer-Kooistra and 
Vosselman (2000) and Dekker (2004) found that trust between alliance partners 
depends on their past cooperative experience. Through a case study, Langfield-Smith 
and Smith (2003) showed that trust is gradually developed through cooperative 
activities between partner firms during the ongoing development and management of 
inter-firm alliances. In contrast, this thesis found that trust in the engine JV was 
developed as the outcome of taking a ‘detour’ (forming a filtration JV) from the ‘main 
road’ (the proposal to form an engine JV). 
5.4 Emergence of New Concerns 
Two years after the operation of the filtration JV, the proposed engine JV and 
hypothesised theoretical management control model (as articulated in the micro world) 
were returned to the macro world for implementation and realisation of the collective 
interests of Delink and Cino. In enacting the theoretical model, both partner firms acted 
strictly according to the JV contract. Delink used some of its own suppliers and sales 
agents for the engine JV. Delink-appointed personnel were told to strictly follow the 
procedures and practices introduced by Cino. Cino invested one of its classic engine 
products, as well as equipment and machines, into the engine JV. Cino also sent a 
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training team to the engine JV to help employees learn how to use the equipment and 
machines, and to teach other working and management knowledge. 
Besides the clauses stated in the JV contract, Cino and Delink took voluntary action to 
support the operation of the engine JV. First, Delink promised 100% penetration rate of 
engines made in the JV. That is, if a surplus of engines made in the engine JV were left 
unsold, Delink would purchase all these engines. Second, both Cino and Delink 
voluntarily shared cost and compatibility information. In addition, information about the 
compatibility between the engines made in the engine JV and commercial vehicles 
made by Delink was voluntarily provided by Delink to Cino. Cino used this 
compatibility information to modify and improve engine technology. Third, Delink 
liaised and convinced the local provincial government to provide preferential tax 
policies, and to establish a reservoir to supply high-quality talents for the JV. The JV 
between Cino and Delink was considered by the local government as one of 100 major 
projects, and the local government sought to ensure the success of the JV project. 
Due to the collaborative atmosphere between the partner firms, the problem of poor-
quality engines under the technology licensing agreement was solved. This led to a 
significant and unexpected increase of engine sales in the Chinese market in the first 
five years of operation of the engine JV. With the worldwide reputation and sales 
network of Cino, the JV’s exporting business also increased dramatically. The sales of 
engines made in the JV in China and overseas markets had increased by roughly 120% 
in the first four years of operation. Cino created an accounting chart (see Graph 1) to 
depict the increase in sales and comparisons between sales in the Chinese domestic 
market and overseas markets in different years. 
Although there had been a dramatic increase in the sales of engines made by the engine 
JV, Cino believed that the JV could sell even more engines, given the large demand for 
engines made in the JV in the Chinese market. In other words, Cino felt that current 
sales of engines made in the JV were far from reaching the potential demand in the 
Chinese market: 
The contradiction between demand and supply was the biggest problem we had this 
year. This problem was particularly salient in the recent three months. The supply of 
engines fell short of demand. Engine sales kept on increasing every consecutive 
month. Workers had continuously worked for a long time. There was urgent need for 
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workers to rest and recover; for more investments on equipment (work summary for 
the year 2000 and work ideas for 2000 and 2001). 
Cino did not anticipate the situation of rapid engine sales growth, given that the 
company’s primary initial intention of forming the JV with Delink was to improve the 
quality of engines made by Delink under the technology licensing agreement. The rapid 
increase in sales of engines made in the JV was perceived by Cino as an opportunity to 
expand its production scale and increase engine JV sales in China. 
 
Graph 1: The Increase and Comparison of Domestic and Overseas Sales of Cino 
Technology–based Engines from 1993 to 2000 
Cino took advantage of the opportunity of rapid engine sales growth in the Chinese 
market by introducing a new series engine into the engine JV. The introduction of the 
new series engine further boosted the sales of the engine JV between Cino and Delink. 
The significant increase of engine sales made Cino believe that China was becoming a 
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dominant medium-duty engine market in the world. This was explained by the director 
of Cino’s strategy department: 
You know that, in the 1990s, China was implementing the economic reform and 
opening-up policy when we formed the JV here in China. China was experiencing 
rapid economic development at that time and buildings, social infrastructures, 
highways were up everywhere. Everywhere was under construction. Chinese 
economy was developing so fast that every company wanted to have its operations 
expanded to China. What did that mean to us? Opportunities! Transporting building 
materials from the factory to the construction sites needed vehicles; more and more 
highways meant that the logistics industry would become much more flourishing than 
before, which also meant that the demand for commercial vehicles would largely 
increase. Our strong sales in the engine JV had confirmed our anticipation of the 
potential huge Chinese market. 
By realising the potential of the Chinese medium-duty engine market, Cino planned to 
further increase sales of the engine JV by enlarging the JV’s target customer range. In 
particular, Cino proposed opening the sales of engines (made by the engine JV) to non–
Delink related OEMs to maximise the engine JV’s profit.11 Cino explained this initiative 
to Delink and believed that Delink would accept this proposal; however, Delink rejected 
the proposal to enlarge the JV’s target customer range. For Delink, if engines made in 
the engine JV were sold to non–Delink related OEMs, it would reduce the 
competitiveness and uniqueness of Delink’s own medium-duty commercial vehicles, as 
Delink would not be the only OEM in China to own Cino technology–based engines. 
The possible reduced competitiveness and uniqueness of Delink’s own commercial 
vehicles was thought to threaten Delink’s dominant position in the Chinese medium-
duty commercial vehicle market. In fact, Delink stated to Cino that it would only make 
additional investment to match Cino’s investments to the engine JV if engines made by 
the JV were sold only to Delink or Delink-related OEMs. As stated by the chief strategy 
manager of the engine JV: 
It did not make any sense for Delink to supply engines made in its subsidiary 
company [DECIE] to its competitors. We knew that Cino wanted more and more 
profits and they had certain performance indicators to achieve. But they did not 
understand Chinese local situations, which was totally different to that in the US or 
                                                          
11 Under the current engine JV arrangement, Delink was in charge of the sales and sales channels of the 
engine JV, and engines made under the engine JV between Cino and Delink were exclusively sold to 
Delink and Delink-related OEMs (the original commercial vehicle manufacturers). 
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Europe. In China, most local companies did not have the independent research and 
development capability of making engines that had the same performance and quality 
as those made in DECIE. And most Chinese customers firmly believed that US and 
European technology–based engines would be much better than those locally-made 
ones … What I am trying to say is that engine meant almost everything for customers 
when they chose commercial vehicles. Delink could not give its strength [Cino 
technology–based engines] to our competitors, which would otherwise not be able to 
differentiate Delink’s commercial vehicles from those of its competitors. 
Delink’s concerns about Cino’s proposal to enlarge the engine JV’s target customer 
range seemed irrational to Cino. As explained by the marketing and sales manager of 
Cino: 
I think the underlying logic is simple. The more engines DECIE could sell, the more 
profits both firms [Cino and Delink] could earn. We understand that Delink was 
afraid that, if Cino technology–based engines were supplied to other OEMs in the 
Chinese market, it might have some negative effects on our partner firm’s [Delink’s] 
sales of commercial vehicles. But we believed that the sales of commercial vehicle 
would depend not only on engine itself, but also other things, like brand name, 
interior decoration, after-sale service and sales promotion, etcetera. I mean, it was the 
whole ‘package’ that would affect customers’ ultimate choice on the purchase of 
commercial vehicles. You know, doing business with competitors was not an unusual 
practice in the US. I felt that this control structure [opening sales to non-Delink or 
non–Delink related OEMs in the Chinese market] would create less competitive 
conflict, and more effectively allow DECIE to target OEM opportunities outside of 
those defined by Delink. Unfortunately, under the existing management structure, 
Delink was in charge of the sales channel of DECIE and they were reluctant to sell 
engines made in DECIE to other OEMs in the Chinese market. This would limit the 
potential profit that we could get from the JV. 
Thus, Delink was concerned about the long-term strategic effect, while Cino was 
focused on the short-term financial benefit of enlarging the target customer range of the 
potential engine JV. Cino continued exerting efforts to convince Delink to accept its 
proposal to enlarge the engine JV’s target customer range by (i) highlighting how the 
engine JV and Delink would benefit financially and (ii) exemplifying similar practices 
(of firms cooperating while simultaneously competing) in the US. However, this 
persuasion failed. Delink insisted that the engine JV’s existing customer range should 
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be maintained, whereby engines made in the JV should only be sold to Delink or 
Delink-related customers. 
Delink’s clear position of being unwilling to enlarge the engine JV’s target customer 
range to non–Delink related OEMs went against Cino’s plan to expand engine sales in 
the Chinese market. The failure to persuade Delink to enlarge the engine JV’s target 
customer range became a matter of concern to Cino. Thus, Cino undertook a set of 
activities and practices to make sense of this concern, which will be discussed in the 
next chapter. 
5.5 Discussion 
This section discusses how the findings of the data analysed in this chapter addressed 
the research questions of this thesis. First, we found that reputational and financial risk 
prior to the formation of the medium-duty engine JV was articulated as the outcome of 
an experimentation process. This experimentation process involved diagnosing the 
causes of the problem (an unusual number and frequency of customer claims for engine 
repairs) that Cino encountered in the macro world of its daily operations, and 
constituting a research collective (consisting of Cino’s directors) in the micro world (a 
manageable virtual environment) to hypothesise the potential effects of this problem. 
Second, the articulation of risks influenced construction of the MCS. The articulation of 
risks made the research collective draw and connect a set of management control 
practices (such as conducting a pre–JV formation audit and mobilising world-leading 
engineering technology and management experience to enrol partner firms and open 
discussion) with the hope of seeking and developing solutions to these risks. This led to 
the construction of theoretical management control models (partner selection, JV 
contract and formation of a filtration JV) that were intended to deal with the risks in the 
proposed engine JV. Third, in crafting an engine JV model to address reputational and 
financial risks, new problems emerged. Making sense of these emerging problems 
became the basis of articulating new risk concerns in the proposed engine JV. In 
addition, this chapter has discussed how the enactment and operation of the proposed 
engine JV model addressed the risks (concerns), while simultaneously generating a new 
problem (the failure to expand sales of the JV). 
Three themes are salient in the above findings: (i) constructing a risk management 
model, (ii) the mutually constitutive relationship between risk and risk management 
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practices and (iii) the use of a JV to build trust between partner firms. These three 
themes are discussed in the following sections. 
5.5.1 Constructing a risk management model 
This chapter found that an engine JV, partner selection, JV contract and filtration JV 
were the theoretical models used by Cino to manage risks. This provides additional 
support for the finding of Dekker (2004) that formal control (JV contract) and social 
control (partner selection) are important MCS for managing problems in inter-firm 
alliances. While Dekker (2004) and similar others formulate a set of sounding alliance 
conditions under which these formal and informal controls ought to be used, this 
chapter finds that risk management models emerge as the outcome of a set of everyday 
relating practices. As such, the finding of this chapter is more consistent with prior 
research’s view on the constructivist nature of MCS (Lupton 1999; Mahama & Ming 
2007; Miller et al. 2008). However, this chapter extends prior research by identifying a 
particular way through which risk management models are constructed: - the 
experimentation process. This experimentation process was undertaken by the research 
collective in the micro world in Cino’s offices, where data gathered from the Chinese 
engine market were transported, disassembled, manipulated and reassembled in a 
different form. This chapter has discussed how the proposal to form an engine JV 
resulted from the research collective’s efforts to compare three competing options that 
had the possibility to manage financial and reputational risk under the technology 
licensing agreement. The selection of Delink as the partner firm of the proposed engine 
JV was the outcome of the research collective’s tentative enrolment of two potential 
partner firms, examination of the suitability of the target firms as JV partners, and 
choice made therein. The JV contract was drafted after iterative discussions in the 
research collective, during which some items were challenged and renegotiated before 
being eventually listed in the proposed engine JV contract. The proposal to form a 
filtration JV was the outcome of imagining a possible network relationship between 
Cino, Delink and one of Delink’s existing supplier firms. The finding here suggests that 
the risk management model was not prescribed based on certain theoretical principles or 




5.5.2 Mutually constitutive relationship between risk and risk management 
practices 
This chapter found that financial and reputational risks under the technology licensing 
agreement made the research collective undertake the management control action of 
assessing, testing and comparing alternative economic arrangements to experiment with 
risk solutions. This led the research collective to hypothesise the proposal to form an 
engine JV as the solution to manage financial and reputational risk. In the process of 
crafting the engine JV model, the combined use of a set of management control actions 
(a pre–JV formation audit, a competition analysis, reference to the public media, 
relating concerned partner firm practices to similar cases in the US, and accounting 
calculations) and inscriptions (production costs and sales price of engines made in the 
proposed engine JV and competing firms, newspaper articles and US regulation) helped 
identify problems, and generate and objectify risk perception. This became the basis of 
articulating new risk concerns about damaged global reputation and sales. This finding 
challenges the implicit assumption widely immersed in the accounting literature (e.g., 
Anderson et al. 2015; Dekker 2004; Van der Meer-Kooistra & Vosselman 2000) that 
MCS are always used to manage risks. MCS also actively contributes to formulate the 
identity of risks by sourcing the object of and producing knowledge on such risks. In 
addition, prior research have the implicit assumptions that risk in inter-firm alliances 
can only be caused by activities or events (such as partner firms’ opportunistic 
behaviour) that occur after these alliances are formed. This chapter extends their 
findings by showing how risk in inter-firm alliances can arise in the process of crafting 
the JV model, prior to the actual formation of the JV.   
Consistent with prior research (Dekker 2004; Anderson et al. 2015), this chapter found 
that risks influence the choices and articulation of MCS. It has been shown that risk 
concerns triggered Cino to mobilise another set of management control actions 
(negotiation with partner firm and mobilising world-leading engine technology and 
management experience) to experiment with possible solutions to mitigate these risk 
concerns. This became the basis of crafting an engine JV contract and developing the 
proposal to form a filtration JV as risk management practices. As can be seen, the risk 
management practices were both the outcomes and conduits of risks. Thus, risk and risk 
management practices co-constitute each other. 
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The co-constitutive relationship between risk and risk management practices suggests 
that new risk (concern) may be created as the outcome of managing risk. For example, 
in crafting the engine JV model to deal with reputational and financial risks under the 
technology licensing agreement, new risk concerns about potential damage to Cino’s 
Chinese and global reputation and sales, and about the use of Booth as the filtration 
supplier of the proposed engine JV, were also hypothesised. This finding provides 
additional support for Vinnari and Skærbæck’s (2014) study which argues that 
managing risks may cause unexpected outcomes. Similar to their argument, this chapter 
showed that the use of MCS in managing risks in inter-firm alliances may lead to the 
creation of new risks within the same alliances. This finding contributes to prior 
research (e.g. Dekker 2004; Anderson et al. 2014) that examine MCS in inter-firm 
alliances.  
5.5.3 Using alliances to build trust between partner firms 
Cino formed a filtration JV with Delink to mitigate risk exposure to using Cino’s 
competitor firm (Booth) in the engine JV between Delink and Cino. In particular, Cino 
suspended continuation of the proposal to form the engine JV, while taking a detour to 
form a filtration JV. The formation and operation of the filtration JV helped build trust 
between Cino and Delink. This trust laid the foundation for the formation of the engine 
JV between these two partner firms. This finding extends Langfield-Smith and Smith 
(2003) and Mahama and Chua (2016) by revealing how trust between partner firms in 
one alliance can be achieved through concurrent activities (the formation of another 
alliance) outside this alliance.  
5.6 Conclusion 
This chapter has demonstrated three stages of the experimentation process, through 
which risks and MCSs in the JV were articulated. In the first stage, the problem of an 
unusual number and frequency of customer claims under the technology licensing 
agreement was reduced to an engineering problem. In the second stage, a research 
collective was formed to understand the implications of the engineering problem for 
Cino’s future business. This led to the articulation of reputational and financial risks 
under the technology licensing agreement with Delink. To address these risks, an engine 
JV between Cino and Delink was experimented as the solution. Crafting the engine JV 
model encountered unexpected problems, which led to the formulation of new risk 
concerns related to Cino’s global sales and reputation. These new risk concerns were 
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believed to hinder the accomplishment of the original purpose of forming the engine JV, 
which led the research collective to construct risk management models (a JV contract 
and formation of a filtration JV). The enactment of the proposed engine JV model 




Chapter 6: Matters of Concern and Crafting a JV Portfolio 
6.1 Introduction 
This chapter analyses the processes and practices through which Cino articulated the 
risk of over-dependence on Delink in the Chinese market. A JV portfolio model was 
experimented as the solution to this risk. This chapter also discusses how the enactment 
of the JV portfolio model created new concerns. This chapter is organised as follows. 
Section 6.2 examines the processes of how Cino made sense of the issue of failing to 
enlarge the engine JV’s target customer range, through which the risk of over-
dependence on Delink was articulated. Section 6.3 discusses how the proposal to form a 
JV portfolio emerged as the solution to deal with the risk of over-dependence on Delink. 
This section also discusses how the JV portfolio was problematised in the process of 
crafting a theoretical management model for the JV, and how these problems were 
solved. Section 6.4 discusses how the enactment and operation of the alliance portfolio 
generated new problems. Section 6.5 discusses the findings from the data analysed in 
this chapter, while Section 6.6 concludes this chapter. 
6.2 Articulating the Problem of Exclusive Dependence on Delink as 
Risk 
Cino’s failure to persuade Delink to enlarge the engine JV’s target customer range, as 
discussed in the previous empirical chapter, caused Cino’s management to consider the 
firm’s long-term strategy in the Chinese market. The strategic analysis focused on 
examining the Chinese medium-duty commercial vehicle market, and the importance of 
Delink to Cino’s business in China. To facilitate strategic analysis, two management 
control practices were simultaneously undertaken. First, Cino calculated and compared 
the sales growth rate and market share of Delink and other local medium-duty OEMs in 
the Chinese market, based on the information collected from CAAM. Through these 
calculations and comparisons, Cino found that Delink’s sales volume of medium-duty 
commercial vehicles was three times more than that of the second-largest OEM in the 
Chinese market, and Delink took one-third of the share of the Chinese medium-duty 
commercial vehicles market. Second, Cino conducted interviews with sales agents of 
Delink’s commercial vehicles and collected their opinions about Delink’s next five 
years of sales. Different sales agents’ opinions were grouped based on similarities, 
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which led to the emergence of three categories (negative, neutral and positive). The 
grouping of the interview results showed that the majority of Delink’s sales agents had a 
strong positive opinion about Delink’s leading position in the Chinese market for the 
next five years. 
The results of the accounting calculations were corroborated with those from the 
interviews, which suggested that Delink had stable and the largest medium-duty engine 
sales in the Chinese market. Cooperating with Delink could guarantee a huge amount of 
Cino’s sales of medium-duty engines. No other medium-duty OEM in the Chinese 
medium-duty engine market would replace Delink’s position in Cino’s Chinese 
business. Thus, Cino concluded that it was not affordable to lose Delink in the Chinese 
market. However, continuing to cooperate with Delink would mean that Cino would 
lose the opportunity to make engine sales to non-Delink OEMs in the Chinese medium-
duty engine market. As such, Cino’s Chinese business would exclusively depend on 
Delink. This exclusive dependence on Delink became a matter of concern to Cino. 
To make sense of the issue of Cino’s exclusive dependence on Delink in the Chinese 
market, Cino’s CEO, CFO, strategy director and accounting director constituted an 
expert team (a type of research collective) to evaluate the potential effects of such 
reliance on Cino’s future business in China. To evaluate the potential effects, the 
research collective gathered information about Cino, Delink and a few actors outside the 
engine JV that were likely to affect the engine JV. These outside actors included Cino’s 
and Delink’s competitors, and potential commercial vehicle customers in the Chinese 
market and other global markets. In this manner, the research collective used 
information to create a network of relations that allowed them to evaluate how Cino’s 
future Chinese business would be affected by possible relations among actors in the 
network. This experimentation process was conducted through four interconnected 
practices. 
First, the research collective expected that the exclusive dependence on Delink was 
likely to tie Cino’s future business in China solely to Delink’s business performance. 
This was believed to place Cino in a vulnerable position, where the company’s future 
business in China would be directly and significantly affected by Delink’s competitive 
relationships with other local medium-duty OEMs. Although Delink was currently 
taking one-third of the Chinese medium-duty commercial vehicle market, the possibility 
that Delink’s market share would become saturated or even decrease in the future could 
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not be excluded. This was particularly concerning because more and more commercial 
vehicle companies were entering the Chinese medium-duty commercial vehicle market. 
If Delink’s sales of medium-duty commercial vehicles became saturated (decreased), 
the sales of engines made by the engine JV would also be fixed (decrease). This was 
explained by the chief strategy manager of the engine JV: 
The introduction of a C series engine to the engine JV [between Cino and Delink] 
would no doubt increase the overall sales of our engines. However, those sales were 
all made to Delink or Delink-related OEMs. But you had to think about the whole 
Chinese medium-duty commercial vehicle market. How about if the engine JV met all 
the demands of Delink and Delink-related customers in the future? When that 
happens, would there be still any opportunity for the growth of the engine JV business? 
If we would limit our sales to only Delink and Delink-related OEMs, one day the 
demand and supply for engines made in the engine JV would be saturated. 
As demonstrated by this quotation, Cino imagined that it might be too risky to 
exclusively depend on Delink to guarantee Cino’s future sales in the Chinese market. 
Second, the sales volume and growth rate for the entire Chinese commercial vehicle 
market (including the light-, medium- and heavy-duty commercial vehicles12 markets) 
were compared to those in some European, North American and African counties. This 
showed that China was becoming the largest commercial vehicle sales market in the 
world. In fact, it was revealed that the Chinese commercial vehicle market had grown at 
a rate of 10.8% per annum in each consecutive year from 1999 to 2002. Thus, the 
research collective concluded that there was huge growth potential in the Chinese 
commercial vehicle market. As the CEO of Cino explained: 
We all felt that Cino should increase its investments in China. China had key factors 
to make itself become a huge commercial vehicle market. First, China had vast 
territory and abundant resources. Second, China was undertaking highway and 
infrastructure construction. Although the total length of China’s highway was just 
over 500 kilometres at the end of the 1990s, it was growing at 800 to 900 kilometres 
per year. We all agreed that China would surpass North America and Europe and 
become the largest commercial vehicle market in the world one day in the near future. 
However, …we all believed that that day would come, but we just didn’t realise that 
                                                          
12  At the time when information about the Chinese medium-duty commercial vehicle market was 
collected, Cino incidentally collected information about the Chinese heavy- and light-duty commercial 
vehicles markets. 
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the day came so quickly, and much quicker than what we expected. Fortunately, the 
sales information collected from CAAM and the interviews made it clear to us that 
the Chinese commercial vehicle market was becoming the biggest commercial 
vehicle market in the world. 
As can be seen from the quotation, Cino realised the huge potential of the Chinese 
commercial vehicle market, and was eager to increase its engine sales in China with the 
momentum of the rapid Chinese economic development. However, the exclusive 
dependence on Delink would limit Cino’s engine sales to other non-Delink OEMs in the 
Chinese market (particularly light- and heavy-duty commercial vehicle markets). This 
led the research collective to develop the hypothesis that Cino might end up giving the 
rest of the market (non–Delink related business) to its competitors, and subsequently 
lose a large amount of potential customers in the Chinese market. 
Third, Cino analysed the business practices of its major Chinese local competitor firms. 
This highlighted that Cino’s local Chinese competitors (such as Weecai and Yuchai) 
were developing at a rapid speed. The sales of engines made by Weecai and Yuchai 
were spreading to more and more different OEMs in the Chinese market: 
Our competitors were supplying engines to many different OEMs, while we only had 
one OEM [Delink and Delink-related OEMs]. This put us at a very disadvantaged 
position. Although the total sales volume of Delink’s commercial vehicles was 
growing each year in the past, the market share of Delink in medium-duty 
commercial vehicles was relatively constant. If we kept Delink as our only supplier in 
the Chinese market, it would mean that we would be locked by Delink, and our future 
development in China would be limited. I mean, it was going to be hard for us to 
occupy more market share other than that of Delink’s in China. If you look at what 
our competitors were doing, particularly Weecai and Yuchai, they kept on increasing 
their market share by selling their products to more and more OEMs—I mean, totally 
different OEMS. I guess that’s one of main reasons that made them develop from the 
brink of bankruptcy to a company whose sales were second to ours in the Chinese 
market (strategy manager of Cino). 
The above quotation demonstrates how the research collective felt that local competitors’ 
sales expansion strategies would pose a threat to Cino’s business in China. 
Fourth, the research collective linked the issue of Cino’s exclusive dependence on 
Delink to Delink’s opportunistic behaviour in the engine JV. In particular, the 
procurement cost for components of B series engines made in the engine JV was 3% to 
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5% higher than the market price. Cino knew that the suppliers of these components 
were Delink-appointed companies. However, given that Delink was responsible for the 
procurement of engine components, as determined in the engine JV agreement, Cino 
was unable to control or intervene in Delink’s choice of supplier for the engine JV: 
As we kept on investing in DECIE, risks associated with Delink would increase as we 
would gradually lose our bargaining power. This would happen because Delink was 
our only customer in China…Delink was in charge of the procurement of components 
for the B series engine in the JV. The supplier they chose gave us a higher price than 
the market price. We knew that the component supplier was a Delink-related 
company. We had to bear this higher price and try to recover this loss by selling the 
engine at a higher price or making more sales to Delink. And we could not choose 
other engine component suppliers because it would damage our JV relation. If the JV 
relation was damaged, we would cut off our own revenue source in the Chinese 
market. The point I was trying to make was that if, today, Delink used its identify of 
being our own and biggest customer as the point of bargaining for procurement-
related benefit, they might do the same thing for decisions in other areas in the future 
(manager of Cino’s strategy department). 
Thus, the research collective believed that Cino’s exclusive dependence on Delink 
would encourage Delink’s opportunistic behaviour in the future operation of the engine 
JV. 
In summary, these four interconnected practices led the research collective to develop a 
hypothesis about the existence of risk exposure from Delink’s potential opportunistic 
behaviour and the loss of a large number of potential customers in the Chinese market. 
The hypothesis became the basis of articulating the risk of over-dependence on Delink 
in the Chinese market. The risk exposure from Delink’s opportunistic behaviour (one 
dimension of the risk of over-dependence on Delink) refers to the possibility that Delink 
may take the advantage of its position in the engine JV to choose preferred suppliers so 
as to obtain self-benefits at the expense of Cino’s interests. This is similar to the 
relational risk (Das & Teng 1996) or appropriation risk (Dekker 2004) conceptualised in 
prior research. In addition, risk exposure associated with the potential loss of the rest of 
the market in which the partner firm operated. The potential loss of the rest of the 
market could affect the JV’s performance, and thus Cino’s China business. This 
resembled the concept of performance risk proposed in prior research (Das & Teng 
1996). However, while Das and Teng (1996) argued that relational risk and performance 
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risk are mutually exclusive to each other in inter-firm alliances, the finding here extends 
prior research by showing how these two risks could coexist in the form of two 
dimensions of the risk of over-dependence on a JV partner firm. 
Also, this risk of over-dependence on Delink could be seen as the consequence of 
Cino’s efforts to make sense of an unexpected problem (Cino’s failure to enlarge the 
target customer range of the engine JV) that emerged when enacting and operating the 
engine JV model. Given that the engine JV model was originally proposed as the 
solution to address financial and reputational risk under the technology licensing 
agreement (as discussed in the previous chapter), it could be interpreted that the risk of 
over-dependence on Delink in the engine JV was articulated as the outcome of 
managing risks that led to the formation of the JV. This finding supports prior research 
by Chua and Mahama (2007), Power (2007) and Vinnari and Skærbæck (2014) about 
the consequences of risk management. In addition, this finding extends prior research 
by presenting a specific practice (the experimentation process) that helped realise and 
understand the consequences of risk management. 
6.3 Crafting an Alliance Portfolio as a Solution to the Risk of Over-
dependence on Delink 
In articulating the risk of over-dependence on Delink, the research collective 
simultaneously experimented with possible solutions that were intended to manage 
these risks. The research collective sought possible economic arrangements with the 
possibility of expanding Cino’s engine sales to non–Delink related customers in the 
Chinese market, without compromising Delink’s competitive position. Given that 
Delink was clearly unwilling to sell medium-duty engines made in the engine JV to 
non–Delink related customers in the Chinese market, the only option available for Cino 
to expand its engine sales was entering the Chinese light- and heavy-duty commercial 
vehicle market. 
Thus, the research collective assessed the potential to enter the Chinese light- and 
heavy-duty commercial vehicle market. In making this assessment, the research 
collective attained inscriptions about the past five years of engine production and sales 
volume in the Chinese light- and heavy-duty commercial vehicle market from CAAM. 
These inscriptions revealed that the Chinese light- and heavy-duty engine market had 
been increasing in the past five years. The research collective believed that these 
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inscriptions reflected the rapid and significant economic development in China. This led 
the research collective to conclude that the increasing momentum of engine production 
and sales of Chinese light- and heavy-duty engines would continue at least for the next 
five years. Further, given that Delink was focused on the Chinese medium-duty engine 
market, the research collective believed that entering the Chinese light- and heavy-duty 
commercial vehicle market would not harm Delink’s interests. As a result, the research 
collective argued that the Chinese light- and heavy-duty commercial vehicle market 
would provide a good opportunity for Cino to expand its sales to non–Delink related 
customers. 
Regarding the models of entering the Chinese light- and heavy-duty commercial vehicle 
market, the research collective proposed using a JV option and eliminated the 
rationalities of other alternative options (such as direct investments). This was because 
the engine JV model had been tested in the cooperation between Cino and Delink, 
which was perceived by Cino to be a success. The research collective believed that the 
same JV model would generate similar outcomes if applied in the Chinese light- and 
heavy-duty commercial vehicle market. Thus, forming a light-duty engine JV and 
heavy-duty engine JV with Chinese local OEMs was considered the solution to deal 
with the risk of over-dependence on Delink. In ANT terms, it can be interpreted that 
Cino sought to create a network of relations in the form of building multiple JVs with 
different partner firms in order to redistribute its resources (and attendant risks) among 
multiple partner firms. The formation of multiple alliances resonates with the concept of 
alliance portfolio in the alliance literature (Goerzen 2005, 2007; Wassmer 2008). The 
prevalent view in the alliance literature is that alliance portfolios may be used to create 
synergy by combining resource/technology knowhow of different JVs in the portfolio. 
The finding here extends prior research by demonstrating an additional rationale of 
forming alliance portfolio—to diversify the risk of over-dependence on Delink, while 
maintaining stable relations with all partner firms in the JV network. Thus, an alliance 
portfolio was used by Cino as a control mechanism to manage the risk of over-
dependence on Delink. The logic was explained by Futong’s relationship manager of 
Cino: 
We knew that we had to reduce the dependence on Delink in the Chinese market. 
Given that it was not possible to do so in investing medium-duty engines to other 
OEMs, the only possible way was to introduce another range of our products to the 
Chinese heavy-duty or light-duty market and form a JV with the leading firm in those 
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markets. If in the future, we break up with Delink, we at least would still have another 
company to cooperate with in the Chinese market. 
After forming a JV portfolio was proposed as the solution to the risk of over-
dependence on Delink, the research collective directed their focus to selecting a partner 
firm and constructing a JV contract. Following Cino’s business tradition of cooperating 
with leading OEMs in the local market, the research collective targeted Sag and Futong 
as potential partner firms for the heavy- and light-duty engine JVs, respectively. This 
was because Sag and Futong were the largest OEMs (based on production volume) in 
the Chinese heavy- and light-duty commercial vehicle market, respectively. Further, 
based on the past experience of operating the medium-duty engine JV, the research 
collective proposed to replicate the contract used for the medium-duty engine JV with 
Delink in the proposed heavy-duty engine JV with Sag and light-duty engine JV with 
Futong. 
To finalise the proposed JV portfolio and respective MCS model, Sag and Futong were 
enrolled by the research collective. The research collective successfully enrolled Sag 
and Futong to accept its proposed JV portfolio model by considering Sag’s and 
Futong’s interest. For Sag, the company had long been eager to upgrade its existing 
outdated heavy-duty engines used in its commercial vehicles. Sag initially engaged with 
Man Se Corporation (one of Europe’s leading commercial vehicle manufacturers) to 
negotiate the possibility of forming a JV to make heavy-duty engines in China. 
However, Sag encountered an impasse in its negotiations with Man Se Corporation 
because the two companies could not agree on the target customer range of the potential 
JV. In contrast, as an independent engine manufacturer, Cino was able to provide 
world-leading heavy-duty engine technology and related services exclusively to Sag. 
For Futong, the company had the ambition of expanding its sales overseas, particularly 
to North America and Europe. However, at the time when Futong was negotiating with 
Cino for the formation of a light-duty engine JV, the quality of engines used in Futong’s 
light-duty commercial vehicle was not competitive to those of other OEMs in the North 
American and European markets. In addition, the engines made by Futong were unable 
to meet the European Emission Standard IV that was adopted in the North American 
and European markets. Thus, the use of Cino technology–based engines was expected 
to increase the competitiveness of Futong’s commercial vehicles in the North American 
and European markets. Further, Cino successfully enrolled Sag and Futong to accept its 
proposed JV contract by mobilising its past JV experience. Cino had past JV experience, 
 105 
while Sag and Futong had no prior JV experience in China. Mobilising past JV 
experience allowed Cino to generate an impression to Sag and Futong that Cino’s 
proposed JV contract was indispensable for the proposed heavy-duty engine JV if this 
JV were to succeed. 
In the micro world (constituted by Cino’s directors) of crafting the heavy-duty engine 
JV model with Sag, an unexpected issue emerged, associated with Sag’s daily operation 
(one element of the macro world). This issue was Weecai’s acquisition of Sag. Weecai 
is a major competitor of Cino that researches, develops and sells engine and engine-
related products in the Chinese market. For Cino, the full acquisition of Sag by Weecai 
would mean that Sag was losing independent power to make decisions, particularly 
relating to the formation and operation of the proposed heavy-duty engine JV. Weecai 
would become the substantive actor that was making the final calls for decisions related 
to the proposed heavy-duty engine JV. This posed a question to Cino: whether Sag 
could still act the same way in negotiating and operating the JV after its acquisition by 
Weecai. 
To answer this question, Cino’s CEO, CFO, engineering directors, strategy director and 
accounting departments formed a new research collective. This research collective 
sought to understand the potential effects of Weecai’s acquisition of Sag on the 
proposed engine JV between Cino and Sag. This sense-making process was conducted 
through open discussion in the research collective. In the open discussion, one argument 
was that Cino, Sag and Weecai could jointly research, develop and make heavy-duty 
engines. This argument was not accepted by most of Cino’s executives in the research 
collective because it seemed to raise one challenging question: given that Weecai has 
full and independent capacity to make engines at low cost, why would Weecai 
cooperate with its competitor (Cino) and spend more money to make engines that would 
be sold to Weecai’s 100%-owned subsidiary company (Sag)? 
Another argument raised in the open discussion in the research collective was that 
Weecai would take action to limit the sales of engines made in the proposed heavy-duty 
engine JV (between Cino and Sag) to Sag’s heavy-duty commercial vehicles. The logic 
of this argument was that Cino and Weecai were competitors in the Chinese engine 
market, and Weecai would not allow its subsidiary company (Sag) to purchase engines 
made by Sag and its competitor (Cino). Rather, most of Cino’s executives in the 
research collective expected that the most likely situation would be that Weecai would 
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supply its own engines to Sag’s heavy-duty commercial vehicles. This would mean that, 
if the heavy-duty engine JV between Cino and Sag was formed, the penetration rate of 
engines made in this engine JV to be adopted in Sag’s commercial vehicles would be 
limited and suppressed by Weecai. As the CEO of Cino stated: 
There was no doubt that Weecai would use its power as the biggest shareholder of 
Sag to limit the penetration rate of the engines made in a potential JV between us and 
Sag to be adopted in Sag’s commercial vehicles. We [the participants in the executive 
meeting] all thought this would happen. This logic was simple. We and Weecai were 
competitors in the Chinese market. In fact, Weecai regarded us as its biggest 
competitor. How would they allow us to supply engines to its subsidiary company? If 
Weecai let that happen, it would first lose a large amount of income, given that Sag 
could sell around 30,000 heavy-commercial vehicles each year. Also, Weecai would 
lose face in the public. I mean, the end users would think about why Weecai’s own 
OEM subsidiary would equip Cino technology–based engines—maybe because Cino 
technology–based engines were better than Weecai’s own engines? Wasn’t this 
strange? We were sure that Weecai would think about this and they did not want this 
happen. 
You know, our main purpose of forming JVs with Chinese local OEMs was to 
guarantee a reasonable percentage of penetration rates for our engines. If the 
penetration rates could not be guaranteed, there was no point for us to form a JV. We 
just could not run the risk of forming an engine JV with Sag and selling engines made 
in this engine JV to other heavy-duty OEMs in the Chinese market. You could not 
simply assume that other OEMs in the Chinese heavy-duty commercial vehicle 
market would purchase the engines made between you and their competitors. This 
was not the way how things were working here in China. In China, you know, guanxi 
was the factor you always need to think about when you are trying to make sales. So 
the point I was trying to make was that, if the sales of engines made in the potential 
JV with Sag could not be guaranteed, we would expect no sales could be made at all. 
The likely harmful effects of Weecai’s acquisition of Sag on the proposed heavy-duty 
engine JV between Cino and Sag were further objectified by the hypothetical 
suppressed penetration rate of engines. The hypothetical suppressed penetration rate of 
engines was believed to limit the sales of the proposed heavy-duty engines. If sales of 
the engines made in the proposed heavy-duty engine JV were limited, Cino would not 
achieve its original purpose of forming a heavy-duty engine JV to expand its engine 
sales to non–Delink related customers in the Chinese market. This became the basis of 
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problematising the proposed heavy-duty engine JV model, which made the research 
collective suspend the proposal to form a heavy-duty engine JV with Sag. 
The research collective’s intention to suspend the proposal of a JV partnership with Sag 
was based on the relation (in the form of a management control power battle) between 
Sag and Weecai. The previous owner and substantial operator of Sag, Shanxi provincial 
government, had a hostile attitude towards Weecai’s acquisition, and resisted 
relinquishing its management control power. Sag had been under the direct control of 
the Shanxi provincial government since 1999. As the only OEM at scale in Shanxi 
province, the Shanxi provincial government regarded Sag one of the most important 
projects to propel the growth of the local automotive industry. Given that Shanxi was a 
large province in the west of China in which industry was underdeveloped, Shanxi’s 
provincial government had a strong desire to develop the automotive industry to 
cultivate new business, alongside the original heavy-duty commercial vehicle business. 
As such, the Shanxi provincial government wished to retain independent management 
control and decision power over Sag, even if Sag Group was acquired by Weecai. 
Further, as one of the leading heavy-duty commercial vehicle producers in the Chinese 
market, Sag was one of the largest taxpaying companies, contributing significantly to 
the finance income of the Shanxi provincial government. The acquisition of Sag Group 
by Weecai would reduce the income of the Shanxi provincial government, as a large 
amount of revenue earned by Sag would be distributed to the Shandong provincial 
government (because Weecai was under the direct control of the Shandong provincial 
government). Thus, the Shanxi provincial government sought opportunities to retain the 
majority of Sag’s ownership from Weecai. 
For Weecai, the company wished to take over management control and decision power 
of Sag from the Shanxi provincial government. Weecai was seeking the opportunity to 
have its own OEM subsidiary company. Weecai’s acquisition of Sag was under 
Weecai’s strategic intention to have and operate its own OEM subsidiary company. 
Weecai wished to have direct management control power over Sag to gain enhanced 
operational experience of running an OEM. 
The Shanxi provincial government ultimately gained the upper hand when competing 
with Weecai for management control and decision power over Sag. This was because 
the original management leaders of Sag had worked for the company for 15 years, and 
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had built a solid foundation in the company.13 This meant that the Weecai-appointed 
management personnel in Sag had no real voice or power during the daily operation and 
management of Sag. In other words, the substantive power of managing and operating 
Sag remained with the Shanxi provincial government. 
Sag showed its ability to independently make management control and operational 
decisions (out of the control of Weecai) regarding Cino, with the hope of continuing 
negotiations to form a heavy-duty engine JV. The director of Cino’s strategy department 
explained: 
Sag told us that the management team, culture and strategy of Sag would not change, 
although the company was acquired by Weecai. For them, Weecai was purely a 
shareholder of Sag and they would not allow Weecai to intervene in the company’s 
daily operations and management. 
Thus, the research collective’s perception of the problem of the suppressed engine 
penetration rate of the engines to be made in the proposed heavy-duty engine JV 
(associated with Weecai’s acquisition of Sag) was mitigated, and the research collective 
became open to continue negotiation on the proposed heavy-duty engine JV with Sag. 
To further attract Cino to return to the proposed heavy-duty engine JV, Sag enrolled 
Shanxi’s provincial governor in the JV negotiation between Cino and Sag—Sag 
enrolled the governor to lobby Cino to continue the negotiation with Sag regarding the 
formation of the JV. Shanxi’s provincial governor had previously worked in Suzhou’s 
industrial park, and was an expert in the commercial vehicle industry. He understood 
the importance of an automobile industry to lead Shanxi province’s economic 
development. He was personally flown to Cino to talk with Cino’s CEO. The provincial 
governor asked Cino’s CEO to give him the personal favour of forming a heavy-duty 
engine JV with Sag. The provincial governor promised that, if a heavy-duty engine JV 
was formed between Cino and Sag, preferential tax policy would be granted to the JV. 
In particular, he promised that there would be no value-added, consumption or export 
tax on the JV. The research collective expected that this would decrease the costs and 
increase the profits of the proposed heavy-duty engine JV: 
                                                          
13  In 1990, in the plan to transfer the planned economy to a market economy, Sag encountered 
unprecedented difficulties in which the company was insolvent and almost became bankrupt. Under this 
situation, Yupu Zhang stepped in as the director of Sag. During his 18 years of leadership, Sag escaped 
the insolvent situation and gradually developed into one of China’s top 500 enterprise companies. As 
such, most of the company’s employees advocate and admire Yupu Zhang. 
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[Shanxi’s provincial governor] personally flew to Beijing and expressed the message 
that the whole Shanxi government would provide strong logistic support to the 
potential JV. He shared his personal thoughts on the formation of the JV between 
Cino and Sag. He said, ‘the cooperation with Cino would be a milestone for Sag in 
the area of international cooperation. Sag was one of the leaders in Chinese heavy-
duty commercial vehicle market and Cino was a world-leading diesel engine 
manufacturer. The formation of a JV would bring win-win results to both firms. And 
the cooperation between Cino and Sag would write a new chapter in China’s truck 
industry’ … [Shanxi’s provincial governor] showed us the proposed joint venture site 
[the Jinwei New City]—the industrial development, infrastructure, transportation, 
sports and entertainment centre of the Jinwei New City. He also showed us the 
companies that had already set up their business in the Jinwei New City. The whole 
site was amazing, including the full range of services we would need from the 
application for manufacturing license and the transportation of finished products. All 
these could be done within Jinwei New City. The provincial governor even offered us 
many concessional policies that would probably not be provided in other cities in 
China (strategy manager of Cino). 
Shanxi provincial governor’s personal involvement in the JV negotiation and promise to 
provide preferential tax policy made the research collective believe that the proposed 
heavy-duty engine JV would be privileged. They believed this offered the JV a unique 
competitive advantage in the Chinese market. As a result, the research collective 
decided to enact the proposed heavy-duty engine JV model with Sag. From the 
perspective of ANT, the tie developed between the Shanxi provincial governor and 
Cino’s CEO was essential in maintaining a stable JV relationship between Cino and Sag. 
The power of this tie lay in the provincial governor’s personal bureaucratic ability to 
give privileged treatment to the proposed JV. In return, Cino’s CEO had to form a 
heavy-duty engine JV with Sag to boost the local economy. This resonates with the 
concept of personal guanxi in the management literature (Luo & Chen 1997; Park & 
Luo 2001; Yang & Wang 2011). To avoid losing ‘face’ (social prestige and status) in a 
guanxi network, one person is obliged to give favour(s) to another person in the network 
when asked. This person is supposed to be repaid by the person who received the favour. 
The findings here extend prior research by demonstrating the importance of personal 
guanxi in maintaining alliance relations. 
In crafting the light-duty engine JV model with Futong, an unexpected issue emerged, 
associated with the short history of Futong. Futong was formed in 1996 and had less 
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than 10 years of operating experience. Compared to Cino’s other two partner firms 
(Delink and Sag) in the Chinese market, Futong had a much shorter history. Although 
Futong was currently the largest OEM in the Chinese light-duty commercial vehicle 
market, Futong’s short history created ambiguity about the long-term performance of 
the proposed light-duty engine JV. To make sense of this ambiguity, Cino’s sales and 
marketing director, strategy director and law director, as a research collective, focused 
on experimenting with the sustainability of Futong’s leading position in the Chinese 
light-duty commercial vehicle market. To facilitate this experimentation, the research 
collective gathered data about the Chinese light-duty commercial vehicle market that 
allowed them to conduct three interrelated practices. 
First, Cino conducted a competition analysis, in which the Chinese light-duty 
commercial vehicle market was compared to the medium-duty commercial vehicle 
market. The analysis revealed that more than 30 companies manufactured light-duty 
commercial vehicles in the Chinese market. The total number of competitors in the 
Chinese light-duty commercial vehicle market was much higher than that in the 
medium- and heavy-duty markets. This indicated that the competition in the Chinese 
light-duty commercial vehicle market might be more intense than that in the medium- 
and heavy-duty markets. 
Second, Delink’s leading position in the Chinese medium-duty commercial market was 
used as a reference to estimate the sustainability of Futong’s leading position in the 
Chinese light-duty commercial vehicle market. The difference in the total number of 
sales of light-duty commercial vehicles between (i) Futong and other OEMs in the 
Chinese light-duty commercial vehicle market and (ii) Delink and other OEMs in the 
Chinese medium-duty commercial vehicle market were calculated. This calculation was 
Cino’s effort to establish an equivalence between Futong’s and Delink’s leading 
positions in two different markets. The calculation showed that the difference in the 
total number of sales of light-duty commercial vehicles between Futong and other 
OEMs in the Chinese light-duty commercial vehicle market was much smaller than that 
of medium-duty commercial vehicles between Delink and other local medium-duty 
OEMs. As Futong’s relationship manager in Cino explained: 
We knew that Futong was growing very fast from the late 1990s to 2005. And indeed 
Futong had become the largest light commercial vehicle manufacturer and seller since 
2003. But initially when we talked about the proposal of forming a JV with Futong, 
we were just not as confident about Futong’s sales as that we had on Delink. I don’t 
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know—probably because Futong only had a short history. Thus, we were thinking to 
make gradual investments to the potential JV with Futong. Instead of making a one-
time investment in the potential JV with Futong, as what we did for DECIE and 
SACIE, we would make additional investments to the JV only when the sales of light-
duty engines made in the potential JV achieved our pre-set targets. 
As can be seen from the above quotation, the research collective was not confident 
about the sustainability of Futong’s leading position in the Chinese light-duty 
commercial vehicle market. The research collective believed that, if Futong lost its 
leading position in the Chinese light-duty commercial vehicle market in the future, the 
potential light-duty engine JV’s sales would be reduced, and it would be financially and 
legally costly for Cino to find an alternative partner firm to form a new light-duty 
engine JV. The research collective would prefer to select an OEM that had a sustainable 
leading position in the Chinese light-duty commercial vehicle market at the beginning 
of the JV. Ideally, the sustainability of the leading position of the potential partner firm 
in the proposed light-duty commercial vehicle market would be equivalent to that of 
Delink in Chinese the medium-duty commercial vehicle market. This would guarantee a 
stable and reasonable amount of engine sales for the proposed light-duty engine JV. 
Third, Cino conducted a three-step accounting analysis. In each step, more actors were 
enrolled in the research collective. These new actors helped collect more data about the 
Chinese light-duty commercial vehicle, which made the three-step accounting analysis 
possible. In the first step of the analysis, Cino’s marketing and sales department and law 
department were enrolled in the research collective. These two departments helped 
estimate the size of the Chinese light-duty commercial vehicle market for the next five 
years. The marketing and sales department collected historical statistics about the sales 
of Chinese light-duty commercial vehicles in the past five years from CAAM. Based on 
these historical statistics, the average sales growth rate of the light-duty commercial 
vehicles for the past five years was calculated. The law department highlighted two 
major macro world factors that were likely to influence the sales of the proposed light-
duty commercial vehicles in the Chinese market (the release of upgrading Emission 
Standard II to Emission Standard III by the Chinese central government, government 
subsidies and preferable tax policies for the purchase of commercial vehicles that met 
Emission Standard III). Considering the data collected from CAAM and government 
policy-related information provided by the law department, the marketing and sales 
personnel estimated the sales growth rates of the Chinese light-duty commercial vehicle 
 112 
market for the next five years. According to this estimation, the sales growth rates of the 
Chinese light-duty commercial vehicle for the next three years should be adjusted 
upwards by 5%, based on the average sales growth rate of the past five years. The sales 
growth rate for the fourth and fifth year should return to the average sales growth rate of 
the past five years. The sales growth rate estimated for each of the next five years was 
multiplied by respective previous years’ predicted sales to estimate the sales of the 
Chinese light-duty commercial vehicle market for each of the next five years. 
In the second step, Cino’s marketing and sales department estimated Futong’s market 
share in the Chinese light-duty commercial vehicle market for the next five years. 
Historical statistics about the market share of Futong in the past five years were 
obtained from CAAM. Further, the marketing and sales department collected macro 
world information about the selling price, sales policy, promotion policy and sales 
agents of Futong’s light-duty commercial vehicles and those of Futong’s local 
competitors. The sales information about Futong and its local competitors’ commercial 
vehicles were then compared. The marketing and sales department combined historical 
statistics from CAAM and commercial vehicle sales information from Futong and its 
local competitors. This led to the estimation that the market share of Futong would 
increase at 3% each year in the following five years. Futong’s market share for each of 
the following five years was calculated as the product of each year’s growth rate and 
respective previous year’s market share. 
In the third step, the sales of Futong’s light-duty commercial vehicles for the next five 
years were calculated as the product of the estimated size of the Chinese light-duty 
commercial vehicle market and Futong’s share in the Chinese market. The estimated 
sales of Futong’s light-duty commercial vehicles were then used to calculate Cino’s 
share of the JV profits, based on the assumption of (i) 50:50 equal share investment and 
(ii) a penetration rate of engines that was the same as that used in the engine JV between 
Cino and Delink. 
The same three-step accounting analysis was done for other leading light-duty 
commercial vehicle manufacturers in the Chinese market. Comparing Futong’s 
predicted sales figures with those of other Chinese light-duty commercial vehicles 
OEMs revealed that Futong was likely to slowly increase its sales and expand its 
leading position in the Chinese light-duty commercial market in the following five years. 
This convinced the research collective that forming a light-duty engine JV with Futong 
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would enable Cino to generate considerably more profit than forming JVs with other 
local Chinese light-duty OEMs. If Cino did not form a JV with Futong, it would lose the 
best opportunity to enter and occupy the Chinese light-duty engine market. 
In summary, in experimenting with the sustainability of Futong’s leading position in the 
Chinese light-duty commercial vehicle market, the first two practices (competition 
analysis and referencing Delink’s leading position in the Chinese medium-duty market) 
concurrently suggested Futong’s ‘weak’ leading position. However, the third practice 
(three-step accounting analysis) suggested that Futong was the best available partner for 
the proposed light-duty engine JV in the Chinese market. This led the research 
collective to form the opinion of endorsing the enactment of the proposed light-duty 
engine JV model between Cino and Futong. 
6.4 The Emergence of Further Concerns 
When the proposed alliance portfolio model was enacted in practice, the partner firms 
acted mainly according to the JV contract. Sag (Futong) exerted their efforts primarily 
on increasing their commercial vehicle sales and reducing material and manufacturing 
labour costs. They voluntarily subordinated and made concessions whenever there was 
a conflict with Cino related to the management and manufacturing process of the heavy-
duty (light-duty) engine JV. Further, Sag and Futong successfully lobbied local 
government to grant preferable tax policies, JV site location and leasing costs to the 
heavy- and light-duty engine JVs. As a result of the positive cooperative atmosphere 
between partner firms, the heavy- and light-duty engine JVs quickly entered production. 
The sales of commercial vehicles (equipped with engines made in the heavy- and light-
duty JVs) increased significantly both in the Chinese and global markets. 
Correspondingly, Cino expanded its engine sales to non–Delink related customers in the 
Chinese market. 
While forming heavy- and light-duty engine JVs enabled Cino to address the risk of 
over-dependence on Delink in the Chinese market, a new problem arose. This new 
problem was associated with Delink’s uncooperative behaviour. Five years after the 
formation of heavy- and light-duty engine JVs, Delink began evidencing uncooperative 
behaviour against the medium-duty engine JV with Cino. Delink’s uncooperative 
behaviour was reflected in accounting-related information and actions. First, Delink 
reduced the penetration rate of engines made in the engine JV (between Cino and 
Delink) that was to be adopted in Delink’s medium-duty commercial vehicles. Cino was 
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told by Delink that the cost of engines made in the engine JV was too high, which made 
Delink’s medium-duty commercial vehicles lose competitive advantage in the Chinese 
market. In response to the high engine cost, Delink stared to use more of its own 
engines in its medium-duty commercial vehicles.14 Cino was even notified by Delink 
that Delink would gradually use more and more of its own engines. This meant that the 
engine JV between Cino and Delink was losing and would increasingly lose engine 
sales to Delink. As such, Cino was losing and would increasingly lose revenue from the 
engine JV between Cino and Delink. 
Second, Delink became resistant to voluntarily sharing accounting and engineering 
information with Cino, which the company used to do. In particular, Delink-appointed 
procurement personnel (accounting personnel) in the engine JV became reluctant to 
provide information about the list of suppliers of engine components (the quotes 
provided by those suppliers) to Cino-appointed personnel. Rather, only the eventually 
selected supplier and finalised transaction price was shared with Cino. In addition, 
Delink stopped disclosing engineering information about how the engines made in the 
engine JV matched with Delink’s commercial vehicles. Delink’s resistance to share 
accounting and engineering information made it difficult for Cino to improve (lower 
costs and develop better technology) the engines made in the engine JV. This new 
problem (Delink’s uncooperative behaviour) led Cino to undertake a set of activities and 
practices to make sense of this issue, which will be discussed in the next chapter. 
6.5 Discussion 
This section discusses how the findings of the data analysed in this chapter addressed 
the research questions of this thesis. First, we found that the risk of over-dependence on 
Delink in the engine JV was articulated as the outcome of an experimentation process. 
This experimentation process involved the formation of a research collective (primarily 
constituted by Cino’s directors) in the micro world (a manageable virtual environment) 
to make sense of a concern (Cino’s failure to enlarge the target customer range of the 
engine JV) that Cino encountered in the macro world (the daily operation of the engine 
JV with Delink). Second, the articulation of the risk of over-dependence on Delink 
                                                          
14 Delink had its own engine R&D and manufacturing factory that was entirely independent of Cino and 
the engine JV (between Cino and Delink). The name of the factory was Factory 49. Most engines made in 
Factory 49 were supplied to Delink’s own commercial vehicles. Factory 49’s ability to independently 
research, develop and manufacture engines continued improving after Delink’s cooperation with Cino to 
make engines. 
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made the research collective experiment with risk solutions through adapting risk 
management models that had been used in the engine JV. This led to the hypothesis of 
crafting a JV portfolio with non–Delink related OEMs and respective management 
control models (partner selection and JV contract) as the solution to address the risk of 
over-dependence on Delink. Third, this chapter indicated that the return of the proposed 
JV portfolio model to the macro world for implementation addressed the risk of over-
dependence on Delink, while simultaneously generating a new problem (relating to 
Delink’s uncooperative behaviour). 
The above findings can be divided into four themes: (i) constructing a risk management 
model, (ii) the mutually constitutive relationship between risk and risk management 
practices, (iii) using an alliance portfolio to hedge against risk and (iv) the connection 
between the corporate business relationship and personal reciprocal behaviour based on 
personal ‘face’. These four themes are discussed below. 
6.5.1 Constructing a risk management model 
This chapter has shown that an alliance portfolio (the formation of heavy- and light-duty 
engine JVs with non–Delink related firms) was hypothesised as the solution to deal with 
the risk of over-dependence on Delink. The proposal to form an alliance portfolio was 
formulated as the outcome of an experimentation process. In contrast to Chapter 5, this 
chapter showed that the primary object of experimentation was not a JV contract. This 
was because Cino proposed to adapt the JV contract that was used in the medium-duty 
engine JV for the heavy- and light-duty engine JVs. The JV contract used in the 
medium-duty engine JV (between Cino and Delink) was perceived by Futong and Sag 
as a successful practice; thus, these two targeted partner firms did not have major 
dissenting opinions on this model. 
Rather, the experimentation process involved an iterative process that focused on 
(re)testing the suitability of Sag (Futong) to be the potential partner firm of the heavy-
duty (light-duty) engine JV. The research collective initially targeted Sag (Futong) as 
the partner firm of the proposed heavy-duty (light-duty) engine JV because of Cino’s 
business tradition of cooperating with leading local OEMs in any markets. With the 
emergence of unexpected macro world activities (Sag’s acquisition by Cino’s 
competitor firm, and the realisation of the short operating history of Futong), the 
research collective undertook a set of management control practices to imagine the 
likely effects of these unexpected activities on the heavy- and light-duty engine JVs. 
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These likely effects led to the research collective problematising the proposed JV 
portfolio model as a solution to the risk of over-dependence on Delink. In particular, the 
problem of the proposed JV portfolio model was related to the suitability of Sag 
(Futong) as the partner firm of the heavy-duty (light-duty) engine JV. The research 
collective even made the decision to withdraw negotiation with Sag for the proposal to 
form a heavy-duty engine JV. Interestingly, Sag’s own management control power 
battle (the execution of a three-step accounting analysis) returned Cino to continue its 
negotiations with Sag (Futong) to enact the proposed heavy-duty (light-duty) engine JV 
model. 
In short, Cino experienced struggles in crafting the JV portfolio model. These struggles 
were caused by unexpected activities that emerged while crafting the model. A set of 
management control actions were taken, either by Cino or a partner firm, that allowed 
Cino to re-test the suitability of Sag (Futong) as a partner firm for the proposed heavy-
duty (light-duty) engine JV. Thus, the formulation of a JV portfolio model to address 
the risk of over-dependence on Delink was the outcome of the iterative experimentation 
process. 
6.5.2 Mutually constitutive relationship between risk and risk management 
practices 
Similar to the finding in Chapter 5, this chapter found that risk and risk management 
practices (the mobilisation of management control actions and inscription, and the 
crafting of a JV portfolio model) co-constituted each other in the ongoing management 
of the medium-duty engine JV between Cino and Delink. On the one hand, risk 
management practices contributed to the articulation of risk. A set of management 
control actions (calculating and comparing the sales growth rate and market share of 
Delink and its competitor firms, interviewing the sales agents of Delink’s commercial 
vehicles, and linking the results of accounting calculations and interviews) and 
inscriptions (interview scripts and numbers) were drawn to help the research collective 
realise Cino’s exclusive dependence on Delink in the Chinese market. Another set of 
management control actions were further undertaken to help the research collective 
understand the potential effects of Cino’s exclusive dependence on Delink. These 
management control actions included projecting how Delink would be affected by its 
competitor firms in the Chinese medium-duty commercial vehicle market, analysing 
parallel segments in the same commercial vehicle market, comparing the performance 
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of the Chinese market to that in other countries, referencing competitor firms’ practice, 
and exemplifying Delink’s past behaviour in the medium-duty engine JV. To execute 
these management control actions, inscriptions that included accounting information 
(such as the sales growth rate and market share) were drawn to bring macro world 
activity/information to the micro world, and enable combining and calculating of the 
information obtained from different sources. The combined use of these management 
control actions and inscriptions led to the development of the hypothesis of two effects 
(the loss of the opportunity to expand Cino’s engine sales in the Chinese market and 
Delink’s possible appropriation behaviour) that could be caused by Cino’s exclusive 
dependence on Delink in the Chinese market. These two projected effects became the 
basis of articulating the risk of over-dependence on Delink. 
On the other hand, the risks triggered selecting and combining different management 
control actions to craft risk management models. In particular, the articulation of the 
risk of over-dependence on Delink motivated the research collective to choose and 
connect a set of management control actions to seek possible risk solutions. These 
management control actions included open discussion between Cino’s executives, 
competition analysis, referencing the existing JV partner firm’s leading position, 
comparing the size of different segments of the Chinese commercial vehicle market, 
accounting calculation and analysis. Inscriptions were collected to facilitate the 
execution of different management control actions, including the engine penetration rate, 
size and sales growth rate of the Chinese commercial vehicle market, and sales volume 
and market share of the potential partner firm and their competitor firms. These 
management control actions and inscriptions together contributed to constructing the 
proposal to form a JV portfolio and respective management control model (partner 
selection and JV contract) as a solution to the risk of over-dependence on Delink. 
Further, together with the findings in Chapter 5, this chapter has shown that the 
enactment of the engine JV model addressed reputational and financial risk under the 
technology licensing agreement, which simultaneously became the conduit for the 
articulation of the risk of over-reliance on Delink in the Chinese market. This suggests 
that new risk in inter-firm alliances may be created as the outcome of organisations’ 




6.5.3 Using JV portfolio to hedge risk 
Cino formed a heavy-duty engine JV with Sag and light-duty engine JV with Futong, 
thereby crafting an alliance portfolio with non–Delink related firms to deal with the risk 
of over-dependence on Delink in the Chinese market. Cino was trying to enrol non–
Delink related OEMs in its JV networks to exploit the Chinese heavy- and light-duty 
commercial vehicle market to mitigate the risk exposure (inability to make sales to non–
Delink related OEMs) to Delink, while maintaining its relationship with Delink in the 
Chinese medium-duty vehicle market. Forming a JV portfolio in different segments of 
the market was the management control practice used to deal with risk in this market. 
6.5.4 Connection between the corporate business relationship and personal 
reciprocal behaviour based on ‘face’ 
Personal reciprocal behaviour based on ‘face’ has implications for the corporate 
business relationship. When Cino was about to withdraw its negotiations with Sag to 
form a heavy-duty engine JV, Sag mobilised Shanxi’s provincial governor to lobby 
Cino’s CEO to continue the JV negotiation. In particular, the governor asked Cino’s 
CEO to give him a ‘face’/favour to resume negotiations with Sag to form a heavy-duty 
engine JV. In return, the governor promised Cino’s CEO that Cino would receive 
preferable tax and operational policies. This personal reciprocal behaviour based on 
personal face partially contributed to Cino’s eventual return to negotiations with Sag for 
the proposal to form a heavy-duty engine JV. This laid the foundation for the formation 
of the JV. 
6.6 Conclusion 
In summary, this chapter has discussed the three stages of the experimentation process 
through which risk and risk solutions were articulated. In the first stage of the 
experimentation process, the problem of failing to enlarge the target customer range of 
the engine JV between Cino and Delink was narrowed down to the problem of Cino’s 
exclusive dependence on Delink in the Chinese market. In the second stage, a research 
collective was formed to make sense of the potential effects of the problem of Cino’s 
exclusive dependence on Delink on Cino’s China business. This led to the articulation 
of the risk of over-dependence on Delink in the Chinese market. 
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The risk of over-dependence on Delink led the research collective to hypothesise a JV 
portfolio as the risk solution. In crafting a theoretical model for the proposed JV 
portfolio, the emergence of unexpected activities led the research collective to 
problematise the appropriateness of the proposed JV portfolio model to address the risk 
of over-dependence on Delink. Through another set of experimentation activities, the 
problem associated with the JV portfolio was solved. When the JV portfolio model was 
enacted and operationalised, it created a new problem in which Delink began to act 
uncooperatively against Cino. The next chapter examines the new round of 





Chapter 7: Articulating New Risks in the Engine JV and 
Constructing an ATS JV 
7.1 Introduction 
This chapter analyses the processes and practices through which the risk exposure of 
losing trust with Delink was hypothesised, how an ATS JV model between Cino and 
Delink was constructed as the solution to mitigate the risk exposure, and how the 
enactment of the ATS JV model created new matters of concern. This chapter is 
organised as follows. Section 7.2 examines the processes of how the risk exposure of 
losing trust with Delink was hypothesised as the outcome of making sense of Delink’s 
uncooperative behaviour. Section 7.3 discusses how the proposal of forming an ATS JV 
between Cino and Delink was experimented as the solution to rebuild trust with Delink. 
This section also discusses how risks in the proposed ATS JV and respective risk 
management control models were articulated. Section 7.4 discusses how the enactment 
and operation of the ATS JV generated new problems. Section 7.5 discusses the 
findings from the data analysed in this chapter, while Section 7.6 concludes this chapter. 
7.2 Uncooperative Behaviour and Risks 
As discussed in the previous chapter, Delink began to act uncooperatively with Cino 
after Cino formed a JV portfolio with non–Delink related OEMs in the Chinese market. 
Delink’s uncooperative behaviour was reflected in the reduced penetration rate of 
engines made in the medium-duty engine JV, and the firm’s reluctance to share 
accounting- and engineering-related information with Delink. To understand why 
Delink behaved uncooperatively, Cino began an investigation with informal 
communications between Cino- and Delink-appointed personnel in the medium-duty 
engine JV. In particular, Cino-appointed personnel in the engine JV (such as the general 
manager of the JV) were required to actively engage with Delink-appointed personnel 
(such as the deputy general manager of the JV) through informal channels, such as 
causal chats during dining and coffee time, and other similar informal conversations. 
These informal communications aimed to help Cino determine the possible causes of 
Delink’s uncooperative behaviour. These informal communications were based on 
personal friendship or guanxi, which refers to private conversations that are unrelated to 
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partner firm-level related decisions. The mobilisation of informal engagements to 
understand Delink’s uncooperative behaviour was explained by the CEO of Cino: 
During that sensitive time, I would recommend that any questions asked directly by 
Cino would be interpreted by Delink as foreshadow, where Cino would do something 
against Delink’s interests. The easiest way to start with the investigation was through 
personal relationships. Some Cino- and Delink-appointed personnel in DECIE had 
developed very good personal relationships … If you kept on attending informal 
functions with the same group of people, you would be treated as one member of their 
group and they would share more ‘group information’ with you. It was just the way 
things were done here in China. 
According to the above quotation, the investigation of Delink’s uncooperative 
behaviour started with informal engagements because Cino did not want to undertake 
any formal corporate-level communications. Cino’s management team was afraid that 
such formal communications might be wrongly interpreted by Delink, and be likely to 
exacerbate Delink’s uncooperative behaviour during the ‘cold times’ between Cino and 
Delink. 
Through the informal engagement, a few opinions about Delink’s uncooperative 
behaviour were collected from multiple Delink-appointed personnel in the medium-duty 
engine JV. A few inscriptions were mobilised and connected to each other to grant 
credibility to different opinions in explaining Delink’s uncooperative behaviour. In 
particular, a summary report was prepared to record different opinions (collected from 
Delink-appointed personnel in the medium-duty engine JV) on Delink’s uncooperative 
behaviour. With the mobilisation of numbers, different opinions were further coded, 
sorted and aggregated based on similarities. The number of frequencies of each group of 
opinion mentioned by Delink-appointed personnel was counted and ranked. This 
quantifying process helped Cino’s management team focus on the two opinions with the 
highest frequency ranking. These two opinions were considered by Cino’s management 
team to be the primary causes of Delink’s uncooperative behaviour. 
First, Delink was not quite happy about Cino’s continuous formation of JVs with Sag 
and Futong. In particular, Delink thought that Cino’s formation of JVs with Sag and 
Futong signalled that Cino was not confident about the engine JV with Delink. This 
made Delink develop the perception that Cino would not share all its best resources 
with Delink in the future. Second, Delink thought that Cino was not flexible in making 
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products that specifically suited the Chinese market. For Delink, Cino had rigorous 
procedures and standards for making engines and providing after-sale service. These 
procedures and standards for manufacturing and servicing engines were transplanted to 
the engine JV between Cino and Delink, which contributed to the high costs of making 
and servicing engines. This high cost made Delink’s commercial vehicles lose a price 
competitive advantage to other local Chinese OEMs. This loss of competitive advantage 
was considered the primary reason for Delink’s gradual decline of market share in the 
Chinese medium-duty commercial vehicle market. 
To validate the plausibility of these two opinions (Delink’s unhappiness with Cino’s 
formation of JVs with non–Delink related OEMs and inflexibility to make products that 
fit the Chinese market) in explaining Delink’s uncooperative behaviour, Cino’s CEO 
personally engaged with Delink’s CEO. Open-ended questions were asked by Cino’s 
CEO in his ‘friend talk’ with Delink’s CEO in the hope of gaining answers related to 
these two opinions. As the CEO of Cino explained: 
We needed to approve this conjecture [Cino’s inflexibility to make engines that suited 
the Chinese market and Delink’s unhappiness with Cino’s continuous formation of 
JVs with Futong and Sag as the causes of Delink’s uncooperative behaviours]. Well, 
the best way to approve it was through my personal guanxi with Delink’s CEO. 
Delink’s CEO and I had been good friends in the past 20 years. He was in fact one of 
the earliest personnel with whom I was dealing back to the 1980s, when I was the 
manager of international business development in Cino. That time, Lixi was an 
engineering manager in Delink … we had participated in the development and 
cooperation between Cino and Delink. We had also witnessed the development of 
Cino’s business in China. Almost every time I came to China, he invited me to 
dinner … I mean, we were really good friends. If he told me what was happening, I 
would no doubt believe that was what really happening. I invited him for coffee and 
dinner, just like the normal catching up between good friends. We were open-minded 
and shared our opinions about what was the problem between Cino and Delink and 
how to solve the problem. 
The above quotation suggests that the informal engagement between Cino’s and 
Delink’s CEOs confirmed that Cino’s inflexibility to make engines that suited the 
Chinese market and Cino’s continuous formation of JVs with Futong and Sag were the 
causes of Delink’s uncooperative behaviour. This analysis highlights the importance of 
informal engagement based on personal guanxi to diagnose problems between partner 
firms in inter-firm alliances. As discussed in the next section, this informal engagement 
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also provided a condition to initiate a solution to address the problem. Thus, informal 
engagement forms an effective control mechanism to manage inter-firm alliances. This 
is similar to the informal controls (such as trust-based self-enforcing safeguards) 
proposed in prior research (Dekker 2004; Langfield-Smith & Smith 2003; Vosselman & 
Van der Meer-Kooistra 2009). However, while previous research generally treated 
informal controls as an organisational-level control mechanism, the finding here extends 
prior research by suggesting that personal guanxi has important implications in the 
management of alliance relations. 
Given that this was the first time Delink had displayed uncooperative behaviour towards 
Cino in their 30 years of cooperation, it was unclear how the two problems (that caused 
Delink’s cooperative behaviour) would affect Cino’s future business in the Chinese 
market, if unresolved. Thus, the ambiguity about the possible effects of these two 
problems became a matter of concern to Cino. To make sense of this matter of concern, 
the Cino-appointed general manager in the medium-duty engine JV and Cino’s CEO, 
CFO and strategy director, as a research collective, tentatively predicted what further 
actions Delink might take against Cino, and the possible effects of these on Cino’s 
future Chinese business. This process was undertaken through three interrelated analysis. 
First, the research collective self-reflected on how well Cino met the needs of Chinese 
local end customers (purchasers of commercial vehicles equipped with Cino engines). 
The self-reflection revealed that the Chinese local end customers’ needs had shifted 
from pursuing engine quality to engine price.15 However, Cino was unaware of this shift 
in customer needs and had continued focusing on making high-quality engines. Making 
high-quality engines required Cino to implement rigorous procedures and standards, 
which made it difficult to control or lower engine costs. 
Second, the research collective considered Delink’s long-term business plan and 
business philosophy. Although Delink was currently focusing on the Chinese medium-
duty commercial vehicle market, the company had the long-term plan of expanding its 
market share into the Chinese heavy- and light-duty commercial vehicle markets. In 
                                                          
15 The shift of local Chinese customers’ needs was primarily due to significant improvement in the 
average quality of engines made by Chinese local engine and OEM companies. As the quality of engines 
significantly improved, the quality and performance differences between these engines and other engines 
based on world-leading technology were significantly reduced. In other words, engines made by local 
Chinese engine and OEM companies were more than sufficient to perform most work required by local 
Chinese customers. At the same time, engines made by local Chinese engine and OEM companies were 
generally cheaper than those made by a JV (with a foreign partner firm). As a result, increasing numbers 
of local Chinese customers were using engines made by Chinese local engine and OEM companies. 
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addition, as a typical Chinese government-owned enterprise, Cino had the business 
tradition of being ‘loyal’ to its partner firm. Delink considered that, if Cino decided to 
cooperate with Delink to make medium-duty engines, Cino should also cooperate with 
Delink to make heavy- and light-duty engines. Cino’s cooperation with Futong and Sag 
made Delink quite upset. In fact, Cino’s cooperation with Futong and Sag was 
interpreted by Delink as Cino helping Delink’s competitors compete with Delink. 
Third, the results of self-reflection and researching into Delink’s long-term business 
plan and business philosophy allowed the research collective to imagine Delink’s 
possible future actions against Cino, and the possible effects of this on Cino’s Chinese 
business. The research collective predicted that the failure to meet the shifting needs of 
the Chinese local end customers in the Chinese medium-duty commercial vehicle 
market, and the perceived action of helping competitors in the Chinese heavy- and light-
duty commercial vehicle markets might reduce Delink’s commercial vehicle sales in the 
entire Chinese commercial vehicle market. This led the research collective to perceive 
that Delink would gradually lose confidence in Cino’s competence to make engines 
suitable for the Chinese market, and sincerity to invest its best engine-related resources 
in the medium-duty engine JV. As such, if Delink’s unhappiness with Cino’s formation 
of JVs with non–Delink related OEMs and inflexibility to make Chinese-suitable 
products was unresolved, Delink would gradually reduce the engine penetration rate, or 
even cease cooperation with Cino. If the engine penetration rate continued reducing, 
Cino would gradually lose its biggest customer in the Chinese market. This would result 
in a significant source of revenue. As a result, the research collective hypothesised the 
existence of danger from losing confidence and sincerity between Cino and Delink. 
Delink’s confidence and sincerity in Cino resonates with two dimensions of trust 
between alliance partner firms (competence trust and goodwill trust) in Dekker (2004). 
Van der Meer-Kooistra and Vosselman (2000), Dekker (2004), Langfield-Smith and 
Smith (2003) and others highlighted the importance of having trust during the 
management of inter-firm alliances. The findings here share the same view with prior 
research, yet through a different angle—by highlighting the harmful effects of losing 
trust in an alliance relationship. In addition, while prior research has argued that trust is 
based on past cooperative experience or activities undertaken between partner firms, the 
findings here suggest that the trust between partner firms can also depend on their 
relationships with other actors (such as customers and competitor firms) in the partner 
firms’ networks. For example, the risk exposure of losing trust was hypothesised based 
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on making sense of Delink’s uncooperative behaviour. Delink’s uncooperative 
behaviour originated from its perception that Cino was helping its competitors compete 
with Delink in the Chinese market, and Cino’s rigorous standards and procedures for 
making and serving engines causing the company to lose commercial vehicle sales in 
the Chinese market. 
7.3 Constructing an ATS JV to Rebuild Trust with Delink 
While hypothesising the existence of danger of losing trust between Cino and Delink, 
the research collective simultaneously experimented with possible solutions. The 
research collective sought to develop an economic arrangement that could rebuild trust 
between Cino and Delink. The collective proposed that Cino and Delink could 
cooperate to make ATSs (an important component of the engine). The idea to make 
ATSs with Delink originated from the informal engagement between Cino’s and 
Delink’s CEOs (as mentioned in the previous section). In this informal engagement, 
Delink’s CEO mentioned that Delink was in the process of developing its own ATSs in 
order to end its dependence on Booth for the supply of ATSs.16 This information was 
noted by Cino’s CEO, who raised the issue with the research collective. The collective 
believed that if Cino helped Delink develop its own ATSs, Delink would appreciate 
Cino’s efforts, which may improve the relationship between the two partner firms. Thus, 
cooperating with Delink to make ATSs was considered a very good opportunity for 
Cino to rebuild trust with Delink. To accomplish the economic arrangement of 
cooperating with Delink to make ATSs, the research collective proposed forming an 
ATS JV with Delink. Cino’s past successful JV experience in China made the research 
collective automatically consider the JV option as the optimal solution when Cino 
wished to start a new ATS business in China, without considering the rationalities of 
alternative options. 
After proposing the formation of an ATS JV with Delink, the research collective 
directed their attention to articulating a relational model that was intended to make the 
ATS JV function. The articulation of a relational model was achieved through an 
experimentation process involving the combined use of inscriptions and open discussion 
between actors in the research collective. The entire process of constructing a relational 
                                                          
16 Booth was the largest ATS manufacturer in the Chinese market, with monopoly power over the market. 
Delink had been using ATSs made by Booth since Booth entered the Chinese market, and Booth had 
absolute bargaining power in negotiating with Delink about ATS price. This made it difficult for Delink 
to lower ATS costs in order to reduce the overall cost of its commercial vehicles. 
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model for the ATS JV followed the A-review document. The A-review document is an 
inscription that provides a roadmap regarding how to select and process a business 
model, among a set of alternatives (including organic, acquisition, alliance, minority 
investment and supply contract—see Graph 2), when Cino wished to start a new 
business to achieve growth. The A-review document was developed by Cino in 2005 
based on the company’s past business experience and practice. The A-review document 
had six sequential stages: 
1. G0 (Brainstorming of Ideas) 
2. G1 (Initial Screen) 
3. G2 (Deep Dive: What?) 
4. G3 (Business Plan Develop: How) 
5. G4 (Launch: A, P or Value Package Introduction Process) 
6. G5 (Monitor Progress to Plan). 
The time deadline for each of the six stages was projected in the A-review document, 
and specific questions that needed to be answered in each of the six stages were listed. 
These questions were extracted from the challenges, drawbacks, merits, and good and 
bad practices of Cino’s past operating experience, and acted as a kind of a checklist to 
complete each stage of the A-review process. The importance of having a common 
practice (such as an A-review document) for undertaking business was outlined in 
Cino’s Business Model and Operating System: 
As we grow in existing markets and expand into new markets, we will have to 
demonstrate an even more disciplined approach to our work. We cannot hope to grow 
to a $30B company without common processes and approaches. The Cino Business 
Model and Operating System (COS) [an A-review document is one type of COS] is 
how we will assure our success. Using COS better enables us to keep focused on the 
customer while continuously improving everything we do by working together to 
reduce variation and eliminate waste. COS is the common approach that will be 
applied globally across Cino regardless of the type of the business. This common 
approach is critical to the achievement of our aggressive growth plans and is the 
foundation for cross business unit and cross functional coordination (2012, p. 2). 
In summary, the A-review document established the procedures that Cino should follow 
to design, evaluate, select and process a particular business model, and listed ‘checklists’ 
for each step. 
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Graph 2: The A-Review Document 
Following the A-review document, the research collective tested the financial feasibility 
of the proposal to form an ATS JV by concurrently conducting three accounting 
analyses, including scenario, net present value (NPV), break-even and probability 
analyses. The scenario analysis primarily focused on estimating three accounting 
inscriptions for the potential ATS JV: sales volume, sale price and cost. The best, base 
and worst cases for each of the three items were obtained through discussions between 
participants in the A-review process. Different participants in the research collective 
were allocated to prepare the best, base and worst cases for each of the three accounting 
inscriptions. For example, the director of Cino’s sales and marketing department was 
allocated to prepare the base, best and worst cases for sales volume and sale price, while 
the director of the procurement and engineering departments was required to prepare the 
best, base and worst cases for production cost. 17  After the scenario analysis was 
conducted, the three cases of sales volume, price and costs were passed to the 
accounting department to process the NPV and break-even analysis. The best, base and 
                                                          
17 After a participant in the A-review document was allocated to conduct a particular task, he or she 
would call a meeting in his or her own department, which key employees of the department would attend. 
The best, base and worst cases of a particular accounting item were obtained through discussions between 
employees in that department. Each employee raised their own opinion (if possible) in the discussion 
based on their past experience, available knowledge (for example, this knowledge was obtained through 
formal and informal contact with the government, interviews with ATS sales agents, and information 
released by professional organisations) and personal feelings about the effects of possible future events on 
the three accounting items. This opinion was then challenged or discussed by other employees in the same 
department. Through these iterative discussions and debates, the best, base and worst cases of a particular 
accounting item were agreed among key employees in the same department. The director of the 
department would present this information to other A-review participants. 
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worst cases for each of the three accounting items were matched and integrated to 
obtain the best, base and worst cases of NPV and break-even year. That is: 
In calculating the best case of NPV and break-even year, we used the highest revenue 
and lowest manufacturing costs obtained from the marketing and sales department 
and procurement and engineering department, respectively. Similarly, we used the 
lowest revenue and highest manufacturing costs to get the worst case of NPV and 
break-even year. The base case of NPV and break-even year were calculated based on 
the parameters [such as penetration rate, sales price and manufacturing costs] of our 
existing ATS sales to DECIE … We also used @risk [software] to estimate the 
probability of the occurrence of a particular NPV as the NPV value itself might be 
misleading (Cino-appointed vice accounting manager in the ATS JV). 
The NPV analysis was further connected to probability analysis. In particular, the 
probability of the occurrence of each of the three scenarios of NPV value was calculated. 
Calculating the probability of occurrence of each possible scenario of NPV was 
completed through a material device called @risk software. The role of @risk software 
in estimating the probability of occurrence of different NPV values was explained by 
the strategy manager of Cino: 
The use of @risk to estimate the probability of the occurrence of a particular NPV 
was simple. We simply put all the parameters [such as sales volume, selling price and 
costs] and risk triggers [such as changes in the sales volume, selling price and costs] 
that might result in the changes on NPV into the model provided by @risk. The 
probability of the occurrence of corresponding NPV values would be shown on the 
computer screen. These probabilities were very important information to us. The NPV 
value itself might be misleading. For example, the NPV value might be quite high, 
but the high NPV value would be meaningless if the probability of the occurrence of 
this NPV value was only 10%. That is, there would be still high risk associated with 
the project of forming an ATS JV, as there was only a little chance of realising that 
high NPV value. 
That is, calculating the probability of the occurrence of NPV values provided additional 
assurance in projecting the financial outcomes of the potential ATS JV. 
The concurrent operation of NPV, break-even and probability analyses showed that: 
 the base case of NPV was small 
 the probability of the occurrence of the base case NPV was around 80% 
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 it would roughly take six years for the potential ATS JV to break even under the 
base case scenario 
 the probability of achieving the worst and best cases of NPV was less than 10%. 
The results of these three accounting analyses were connected, which revealed that the 
formation of an ATS JV had a high probability of not adding financial value to Cino. 
This led the research collective to hypothesise the existence of risk concern about the 
non-value adding of the proposed ATS JV. 
The high probability of the risk of non-value adding, based on the A-review document, 
would suggest that Cino should abandon the proposal to form an ATS JV with Delink, 
and alternative solutions should be sought. However, the research collective ‘ignored’ 
the risk of non-value adding due to Cino’s CEO’s personal feelings and persistence to 
form the ATS JV. First, the CEO believed that the most important issue at that time was 
rebuilding trust with Delink. The formation of an ATS JV might not necessarily add 
financial benefits to Cino, but it was believed to enhance Delink’s trust in Cino. The 
enhanced trust would bring benefits to the long-term cooperation between Cino and 
Delink. Second, Cino had been using a JV model for its China operation for the past 20 
years, which had brought significant benefits to Cino. This led Cino’s CEO to develop 
strong personal faith in the outcomes of using the JV model, and preference to use a JV 
as the best option for Cino to start a new business in China. Thus, the proposal to form 
an ATS JV with Delink passed the feasibility test. 
The findings here highlight the importance of personal faith in driving the decision to 
form an ATS JV under high risk of non-value adding. This resembles Chua (1995), who 
found that accounting inscriptions help constitute personal faith, which drove 
accounting system change in three Australian hospitals. However, the findings here add 
to prior research by showing ‘ignorance’ as another way of dealing with risks. Given 
that managing risks may result in the risk management of nothing (Power 2009), should 
we just do nothing for risks? Here, the ‘ignorance’ of risk in the proposed ATS JV 
model contained the research collective’s belief in rebuilding trust between Cino and 
Delink to secure the benefits of the medium-duty engine JV. Under ANT, construction 
of the proposed ATS JV model would be interpreted as Cino’s effort to invest additional 
resources to its JV portfolio under possible overflows (the potential loss of trust 
between Cino and Delink due to Cino’s formation of heavy- and light-duty engine JVs 
with Sag and Futong, respectively) in order to maintain the stability of the network. 
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This finding extends prior research by demonstrating how, when trust is damaged 
between partner firms, it may be rebuilt through forming another alliance between the 
same partner firms. 
After the proposed ATS JV model passed the feasibility test, the research collective 
experimented with possible challenges (guided by the A-review document) related to 
the future operation and management of the ATS JV. This experimentation process was 
conducted through a few interconnected practices, including brainstorming and 
discussions between A-review participants in the research collective, calculations and 
rankings. The discussion between A-review participants was a brainstorming process 
(following the A-review document) in which each participant was free to argue their 
opinions (based on their personal experiences and/or feelings) about the potential 
challenges that might arise in the future operation and management of the potential ATS 
JV. A total of 24 challenges were proposed. Each of the challenges was explained to 
other participants in the A-review process (the reason the problem was a challenge and 
the effect of the challenge on Cino’s business). The participant who proposed a 
particular challenge was required to give: 
 one score in a three-point range where 3 = least severity on Cino’s businesses, 6 
= medium severity on Cino’s business and 9 = most severity on Cino’s business 
 one score in a three-point range where 3 = least probability of occurrence, 6 = 
medium probability of occurrence and 9 = highest probability of occurrence. 
The participants also had to explain the reason they chose a particular score for a 
particular challenge item. Some participants did not agree with the scores given to 
particular challenge items, and the participant who proposed and scored the challenge 
items had to respond to these dissenters. A typical example of the debates between 
different participants in the A-review processes is listed below: 
When I initially proposed the challenge of ‘downward pricing pressures’, I scored 9 
marks for severity of the consequence and 9 marks for likelihood of the occurrence of 
this event … Neil [manager of the strategy department] thought the score for the 
severity of the consequence of the ‘downward pricing pressures’ should be lowered 
down from 9 to 6 marks. He pointed out that the Chinese government’s release of 
NS4 [an emission standard] would make Cino technology–based ATS more desirable 
and preferable than those of other competitors [few firms in the Chinese market were 
able to research, develop and make ATSs for engines to strictly meet NS4]. That is, 
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the release of NS4 would increase our bargaining power on negotiating the ATS price 
to be supplied to Delink’s commercial vehicles. Well, I responded to Neil, saying that 
Delink would obtain ATS technology that would meet NS4 sooner or later, if not 
from us. Delink was negotiating with Vista [one of Cino’s competitor firms] for 
forming a heavy-duty engine JV, and Delink would obtain the qualified ATS from 
Vista. Neil was eventually convinced by me … Lynn [manager of the procurement 
department] also recommended lowering down the severity score. They told me that 
the price of the stainless steel [raw material to make ATSs] could be reduced by 5%, 
which would buffer the effects of ‘downward pricing pressure’. Well … I didn’t have 
any information about the raw material price changes and I was convinced by her. 
Eventually, we reset the severity score for ‘downward pricing pressure’ at 6 (Cino-
appointed general manager in the ATS JV). 
As seen in the above quotation, the score for the severity and probability of occurrence 
of different challenge items became the object of discussion between the A-review 
participants. Through these discussions, a final score for the severity and probability of 
occurrence of different challenge items was finalised. The score of severity was 
multiplied by the score of probability to obtain a total score. The nine challenge items 
(proposed by all A-review participants) with the highest total score were labelled as 
risks in the proposed ATS JV model. These nine risks included flexible products to be 
made in the JV, unclear scope of activity, Delink not adopting the volume as promised, 
downward pricing pressure, kits not purchased from Cino, the effect on one of Cino’s 
supplier, sufficient resource allocation for execution, general manager selection delay, 
and lack of experience with JVs. These nine risks are shown in Graph 3. 
These nine risks were articulated in the process of crafting the ATS JV model before the 
formation of this ATS JV. This finding extends prior research (e.g., Das & Teng 1998, 
2002; Dekker 2004), which generally treated risk in inter-firm alliances as a pure post–
alliance formation phenomena. In addition, given that the purpose of crafting the ATS 
JV model was to address the risk exposure of losing trust with Delink, it could be 
interpreted that new risks were created by the ATS JV as the outcome of the research 
collective’s efforts to manage risk in the medium-duty engine JV. This finding supports 
Vinnari and Skærbæck (2014), who argued that risk management may create 
uncertainties that would otherwise not emerge. Vinnari and Skærbæck’s (2014) finding 
of the uncertainties of risk management was based on the study of a single municipality 
in a public sector setting; thus, this thesis extends their findings to an economic context 
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that comprised multiple inter-firm alliances. This economic context shows how risk 
management of one inter-firm alliance may create new risks in a different alliance. 
In articulating the nine risks in the proposed ATS JV, the research collective 
simultaneously sought possible mitigation actions to these risks. In seeking these 
possible mitigation actions, the research collective undertook an experimentation 
process involving three sequential processes of drafting and categorising mitigation 
actions, constructing an initial term sheet and singing an ATS JV contract, and settling 
conflicts on key management positions in the ATS JV. This experimentation process 
involved a set of calculating and ranking practices, which were made possible through 
the combined use of open discussions and inscriptions. These 
 
Graph 3: Risks and MCSs Articulated in the ATS JV 
7.3.1 Drafting and categorising mitigation actions 
The experimentation process began by drafting possible actions that may have the 
potential to mitigate each risk in the proposed ATS JV. In drafting possible mitigation 
actions, the research collective focused on the effect of each risk on Cino’s specific 
business functions. Focusing on the effect of risks enabled the research collective to 
target relevant action owners/teams to draft the possible mitigation actions for each risk. 
Each targeted action owner/team was required to propose a mitigation action to deal 
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with the respective risk. After all mitigation actions were proposed, three terms (internal, 
uncertain and external) were used to code and categorise the proposed mitigation 
actions. This coding and categorisation process helped determine the method and timing 
to execute different mitigation actions. Internal mitigation actions were treated as those 
that could be controlled by Cino itself, which were operated immediately. The 
mitigation actions to deal with unanswered risk 18  were categorised as ‘uncertain 
mitigation action’. Accounting numbers were used to quantify the predicted effects of 
the uncertain mitigation actions on risks, which were then built into accounting models 
(scenario, NPV and break-even analyses) to calculate the corresponding accounting 
outcomes. The drafting and enactment of external mitigation had to be negotiated with 
the partner firm during the formation and ongoing management of the JV. These 
external mitigation actions laid the foundation to produce a new inscription, called an 
‘initial term sheet’ (see Graph 4) that was intended to guide Cino’s future negotiation 
with Delink to structure the proposed ATS JV. 
 
Graph 4: Initial Term Sheet 
7.3.2 Constructing an initial term sheet and signing the ATS JV contract 
When constructing the initial term sheet, the research collective discussed and listed 
Cino’s preferred management structure for the proposed ATS JV. The collective also 
                                                          
18 The unanswered risk is the risk for which Cummins was really not sure about the likelihood about their 
occurrence. 
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used their past JV operation experience to predict Delink’s preferred management 
structure to be used in the proposed ATS JV. This management structure included 
ownership structure, partnership scope, operational structure, supply structure, land 
ownership, profit structure, engineering licenses and royalties, R&D/engineering, 
branding, and warranty and risk management. Further, when constructing the initial 
term sheet, the research collective simulated possible consensus and conflicts that might 
appear in future negotiations between partner firms regarding the choices of the 
management structure in the proposed ATS JV. They also highlighted Cino’s bottom 
line for each management structure option, and distributed efforts in elaborating 
strategies to solve possible conflicts between partner firms. The logic of preparing the 
initial term sheet was explained by the CEO of Cino: 
Basically, the term sheet was guidance for our negotiations with Delink. It provided 
us an instruction or checklist in the negotiation with Delink. It provided a 
hypothetical negotiation scene that more or less depicted what would happen in real 
negotiations. By looking at the term sheet, we were able to know the specific items on 
which we and Delink would most likely have divergence. This made it possible for us 
to think about possible strategies and methods of convincing Delink to accept our 
proposal prior to the real negotiation process, and to fully understand and bear our 
bottom lines for different items in our mind in the real negotiation process. You know, 
the negotiation process somehow was like an auction. You might be temporarily 
convinced by the auctioneer who had good auctioning skills for bidding very high 
price. But later on, when you went back home, you realised that the price you offered 
in the auction was not rational. It was the same thing here in the negotiation process. 
Once you said ‘yes’ and signed the agreement, it would be hard to turn it around later 
on. By having the term sheet in advance, it would put us at an advantaged position in 
the negotiation process. 
In short, the research collective constructed the initial term sheet with the aim of helping 
Cino prepare and practice its future official negotiations with Delink for the formation 
and management structure choices of the proposed ATS JV. 
Delink was enrolled to finalise the management structure to be used in the proposed 
ATS JV. Delink was successfully enrolled in the proposal to form an ATS JV because 
the research collective considered Delink’s interest—Delink was eager to develop its 
own ATS. Cino and Delink reached agreement without much debate on most items 
listed in the initial term sheet, and both parties felt that it was time to sign the JV 
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contract because the main direction of the potential JV had been oriented based on the 
agreed items. This was explained by the manager of the strategy department of Cino: 
Given that the most controversial items in the term sheet had been settled and agreed 
upon by both parties, it was time to sign the JV contract. We wanted to close the deal 
as soon as possible in case Delink would change its mind on the agreed items later on. 
Delink was also eager to put the ATS JV into production as soon as possible to cope 
with its already-started ATS researching and developing process, which were aiming 
to match with its own engines that would meet NS4. Both parties thought that signing 
the JV contract and starting JV operation as soon as possible was the first priority 
after the big directions of the JV had been oriented, and the detailed stuff for which 
both parties had not agreed upon could be solved later on. 
Thus, the contract for the potential ATS JV was constructed and signed by both parties. 
However, there were different opinions on the appointment of three key management 
positions (the accounting manager, procurement manager and engineering manager) in 
the potential ATS JV. These items were not settled in this meeting, and both partner 
firms decided to leave these issues to be discussed and resolved in the future. 
7.3.3 Settling conflicts on key management positions in the ATS JV 
After the JV contract was signed, yet prior to the actual operationalisation of the ATS 
JV, the controversies between Cino and Delink on key management positions (the 
managers of the procurement, engineering and accounting departments) in the ATS JV 
were settled in different ways. First, it was agreed between the partner firms that Cino 
would appoint the engineering manager in the ATS JV. Cino highlighted the importance 
of beginning operation of the ATS JV as soon as possible by using both partner firms’ 
existing strengths, challenged Delink’s lack of experience and knowledge in 
engineering and making world-leading ATSs, and highlighted the role of Cino-
appointed personnel in helping Delink acquire resources from Cino. These arguments 
convinced Delink to accept Cino’s proposal to use a Cino-appointed engineering 
manager in the JV. 
Second, the controversies between Cino and Delink on procurement manager in the JV 
were settled with the agreement to establish a procurement committee. Delink 
exemplified the past practice of the engine JV (between Cino and Delink), and 
highlighted their ability to access low-price engine supplies. However, by drawing on 
past experience in the engine JV (where Delink used its position of leading the 
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procurement department to gain private benefits at the cost of the JV and Cino), Cino 
learnt that it was important not to give full procurement power in the ATS JV to Delink. 
Rather, Cino proposed to establish a procurement committee in the potential ATS JV 
that included three Cino-appointed personnel and three Delink-appointed personnel, if a 
Delink-appointed staff member was the procurement manager in the ATS JV. The use 
of a purchasing committee was explained by the general manager of the ATS JV: 
After several rounds of contacts with Delink and field trips to its manufacturing plant, 
I thought Delink had its own strength in procurement [such as large supplier 
networks], which could be utilised to bring benefits to the JV. That was why I 
compromised to take Delink’s proposal of making Delink-appointed personnel as the 
procurement manager. However, taking into consideration of Cino’s past JV 
experience [DECIE], where the Delink-appointed procurement manager selected 
higher-than-average market price raw materials from Delink-related suppliers, I 
thought we should not give the entire procurement power to Delink. Thus, the idea of 
a procurement committee came. Basically, each partner assigned three personnel as 
the committee members, and all key procurement decisions would have to be 
approved by the procurement committee. This would balance Cino’s and Delink’s 
powers in key procurement decisions. 
In short, Cino sought to mobilise the procurement committee to balance the power of 
Delink in unilaterally making procurement-related decisions. 
Third, it was agreed that two accounting managers would be appointed in the ATS JV—
one Cino-appointed deputy manager and one Delink-appointed manager. Initially, 
Delink hoped to have only one accounting manager in the ATS JV. However, Cino 
argued that, since Cino’s financial statements, budget and other financial documents 
needed to be prepared in English, it would be very important for Cino to access timely 
information about costs, revenues and other accounting information. This argument 
caused Delink to accept Cino’s proposal of adding one deputy accounting manager 
position in the ATS JV. Further, Cino hired one previous Delink accounting person, and 
appointed that person as the Cino-appointed deputy manager in the ATS JV. Drawing 
on past engine JV experience, Cino learnt that Delink might resist providing accounting 
information about the ATS JV to Cino in the future. Hiring a previous Delink 
accounting person would allow Cino to at least obtain some accounting-related 
information (such as the original filtration cost when Delink purchased filtrations from 
 137 
Booth), which would enable Cino to avoid becoming completely ‘blind’ to such 
information. This was explained by the general manager of the ATS JV: 
In case the same thing might happen again [Delink resisting providing accounting 
information about the JV/DECIE to Cino] in DECIATS that would make us totally 
become blind about what was happening in the JV, we had to think about alternative 
ways that would allow us to access those accounting information. The hiring of 
Delink’s previous accounting manager was the quickest and easiest way that would 
ensure that we would have some basic accounting information about Delink [such as 
suppliers, material purchasing price and the cost of manufacturing engines by Delink]. 
As can be seen from above, by drawing on past engine JV experience, Cino learnt that 
Delink might resist providing accounting information about the ATS JV to Cino in the 
future. To mitigate this risk, Cino hired a previous Delink accounting person, and 
appointed this person as the deputy accounting manager in the ATS JV to implicitly 
‘monitor’ the actions of the Delink-appointed accounting manager in the ATS JV. 
In summary, Cino learnt lessons from its past JV cooperative experience with Delink. 
These lessons made the research collective initiate semi-innovative solutions in three 
key management positions (the accounting manager, procurement manager and 
engineering manager) in the proposed ATS JV. These solutions were semi-innovative in 
the sense that they combined the research collective’s willingness to replicate 
counterpart management models in the medium-duty engine JV, and added new 
components to these counterpart management models to avoid Delink’s possible 
opportunistic behaviour in the future operation of the proposed ATS JV. This finding is 
similar to prior research (e.g., Anderson et al. 2015; Ding, Dekker & Groot 2013) that 
highlighted the importance of past experience between partner firms in designing and 
selecting MCSs in inter-firm alliances. 
7.4 Some Further Matters of Concern 
When the proposed ATS JV models were enacted, both partner firms acted strictly 
according to the JV contract. In addition, to ensure the survival of the ATS JV in its first 
few years of operation, the medium-duty engine JV promised a high penetration rate of 
ATSs made in the ATS JV, with the hope of giving significant financial support to the 
ATS JV. Cino invested its most recent world-leading technology to make core ATS 
components. These core components were supplied to the ATS JV to ensure the quality 
and competitiveness of the ATSs made in the JV. As a result, the ATS JV was quickly 
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put into production. However, the enactment and operation of the ATS JV model 
simultaneously became a conduit for internal conflicts between Cino and its multiple 
JVs. These internal conflicts were triggered by the Chinese government’s unexpected 
‘harmonisation’ process to upgrade the emission standard. 19  The government’s 
‘harmonisation’ process made Delink’s commercial vehicles (equipped with Cino 
technology–based engines) lose significant price competitive advantage in the Chinese 
market. It took Cino four years to research and develop the ATSs used in the engines 
(that would meet NS4) made in the engine JV. A large amount of money had been 
invested in this R&D process, which made Cino technology–based ATSs more 
expensive than those of its competitors in the Chinese market. The expensive ATSs 
partially contributed to the high costs of engines made in the engine JV (between Cino 
and Delink). Cino expected to recover the large amount of ATS R&D costs through 
increasing engine sales. However, it was expected that upgrading the emission standard 
would limit the total number of engines that would be available in the Chinese market, 
as engines that did not meet NS4 would be gradually eliminated. This was expected to 
increase the market share of Delink’s commercial vehicles that were equipped with 
Cino technology–based engines. However, due to the Chinese government 
‘harmonisation’ process, engines and commercial vehicles that did not meet NS4 were 
still allowed to be used and sold in the Chinese market. This made Delink’s commercial 
vehicles much more expensive than those of Delink’s competitors that used ‘unqualified’ 
                                                          
19 The Chinese government’s ‘harmonisation’ process occurred when the date of implementing the NS4 
was unexpectedly postponed from its pre-specified date by the government. Due to the ‘harmonisation’ 
process, engines that did not meet the NS4 standard could now be sold in the Chinese market. 
The ‘harmonisation’ process happened for two reasons. First, the Chinese government wished to protect 
local commercial vehicle and engine companies. A large number of Chinese engine and commercial 
vehicle companies did not have the capacity to independently research and develop engines that could 
meet NS4 by the original deadline. If commercial vehicle and engine firms that did not have the capacity 
to meet the NS4 were still forced to meet the NS4, they would need to outsource engines or ATSs (the 
key component in the engine that had a primary role in determining whether the engine met NS4) from 
other companies. The price of the outsourced engines or engine technology to meet NS4 would be 
significantly higher. That is, strict enforcement to implement NS4 would significantly (i) reduce Chinese 
local firms’ motivation to research and develop independent ATS technology and (ii) increase the price of 
engines and commercial vehicles in the Chinese market, which a large number of consumers would be 
unable to afford. To support the development of the local Chinese ATS industry and increase the 
affordability for Chinese commercial vehicle consumers, the Chinese government decided to harmonise 
the compliance of meeting NS4. 
Second, the Chinese government wished to avoid potential market turmoil. The diesel oil available in the 
Chinese market had not yet achieved a quality that would match NS4-compliant engines. The diesel oil 
available in the Chinese market was monopolised and supplied by China Petroleum Group and Sinopec. 
These two companies were not active in researching and developing a new generation of oil product, as 
there was no competition in the Chinese diesel oil market. The diesel oil supplied by China Petroleum 
Group and Sinopec was not qualified to match NS4-compliant engines. If this ‘unqualified’ diesel oil was 
used in NS4-compliant engines, it would damage or reduce the lifespan of the engines. Thus, avoiding 
potential market turmoil was another factor that led the Chinese central government to ‘harmonise’ the 
implementation of NS4-compliant engines. 
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engines (engines that did not meet NS4). The effects of the government’s harmonisation 
process on Cino were as follows: 
We started to research and develop ATS technology that would make engines [made 
in DECIE] meet NS4 as soon as the Chinese government released its intention of 
adopting NS4. That is, it took us almost four years, from the time when the intention 
of adopting NS4 was informed to the time when the NS4 was originally supposed to 
be implemented, in researching and developing ATS technology. You know, we 
could not wait until the last minute to research and develop ATS technology! The 
research process did take time, as we had to do all the preparation work in advance. 
The postpone of implementing NS4 destroyed our plans, as it would mean that it 
would take a longer time to recover R&D costs as no customers in China were willing 
to pay a higher price for commercial vehicles that met NS4 when there were much 
cheaper ones available in the market (chief secretary of DECIE’s general manager). 
It was clear that Delink’s commercial vehicles (equipped with engines made in the 
engine JV) lost a price competitive advantage in the Chinese market because of the high 
costs of ATSs and engines. This loss of a competitive advantage significantly reduced 
sales of Delink’s commercial vehicles, and Delink started to press Cino to reduce the 
cost of engines made in the engine JV. 
The pressure from Delink to reduce engine price was initially imposed on the engine JV 
between Cino and Delink. In particular, Delink requested further reduction of the 
penetration rate of engines made in the engine JV to be adopted in Delink’s commercial 
vehicles. This was explained by the strategy manager of Cino: 
Delink raised the point that the engine [made in DECIE] price was too high for them, 
in the DECIE annual board meeting. Delink was thinking to use more and more 
engines made by itself [engines made by Delink’s own independent engine factory] in 
those commercial vehicles to be digested internally within the Chinese market, and to 
equip engines made in DECIE in those commercial vehicles to be exported overseas. 
This would mean that Delink would rely more and more on engines made by itself, 
while reducing the dependence on Cino technology–based engines made in DECIE. 
This would have significant negative impacts on Cino’s China engine business, given 
that Delink was our largest OEM customer in China. 
As can be seen, in response to the decreased sales of medium-duty commercial vehicles 
in the Chinese market, Delink planned to replace engines made in the engine JV with 
engines made by itself in its medium-duty commercial vehicles. That is, Delink thought 
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that the price of engines made in the engine JV was much higher than those made by 
local Chinese engine manufacturers. Given that the majority of engine technology, 
management and operation culture in the engine JV was adopted from Cino, Delink 
thought that Cino should have the primary responsibility of lowering the engine cost. 
Delink’s intention to reduce the penetration rate of engines made in the engine JV to be 
adopted in Delink’s commercial vehicles placed pressure on Cino and the engine JV to 
consider possible ways to lower the overall engine cost. 
The engine JV transferred the pressure (from Delink) to reduce engine cost to the ATS 
JV. The ATS JV supplied ATSs to the engine JV. In the engine JV, the ATS was one 
the most expensive engine components, yet contributed least to the overall engine 
performance and stability. In addition, the engine JV believed that the ATS JV, in its 
early years of operation, lacked experience in making ATSs, which led to the high ATS 
cost. This was explained by the chief strategy manager of the engine JV: 
When we [DECIE] sold engines to Delink, it was a whole package. The whole 
package included everything, including the engine base and technology, ATS, fuel 
system, so on and so forth. Delink did not care how different components were made 
and assembled. What they cared was the price of these engines that we supplied to 
them. I mean, it would not help at all if we told Delink that it was the government 
requirement of making NS4-complied engines that raised the overall engine prices. 
Delink would think it would be our own business and we would handle it ourselves. 
The best thing we could do was to find ways to reduce the overall cost of the engines 
supplied to Delink. Given that we [DECIE] had been operating for more than 15 years 
and had mature practice and management experience of making engines, I thought 
that the best thing to do was to lower down the cost of ATSs purchased from 
DECIATS. The ATS was a non–value added component in the engine, which was one 
of the most expensive components in the engine. Also, you know, this year was only 
DECIATS’s second year of operations. I doubted whether they had done its best of 
controlling the cost of making ATSs. If you look at other ATSs available in the 
Chinese market, the prices of those ATSs were much cheaper than those made in 
DECIATS. 
For the engine JV, the ATS JV’s lack of experience was the major reason for the high 
cost of ATSs, and the ATS JV should act to reduce the cost of making the ATSs. Thus, 
the engine JV told the ATS JV that if the cost of the ATSs could not be reduced to a 
level that was similar to the average market price, the engine JV might outsource the 
ATSs to other companies. 
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The ATS JV believed that it was not its own responsibility to lower ATS costs to reduce 
the overall engine cost. First, the identity of Cino as the major component supplier of 
the ATS JV made it difficult for the ATS JV to reduce the cost of making ATSs. In 
particular, Cino supplied core ATS technology to the ATS JV, and Cino always aimed 
to sell the core ATS technology to the ATS JV at as high a price as possible so that Cino 
could earn a high profit margin: 
The core ATS technology used in DECIATS was supplied by Cino. Cino, as a 
worldwide and publicly listed firm, was always pursuing to maximise its profits. They 
had many indicators to meet each year, and they had to meet those key indicators to 
obtain more resources from Cino’s head office for sustaining its future operations in 
China. The pressure of meeting those indicators was one reason why they supplied 
ATS technology to us at the highest sales price that they thought appropriate. But, 
you know, the cost of purchasing core ATS technology took up about 30% of the 
overall cost of making ATSs, which was one of the biggest costs to us (general 
manager of the ATS JV). 
Unfortunately, the ATS JV had no choice but to purchase core ATS technology from 
Cino. This was because the ATS JV was a 50%-owned subsidiary of Cino, and Cino 
took it for granted that the ATS JV would eventually purchase core ATS technology 
from Cino, regardless of how this component was charged by Cino: 
Our [DECIATS’s] relationship with Cino was like the relationship between a father 
and son. Cino was the father and DECIATS was the son in such relationship. Given 
that DECIATS was still in its early years of operations, the JV relied heavily on Cino. 
For example, the annual working capital was contributed and shared by both partner 
firms; some operational, management and strategic decisions needed the support from 
Cino. It was like DECIATS, the son, did not have independent decision-making 
capacity. And Cino, the father, was making decisions on behalf of the son. In turn, 
Cino thought DECIATS would do whatever was required by Cino. So, we had no 
choice but accept whatever price was being quoted by Cino (general manager of the 
ATS JV). 
Cino’s use of performance-driven indicators and the parent-subsidiary relationship 
between Cino and the ATS JV made it difficult for the ATS JV to reduce the cost of 
making the ATS. 
The ATS JV believed that the engine JV should have the major responsibility of 
reducing overall engine costs. From the ATS JV’s perspective, the engine JV had been 
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operating for more than 20 years and should be more experienced than the ATS JV in 
the Chinese environment (such as knowing how to negotiate with suppliers, deal with 
JV partners, and streamline cost control and the manufacturing process). In addition, 
engines made by the engine JV comprised different components, including fuel systems, 
ATSs, turbo systems, filtration and other components. The ATS JV believed that the 
engine JV would have more flexibility (than the ATS JV) to reduce the cost of making 
engines. This was explained by the general manager of the ATS JV: 
DECIE had been operating in China for more than 15 years, while we [DECIATS] 
just started our operation one year ago. They knew pretty much everything here … 
Who do you think is more experienced and should take the leading role of lowering 
costs? I think they should streamline their manufacturing process in putting different 
components together. They should exert efforts to negotiate with all its suppliers to 
lower down the costs of purchasing different engine components. They have much 
better opportunities than us to do this. You know, how would you expect us 
[DECIATS] to bargain against our parent company [Cino] to lower down costs of 
purchasing components? DECIE has many external suppliers outside of Cino systems. 
Also, I think they should streamline their manufacturing process. I visited their 
manufacturing plant twice, and I think I would only need half of the employees than 
what they did to complete the same amount of workload. 
The ATS JV believed that the engine JV should consider ways to reduce the cost of 
making engines, rather than pressing others to achieve this target. 
Further, the ATS JV believed that the existing manufacturing and management control 
procedure in the ATS JV was overly tedious, which made it difficult to reduce costs. All 
manufacturing and management practices undertaken in the ATS JV had to follow those 
pre-set standard procedures. Two examples of these tedious manufacturing and 
management controls were explained by the general manager of the ATS JV: 
After the time when the Chinese government released the plan of implementing NS4, 
all ATSs made in DECIATS were required by Cino to strictly achieve the standard 
and quality that would make engines meet NS4. Even when almost all the rest of local 
engine companies kept on making ATSs that would only allow relevant engines to 
meet NS3, Cino still insisted in making ATSs that would satisfy NS4-compliant 
engines. This would, of course, reduce the sales of Delink’s commercial vehicles that 
were equipped with ATSs made by us, as the cost of making those ATSs was much 
more expensive … It was not until the Chinese government officially announced the 
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postponed implementation of NS4 that DECIATS was allowed by Cino to come back 
to make ATSs for NS3-complied engines. 
The general process for researching, developing and making a new ATS product was 
concept design and approval, VPI, engineering application and road testing. The 
concept design and approval and VPI were done in the US head office. And the 
VPC/engineering application and road testing were done locally in China. Once a 
standard ATS product was designed, all variations, no matter how big or small, as 
required to be customised by customers would trigger the re-starting of all these 
processes. Re-going through the whole process would also mean more costs, which 
would eventually be added in the final products. If you look at Weecai [Cino’s 
competitor], they were quite quick and flexible in adjusting their manufacturing 
process to tailor customers’ needs. If the same situation happened to Weecai, they 
would address the variation within three days without re-going through the whole 
process [from design to road testing]. 
That is, the ATS JV believed that the manufacturing and management control 
procedures used in the ATS JV (as required by Cino) limited the JV’s ability to lower 
the cost of manufacturing ATSs. Thus, the ATS JV believed it had limited capacity and 
flexibility to reduce the cost of making ATSs, and the engine JV and Cino should take 
the major responsibility for reducing engine costs. The continuous transfer of 
responsibility for lowering costs among Cino and its subsidiaries became a new 
problem to Cino. 
7.5 Discussion 
This section discusses how the findings of the data analysed in this chapter addressed 
the research questions of this thesis. First, we found that the risk of losing trust with 
Delink was articulated as the outcome of an experimentation process. This 
experimentation process involved seeking the causes of the problem (Delink’s 
uncooperative behaviour) that Cino encountered in the macro world (the daily operation 
of the JV portfolio) and constituting a research collective (comprising A-review 
participants) in the micro world (a manageable virtual environment) to hypothesise the 
potential effects of this problem. Second, the articulation of risks led the research 
collective to draw and connect a set of management control actions (such as accounting 
calculation, open discussion, mobilising the A-review document and brainstorming) 
with the hope of seeking and developing solutions to these risks. This led to the 
development of the proposal to form an ATS JV to mitigate the risk exposure of losing 
 144 
trust with Delink, and crafting theoretical management control models (mitigation 
actions, JV contract and key management positions) to deal with risks in the proposed 
ATS JV. 
Third, this chapter showed that, in crafting an ATS JV model to mitigate the risk 
exposure of losing trust with Delink, new risks associated with future negotiations (with 
Delink) and operation of the proposed ATS JV were simultaneously articulated. This 
chapter also demonstrated that implementing the proposed ATS JV model in the macro 
world for operation unexpectedly generated conflicts between the organisation’s own 
subsidiaries and JVs. 
The above findings revealed four themes: (i) the construction of risk management 
models, (ii) the mutually constitutive relationship between risk and risk management 
practices, (iii) the use of JV to rebuild trust between partner firms and (iv) the 
connection between corporate business relationships and personal guanxi. These four 
themes are discussed below. 
7.5.1 Constructing risk management models 
This chapter has demonstrated that forming an ATS JV with Delink, mitigation actions, 
a JV contract and key management positions were the theoretical models used by Cino 
to manage risks. Similar to Chapters 5 and 6, these risk management models were 
constructed as the outcome of an experimentation process. Different to Chapters 5 and 6, 
the focus of the experimentation process was testing the feasibility of forming an ATS 
JV and crafting a management control model to deal with foreseeable risks in the 
proposed ATS JV. The feasibility of the proposal to form an ATS JV as a solution to 
mitigate the risk exposure of losing trust with Delink was tested through four 
accounting calculations (scenario, NPV, break-even and probability analyses). The 
management model (mitigation actions, JV contract and key management positions) for 
risk management of the proposed ATS JV were crafted as the outcome of a set of 
sequential actions, including initiating and categorising possible mitigation actions for 
risks, constructing an initial term sheet, drafting and signing an ATS JV contract, and 
settling debates between Cino and Delink on key management positions in the ATS JV. 
Thus, the proposal to form an ATS JV with Delink and relevant risk management 
models to be used in the proposed ATS JV were not prescribed based on theoretical 
principles or alliance transaction characteristics, as suggested in prior research (e.g., Das 
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& Teng 1998; Dekker 2004), but constructed as the outcome of an organised 
experimentation process. 
It is also worth mentioning that the experimentation process found in this chapter 
differed to that in Chapters 5 and 6 in two ways. First, the research collective that 
undertook the experimentation process included a broader range of actors than those in 
Chapters 5 and 6. In Chapters 5 and 6, the research collective primarily consisted of the 
directors of Cino’s different departments. This chapter shows that a number of 
‘laypersons’ (from Cino’s top management team), such as employees in Cino’s different 
departments, were also enrolled in the research collective to construct the ATS JV 
model. Second, the experimentation process in this chapter became more standardised 
than that in Chapters 5 and 6. This is because the experimentation process was guided 
by an inscription (the A-review document). The A-review document set out detailed 
procedures that the research collective should follow when constructing the ATS JV 
model, even though the determination of specific content needed in each procedure 
might require open discussion and brainstorming in the research collective. 
7.5.2 Mutually constitutive relationship between risk and risk management 
practices 
Similar to the findings in Chapters 5 and 6, this chapter found that there is a mutual co-
constitutive relationship between risk and risk management practices. It has been shown 
that the mobilisation of a collection of management control actions (informal 
engagements, grouping and quantifying opinions on Delink’s uncooperative behaviour, 
self-reflection and researching into partner firms and imagination) and inscriptions (a 
summary report, numbers and engine penetration rate) helped the research collective 
identify the source and predict the possible effects of the problem of Delink’s 
uncooperative behaviour. This lay the foundation for developing the hypothesis of the 
existence of the risk exposure of losing trust with Delink. The risk exposure of losing 
trust with Delink prompted the research collective to undertake the management control 
action of conducting and connecting four accounting calculations (scenario, NPV, 
break-even and probability analyses), through which forming an ATS JV was proposed 
as the risk management practice to mitigate this risk exposure. 
Crafting a theoretical model that was intended to make the proposed ATS JV function 
involved the mutual construction of management control actions and risks. On the one 
hand, the combined use of management control actions (following the A-review 
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document, brainstorming and open discussions between A-review participants, 
mathematic calculations and rankings) helped source and rationalise potential 
challenges that may appear in the future operation of the proposed ATS JV. This led to 
the articulation of nine risks associated with the future operation of the proposed ATS 
JV. On the other hand, the nine risks articulated in the process of crafting the ATS JV 
model made the research collective undertake a few management control actions 
(drafting and categorising mitigation actions, constructing an initial term sheet and 
signing an ATS JV contract, and settling conflicts on key management positions in the 
ATS JV), which became the basis of constructing risk management models to be used in 
the proposed ATS JV. As can be seen, risk management practices were both the 
outcome and conduits for risks. Thus, in this sense, risk and risk management practices 
co-constitute each other. 
Further, similar to the finding in Chapter 5, the co-constitutive relationship between risk 
and risk management practices found in this chapter suggests that new risk (concern) 
may be created as the outcome of managing risk. Continuing Chapter 6, this chapter 
shows how the risk exposure of losing trust with Delink was hypothesised as the 
outcome of enacting the JV portfolio model to deal with the risk of over-reliance on 
Delink in the Chinese market. That is, managing one risk associated with operating the 
engine JV between Cino and Delink led to the creation of a new risk related to operating 
the same engine JV. In addition, this chapter shows that, in crafting the ATS JV model 
to mitigate the risk exposure of losing trust with Delink, the risk of non-value adding 
and risks associated with the future operation of the proposed ATS JV were created. 
This finding resembles the finding in Chapter 5 that risk in JV may arise in the process 
of crafting the JV model, before the actual formation and operation of this JV. However, 
this finding differs from that in Chapter 5 by showing how managing risk in one JV 
may led to the creation of new risks in a different JV. 
7.5.3 Using alliances to rebuild trust between partner firms 
Cino formed an ATS JV with Delink to mitigate the hypothesised risk of losing trust 
with Delink. Cino’s formation of heavy- and light-duty engine JVs with non–Delink 
related local Chinese OEMs damaged trust between Delink and Cino. To repair the 
damaged trust between Cino and Delink, Cino formed an ATS JV with Delink. By 
forming an ATS JV with Delink, Cino hoped to show its sincerity to help Delink 
develop ATSs to break away Delink’s dependence on Booth. In other words, Cino was 
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helping Delink reduce its dependence on Booth by forming an ATS JV with Delink, and, 
in this manner, Cino aimed to repair the torn tie with Delink. Repairing this torn tie with 
Delink even drove Cino to go against the economic rationality of forming the ATS JV, 
as the accounting calculations suggested that the ATS JV had a high probability of not 
adding value to Cino. Rather, the rationality of forming the ATS JV was to sacrifice the 
ATS JV with the hope of strengthening the overall JV network with Delink. 
7.5.4 Connection between corporate business relationships and personal guanxi 
Personal guanxi has implications for corporate business relationships. The personal 
guanxi relevant here was that between Cino- and Delink-appointed employees in the 
engine JV, and Cino’s and Delink’s CEOs. Different to personal face based on personal 
social prestige or bureaucratic power (as discussed in Chapter 6), this personal guanxi 
was developed through personal social activities (such as talking during dining, having 
coffee or tea, attending karaoke and playing mahjong) between these people, which 
were based on the implicit hope of reciprocating each other. Similar to personal face, 
personal guanxi can lead to reciprocal behaviour. This personal guanxi facilitated the 
informal engagements between Cino- and Delink-appointed personnel in the engine JV, 
and Cino’s and Delink’s CEOs. During these informal engagements, the corporate-level 
issue relating to Delink’s uncooperative behaviour was discussed. This helped Cino 
obtain some private and internal information from Delink, which helped the company 
diagnose the reasons for Delink’s uncooperative behaviour, and find an angle to tackle 
this issue. As a result, the idea of forming an ATS JV was proposed. The implication is 
that personal ties based on guanxi are important in driving business ties between JV 
partner firms. 
7.6 Conclusion 
In summary, this chapter has shown the three stages of the experimentation process 
through which risk and risk solutions were articulated. The first stage of the 
experimentation process identified the two plausible causes of the problem of Delink’s 
uncooperative behaviour (Cino’s formation of JVs with non–Delink related OEMs and 
inflexibility to make engine products suited to the Chinese market). In the second stage, 
a research collective was formed to make sense of the potential effects of the two causes 
of Delink’s uncooperative behaviour on Cino’s Chinese business. This led to the 
development of the hypothesis of risk of a loss of trust with Delink. The hypothesised 
risk exposure led the research collective to experiment the proposal of forming an ATS 
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JV with Delink as a solution to mitigate this risk exposure. In crafting a theoretical 
model for the proposed ATS JV, an A-review document guided the research collective 
to articulate risks in the proposed ATS JV, and respective risk management models 
were simultaneously constructed. However, the enactment and operation of the 
proposed ATS JV model became a conduit for internal conflicts between Cino and its 




Chapter 8: Summary and Conclusion 
8.1 Introduction 
This chapter summarises and concludes this thesis. In particular, this chapter reviews 
the major themes of this thesis and the connections among these themes. It highlights 
the articulation and complex dynamics of risks as the outcome of an ongoing 
experimentation process involving interactions between actors, events and activities in 
the daily operations of inter-firm alliances, and how MCSs are implicated in these 
processes. This chapter also discusses how future research may extend the present thesis. 
This chapter is organised as follows. Section 8.2 summarises this thesis, Section 8.3 
discusses the major contributions of this thesis to theory and practice, Section 8.4 
discusses directions for future research, and Section 8.5 concludes this chapter. 
8.2 Summary of the Thesis 
This thesis provided accounts and analysis of the interacting processes and practices 
through which risks are articulated and evolve in inter-firm alliances, and how MCSs 
may be implicated in these practices and processes. In doing so, this thesis also 
examined how management controls contribute to these interacting processes and 
practices. 
Chapter 1 discussed the motivating factors and aims of this thesis. This chapter 
highlighted the paradoxical relationship between risk and inter-firm alliances, where 
inter-firm alliances are treated as both the solution and source of risks. In doing so, this 
chapter also discussed how MCS are theorised in a very constrained way to deal with 
risks in inter-firm alliances by existing accounting research, thereby locating the present 
thesis within the wider accounting literature. 
Chapters 2 and 3 discussed the theoretical foundation to address the research questions 
of this thesis. Chapter 2 reviewed the extant literature on risks. This chapter also 
discussed the predominant accounting literature that examines the relationship between 
risk and inter-firm alliances, and the design choice of MCSs for risk management of 
inter-firm alliances. In doing so, this chapter drew on the social science and sociological 
literature on risks, and the accounting literature on accounting/MCSs in intra-
organisations to critique the predominant accounting literature on risk and MCSs in 
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inter-firm alliances. This chapter argued that most existing accounting literature has a 
number of limitations on understanding the relationship between risk and MCSs in 
inter-firm alliances. First, most accounting studies tend to treat risk as an objective 
reality ‘out there’ that can be measured and captured a prior to the practice of 
interacting and relating between actors, events and activities occurring in alliances’ 
daily operation. This is done with the mobilisation of particular inter-firm alliance 
characteristics (such as alliance transactions, alliance environments and partner firms) 
(Anderson & Dekker 2005; Das & Teng 1998, 2001; Dekker 2004; Ding, Dekker & 
Groot 2013; Van der Meer-Kooistra & Vosselman 2000). Contrary to this view, this 
chapter showed (by drawing on the social science and sociology literature and a few 
accounting studies) that risks are empirical phenomenon because they are constructed as 
the outcome of relations and interactions between people, events and activities 
occurring in people’s daily lives (Beck 1992; Douglas 1992; Lupton 1999; Mahama & 
Ming 2009; Miller, Kurunmaki & O’Leary 2008; Power 2007, 2013). That is, risk is a 
posteriori to the interacting practices occurring in the daily operation of inter-firm 
alliances. 
Second, most of the accounting literature’s treatment of risk as predetermined 
phenomenon tends to limit understandings of risk in inter-firm alliances as something 
purely caused by activities and events that occur after the formation of alliances 
(Anderson & Dekker 2005; Das & Teng 1998, 2000, 2001; Dekker 2004; Ding, Dekker 
& Groot 2013; Van der Meer-Kooistra & Vosselman 2000). However, research in the 
management literature tends to suggest that activities (such as risk) that are prior and 
lead to the formation of inter-firm alliances may have implications for risks in inter-firm 
alliances (Das & Teng 2003; Narasimhan & Nair 2005). Including these pre–alliance 
formation activities and connecting them to post–alliance formation activities may 
improve understandings of how risks are constructed in inter-firm alliances. Third, the 
static nature of risk presented in much accounting literature disguises and subsequently 
does not consider the dynamic nature of risks in inter-firm alliances. This is because the 
identity, meaning or object of risks may constantly change as alliances develop in their 
daily practices and operations. 
Fourth, in treating risk as predetermined and static phenomena in inter-firm alliances, a 
large number of accounting studies have devoted profound effort to designing and 
categorising different types of MCSs, and prescribing them with fixed properties and 
structural forms (Anderson & Dekker 2005; Dekker 2004; Ding, Dekker & Groot 2013; 
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Van der Meer-Kooistra & Vosselman 2000). For different types of risk, the extant 
accounting research has argued that there always exists an ‘optimal’ or ‘ideal’ MCS that 
can be used to manage certain types of predetermined risk in inter-firm alliances. The 
review of more recent accounting studies (mainly in a non-inter-firm alliance context) 
showed that MCSs, such as accounting controls, do not have predetermined fixed 
properties or functions (Ahrens & Chapman 2007; Chua & Mahama 2007; Miller & 
O’Leary 2007; Mouritsen & Thrane 2006). Rather, these researchers have argued that 
the ways MCSs obtain various forms and perform varying functions are the outcomes of 
interactions and translations between heterogeneous entities in locales. Thus, most 
accounting research limits understandings of the ‘fragile’ nature of MCSs in the risk 
management of inter-firm alliances. Prescribing MCSs that ‘should’ be used to manage 
risk in inter-firm alliances limits understandings of how MCSs may actively contribute 
to the articulation and evolution of risks. 
Chapter 3 discussed how an emerging theoretical perspective (the three-stage 
experimentation process) in ANT would be useful to provide an alternative view (to 
extant accounting literature on risk management in inter-firm alliances) on risk and 
MCSs for risk management of inter-firm alliances. ANT focuses on examining how 
heterogeneous entities, events and activities interact via a three-stage experimentation 
process in the daily practice of inter-firm alliances, through which risks and MCSs are 
articulated and evolve. Applying ANT in this study: 
1. enabled analysis of the constructivist and dynamic nature of risk and MCSs in 
the practice of operationalising and managing inter-firm alliances 
2. provided opportunities to study how the use of alliances to address risk may lead 
to new risks 
3. facilitated examination of the ‘fragility’ of MCSs in the practice of risk 
management in inter-firm alliances 
4. made it possible to study how MCSs may affect and be affected by risks in inter-
firm alliances. 
While applying ANT to study risks and MCSs in inter-firm alliances, the possible roles 
of accounting, accounting inscriptions and other inscriptions were also discussed. 
Following ANT and the research questions of this thesis, this research conducted a field 
study on one international JV. The details of this JV were presented in Chapter 4. This 
chapter discussed the reasons for using the field study method, the processes and logic 
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of selecting the research site, the description of the JV studied, and the methods of 
collecting and analysing the data collected from the field. 
Data collected from the field were analysed based on the theoretical framework 
explicated in Chapter 3. The analysis of data collected from the field led to the 
elaboration of three empirical chapters (Chapters 5, 6 and 7). Chapter 5 focused on an 
experimentation process through which risk was articulated as the outcome of making 
sense of a problem (the unusual number and frequency of customer claims for engine 
repairs) that Cino encountered in its technology licensing agreement with Delink. This 
chapter also showed how this risk led to crafting a proposal to form a medium-duty 
engine JV and respective MCS models as solutions, and how enactment of this risk 
management model created a new problem. This new problem was associated with 
Cino’s failure to expand the target customer range of the medium-duty engine JV. 
Following Chapter 5, Chapter 6 discussed how the new problem triggered a second 
round of experimentation process, which led to the articulation of a new risk in the 
medium-duty engine JV, and respective risk solutions (the formation of a JV portfolio). 
Chapter 6 also discussed how the enactment of the JV portfolio model created a new 
problem (relating to Delink’s uncooperative behaviour). Chapter 7 discussed the third 
round of experimentation process, which involved making sense of Delink’s 
uncooperative behaviour. It showed how this sense-making process led to developing a 
hypothesis about the existence of the risk exposure of losing trust with Delink, and how 
an ATS JV model was crafted to mitigate this risk exposure. Chapter 7 concluded by 
showing how internal conflicts between Cino and its multiple JVs arose when an ATS 
JV model was implemented. The third round of experimentation involved a broader 
range of actors and more sophisticated inscriptions than did the previous two rounds. 
Overall, the three empirical chapters found that JVs and MCSs for risk management of 
these JVs were (re)constructed as the outcome of an ongoing experimentation process. 
This process was executed by a network of actors, which involved interactions among 
people within and outside Cino, a few local Chinese commercial vehicle firms, Cino’s 
competitor and supplier firms, professional automobile institutions and the Chinese 
government to craft and test solutions to risks. In the experimentation process, complex 
economic issues encountered in Cino’s daily operations (macro world) were attributed 
or simplified to representative problems in a manageable virtual environment (micro 
world). In the micro world: 
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 the plausible causes and effects of these problems on Cino’s Chinese and global 
business were hypothesised, leading to the articulation of risks 
 competing options for managing these risks were compared, and JV was selected 
 the feasibility of the proposal to form JVs was tested 
 the potential partner firms of the proposed JVs were sourced, targeted and 
engaged with 
 items leading to drafting the JV contract were discussed 
 potential problems and challenges in the future operation and management of the 
proposed JVs were predicted, leading to the hypothesis of the existence of risks 
in the proposed JVs 
 plausible MCS models were created to manage the hypothesised risks in the 
future operation 
 management of the JVs was initiated, discussed, converged, categorised and 
organised. 
When the JV and respective MCS models were enacted in Cino’s daily operation 
(macro world), a new economic issue emerged. This triggered another round of the 
experimentation process. Different sets of MCSs (management control activities/actions, 
inscriptions and material devices) and personal feelings, experiences and beliefs were 
related to each other in each round of the experimentation process. These findings have 
significant implications for the literature on risk management and management control 
of inter-firm alliances. 
8.3 Major Contributions 
This thesis sought to contribute to the accounting and management control literature on 
the risk management of inter-firm alliances by examining the processes and practices 
through which risks become articulated, and how MCSs may be implicated in these 
processes and practices. This section summarises the major contributions of this thesis, 
while the following section presents avenues for future research. 
8.3.1 Risk and risk management 
This thesis found that risk management models (the proposal to form JVs and respective 
theoretical models hypothesised to be used for risk management of the proposed JVs) 
were constructed as the outcome of an ongoing experimentation process. This 
experimentation process involved crafting solutions that could plausibly manage risks in 
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a micro world (a manageable virtual environment constituted by partner firms’ top 
management teams) and enacting these hypothetical risk management models in the 
macro world (JV partner firms’ daily operations). Crafting risk management models 
involved: 
 comparing and choosing between competing economic arrangements that could 
plausibly manage risk 
 examining the feasibility of undertaking the proposal to form JVs 
 sourcing and selecting (potential) partner firms 
 enrolling the targeted partner firms in the proposed JV 
 testing the suitability of the targeted firms as JV partners 
 analysing problems or challenges that may arise in the future operation of the 
proposed JV 
 articulating theoretical solutions for those foreseeable problems or challenges 
 discussing within and between partner firms to negotiate a JV contract. 
Enacting the risk management models required implementing these models in the JV 
partner firms’ daily operations to address risks. However, enacting the risk management 
models always created new problems (Cino’s failure to enlarge the target customer 
range of the engine JV, Delink’s uncooperative behaviour, and internal conflicts 
between Cino’s and its subsidiaries) for partner firms’ daily operations, which triggered 
new rounds of the experimentation process. This meant that the construction of the risk 
management model was an ongoing process. 
This finding about the ongoing experimentation of the risk management model has 
implications for the constructivist nature of the risk management model. The first 
implication is that the risk management model is constructed. This is consistent with a 
few accounting studies’ (primarily in the intra-organisation context) views on the 
constructivist nature of MCS (Lupton 1999; Mahama & Ming 2007; Miller et al. 2008). 
This thesis extends the constructivist view of MCS to the context of inter-firm alliances. 
Instead of prescribing a risk management model that ‘should’ be used in the everyday 
business of inter-firm alliances, based on alliance transaction characteristics (such as 
transaction costs, the frequency of alliance transactions and value creation), alliance 
partner characteristics (such as inter-partner market commonality and partner firms’ 
resource alignment complementarity) and environment characteristics (such as 
uncertainty and the number of alternative companies in the market) (Das & Teng 1998, 
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2001, 2002; Dekker 2004), attention should focus on how risk management models are 
constructed through a set of interacting and relating practices. 
Further, this thesis extends prior accounting research by showing how risk management 
models and practices are (re)constructed through the practice of experimentation. Most 
prior accounting research has tended to treat risk management models and practices as 
the outcome of a set of relating and interacting practices occurring exclusively in one of 
two opposing scales (a laboratory type of environment/microcosm and the real market 
outside the laboratory type of environment/macrocosm). That is, risk management 
models and practices are either treated as a theoretical model that can be designed in the 
microcosm or as an empirical phenomenon that only emerges as the outcome of 
everyday practices in the macrocosm. However, this thesis found that the risk 
management model was continuously moving between the macrocosm and microcosm, 
(re)crafting the model in the micro world and (re)testing the model in the macro world. 
In addition, the construction of the risk management model itself involved interactions 
between activities and practices in the macrocosm and microcosm. This finding 
supports and links the two opposing views of prior accounting research on risk and risk 
management models and practices. As such, the findings of this thesis highlight the 
need to bridge the gap between activities in the macrocosm and microcosm, and 
examine how they overlap and support each other to (re)construct risks and risk 
management models and practices. 
The second implication is that, instead of treating the risk management of inter-firm 
alliances as a one-time practice that is characterised by the successful design or 
implementation of a certain MCS, this thesis found that the risk management of inter-
firm alliances is an ongoing and never-ending process, requiring regular maintenance 
and redesign of models. In this ongoing process, existing risk management models 
(such as forming JVs) continued being translated into new patterns, and new risk 
management models were continuously devised, practised and tested to manage 
emerging risks. This finding reflects Power’s (2007) argument of ‘risk management of 
everything’. Thus, this thesis has a practical contribution because it suggests that the 
risk management of inter-firm alliances require organisations’ long-term efforts, and 
managers responsible for the risk management of inter-firm alliances must continue 
monitoring the dynamics of the alliance and the corresponding changes needed for the 
risk management model and practices. 
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8.3.2 Mutually constitutive relationship between risk and risk management 
practices 
This thesis found that risk and risk management practices (the mobilisation of 
management control actions and inscription, and crafting and enacting JV models) co-
construct each other in the dynamics of inter-firm alliances. Crafting, enacting and 
operating the JV model created problems, which became the conduit for articulating 
risks in the JVs. In addition, the combined use of management control actions helped: 
 attribute and simplify complex economic problems encountered in the macro 
world to problems and relevant matters of concern that could be acted upon in 
the micro world 
 initiate and draw relationships between entities that were connected to the 
problems 
 diagnose plausible causes of the problems 
 hypothesise possible effects if these problems were left unresolved 
 formulate and objectify risk perceptions. 
A variety of inscriptions were mobilised to guide and limit the choices of management 
control actions, enable the operationalisation of different management control actions, 
and objectify the outcomes of operating different management control actions. In 
addition, these management control actions and inscriptions and the ways they were 
related to each other were performed differently, depending on alliance local practices. 
This led to different methods and processes of articulating risks. Different MCSs and 
connections between them are listed in Appendix 3. However, the point here is that 
these risk management practices played a central role in articulating risks in inter-firm 
alliances. In contrast, the articulated risks triggered the drawing, selecting and relating 
of an array of management control actions and inscriptions, through which risk 
management models (such as the proposal to form JVs, JV contracts and key 
management positions) were (re)constructed. In other words, risk influenced the 
selection of management control actions for (re)constructing the risk management 
model in inter-firm alliances. As such, it can be concluded that risk management 
practices were both the outcome and conduits of risks. 
This finding of the co-constitutive relationship between risk and risk management 
practices contributes to the prior research in the following ways. First, it challenges the 
implicit assumption widely immersed in the accounting literature (e.g., Anderson et al. 
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2015; Dekker 2004; Van der Meer-Kooistra & Vosselman 2000) that there always 
exists an ‘optimal’ MCS that can be designed and used to manage risks in inter-firm 
alliances, and if an MCS fails to manage these risks, the MCS must be inappropriately 
designed or used. This thesis extends this view by finding a bidirectional relationship 
between risk and MCSs—that is, the MCS not only acts to manage risk, but also 
actively participates in articulating risk. 
Second, the finding of the co-constitutive relationship between risk and risk 
management practices suggests that managing risks leads to the creation of new risks. 
This finding is not only consistent with Vinnari and Skærbæck’s (2014) argument of the 
uncertainties of risk management, but also extends their argument to an economic 
context (JVs), which increases the generalisability of their findings. In addition, prior 
research by Das and Teng (1998), Langfield-Smith and Smith (2003), Dekker (2004) 
and Anderson et al. (2015) generally treated risk in inter-firm alliances as a pure post–
alliance formation phenomenon. This creates the impression that risk in inter-firm 
alliances can only be caused by activities or events (such as partner firms’ opportunistic 
behaviour) that occur after these alliances are formed. The findings of this thesis 
extends prior research by showing that risk in inter-firm alliances can arise in the 
process of crafting the JV model, prior to the actual formation of the JV. 
8.3.3 Practice of using an alliance portfolio for risk management 
This thesis found that Cino continued building JVs, thereby forming a JV portfolio to 
deal with the dynamics of risks. The prevalent view in prior research has been that 
forming an alliance portfolio will help organisations create a competitive advantage 
(such as obtaining and synergising resources from different alliances in the portfolio), 
which is critical for managing risk. While the findings of this thesis align with this 
opinion, this thesis also extends prior research by showing different rationalities and 
practices for forming and expanding the alliance portfolio to achieve risk management. 
For example, Cino formed a medium-duty engine JV with Delink in order to obtain 
management control power in the engine manufacturing process. Obtaining this power 
helped Cino manage financial and reputational risk under the technology licensing 
agreement. In order to become competitive in the Chinese market, a filtration JV with 
Delink was formed by Cino to cut the ties between Cino’s partner firm (Delink) and 
competitor firm (Booth), and simultaneously strengthen the ties between Cino and 
Delink. This helped Cino mitigate risk exposure in the uncertain Chinese market. To 
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mitigate the risk of over-dependence on Delink in the Chinese commercial vehicle 
market, Cino formed heavy- and light-duty engine JVs with non–Delink related OEMs 
to exploit the benefits of other segments in the same market. In response, an ATS JV 
was formed with the aim of repairing the damaged trust between Cino and Delink. As 
can be seen, different types of JVs were enacted to fulfil different rationalities of risk 
management, depending on the in situ relationships between multiple partner firms and 
local activities, and the events in Cino’s daily operations. Showing different rationalities 
and practices of forming and expanding the alliance portfolio to achieve risk 
management reflects on Ahrens and Chapman’s (2007) call to study the ‘situated 
functionality’ of risk management practices. 
8.3.4 Connection between the corporate business relationship and personal 
reciprocal behaviour 
This thesis found that personal reciprocity plays a critical role in risk management of 
inter-firm alliances. Inter-firm alliances were generally treated by prior research as 
reciprocal corporate-level behaviour, in which resources were shared and cooperative 
activities were undertaken between partner firms with the hope of achieving certain 
objectives (Ring & Van de Ven 1992). As such, sharing, mitigating or managing risk 
was one of the objectives of forming inter-firm alliances. This thesis extends prior 
research by demonstrating that personal reciprocal behaviour may have implications for 
the alliance relationships between partner firms. For example, after Cino planned to exit 
its negotiation with Sag to form a heavy-duty engine JV, Sag sent the provincial 
governor of Shanxi province to lobby Cino’s CEO to return to the negotiation. The 
governor asked Cino’s CEO to give him a personal favour/‘face’ to resume Cino’s 
negotiation with Sag for the formation of the heavy-duty engine JV. In return, the 
governor would reciprocate Cino’s CEO by offering preferable accounting policies to 
the JV. The reciprocal behaviour between the governor and Cino’s CEO was based on 
the exchange of personal ‘face’, which was underpinned by the bureaucratic power that 
each had in their own organisations. 
This thesis has also demonstrated that, when Delink started acting uncooperatively 
against Cino, the informal engagements between Cino- and Delink-appointed personnel 
in the medium-duty engine JV and Cino’s and Delink’s CEOs provided conditions to 
diagnose the possible reasons for Delink’s uncooperative behaviour. These informal 
engagements were based on personal guanxi, which was enacted through working 
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relationships and further developed through mutual social activities. Delink’s current 
progress and strategic plan (to develop its own ATSs) were disclosed by Delink’s CEO 
to Cino’s CEO in their informal engagement. This information was critical in driving 
Cino to develop the proposal to form an ATS JV to mitigate the risk of losing trust with 
Delink. These two examples clearly show that personal reciprocal behaviour was 
practised in two different paths (‘face’ and guanxi), which saved or enhanced the 
business relationships between Cino and its partner firms. This laid the foundation to 
form the heavy-duty engine JV and ATS JV. Thus, personal ties can have a significant 
effect on the alliance relationship between partner firms. 
8.4 Directions for Future Research 
While this thesis provides insights to the constructivist and dynamic nature of risks in 
inter-firm alliances and how MCSs may be implicated and practised in the risk 
management of inter-firm alliances, there are at least three additional issues that future 
research could examine. 
First, besides JVs, there are many different forms of inter-firm alliances that could be 
studied, such as strategic supply alliances, licensing agreements, outsourcing, research 
consortia and franchising (Ring & Van de Ven 1992). It is possible that the relationships 
between risk and MCS could play out differently in these other inter-firm settings. 
Future research could apply the analytical framework used in this thesis (the three 
stages of the experimentation process) to study risk and MCSs in these other forms of 
inter-firm alliances. This would allow researchers to understand how the 
experimentation and articulation of risk and MCSs in these other forms of inter-firm 
alliances may be similar or different to the practices and processes discovered in this 
thesis, and how accounting inscriptions and devices and other inscriptions may be 
implicated therein. 
Second, the findings of this thesis are based on one JV in automotive industry. As in 
most field studies, the focus on only one JV in a single industry may limit the 
generalisability of the findings of this thesis. This thesis can be extended by examining 
JVs in industries other than the automotive industry. Doing this may enhance the 
generalisability of the findings of this thesis by eliminating the effects of factors 
particularly pertinent to the automotive industry (such as the requirement to meet the 
emission standard) on the findings of this thesis. Further, future research could apply the 
analytical framework of this thesis to study smaller JVs. The JVs studied in this thesis 
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generally had a large initial investment and annual turnover. Future research could 
examine smaller JVs to see whether the findings of this thesis still hold. Finally, the JVs 
studied in this thesis were all cross-culture JVs, in which the parent firms were from 
countries with a different culture (China and the US). Future research could examine 
JVs whose parent firms are from the same country or countries with a similar culture. 
Third, the analytical framework used in this thesis (the three stages of the 
experimentation process) could be applied in intra-organisations. Instead of (i) treating 
risk as a theoretical phenomenon that can be predetermined outside a set of interacting 
and relating practices that lead to such risks and (ii) prescribing MCSs that ‘should’ be 
used to manage risks independent of practical actions, risks and MCSs (as a fragile 
assemblage) could be theorised as the outcome of a set of iterative and innovative 
experimentation processes that mutually participate in the (re)construction of each other, 
embedded in organisations’ daily practices. Studying risks and MCSs as the outcome of 
ongoing experimentation processes and practices would enhance understandings of the 
constructivist and dynamic nature of risks, and how MCSs may be implicated and 
practised in these processes and practices. By doing so, researchers could gain 
alternative ways of understanding risks and MCSs to the views offered by rationalist-
cognitive, functionalist, social constructivist, structuralist and post-structuralist 
approaches (Themsen 2014). 
8.5 Conclusion 
This thesis has focused on examining the processes of how risks are articulated and 
evolve in inter-firm alliances, and how MCSs may be implicated and practised in these 
processes. An emerging area of ANT (the three-stage experimentation process) was 
employed to examine the research questions of this thesis. The findings of this thesis 
have usefully extended and made theoretical contributions to the existing literature. 
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Appendix 1: Definition of Major Concepts 
Risk: A large number of studies have taken a positivist view on risks (Gephart et al. 
2009; Lupton 1999; Power 2009; Renn 1990). These studies have tended to define risk 
as the probability of occurrence of some unexpected outcomes. In this regard, risk is 
generally treated as a pre-existing reality ‘out there’ that is waiting to be measured or 
perceived by people. The focus of these positivist studies is on (i) identifying the risk 
events, (ii) developing statistical tools to calculate or analyse human behaviour (such as 
mental heuristics) that contributes to the subjective perception of the probability of the 
occurrence of risk and (iii) elaborating measurement models to capture the financial or 
non-financial effects of risks. This positivist view on risks has led to some accounting 
researchers’ tendency to define different types of risks, such as audit risk, client risk, 
operational risk, financial risk, performance risk and relationship risk (Das & Teng 
1998, 1999, 2001; Houston 1999; Woods 2009). 
Another group of research has adopted a constructivist approach to study risk (Kalthoff 
2005; Mahama and Ming 2009; Miller et al. 2008; Millo & MacKenzie 2009; Rocher 
2011). These studies believe that risk is not a pre-existing reality, but is the outcome of 
the practice of constructing. The research focus is examining the social norms, events, 
actions, activities, practices and possible interactions between them in people’s and 
organisations’ everyday business. According to these researchers, the collective effects 
of these everyday practical activities lead to the perception of something as risky, and 
thus the labelling of it as risk. In other words, risk is only the outcome of the collective 
effects of everyday practices. This thesis adopts the constructivist approach to study risk 
in inter-firm alliances. Risk is defined in this thesis as an a posteriori outcome of a set 
of interacting and relating practices in the daily operations of inter-firm alliances. This 
thesis does not predefine what risk is and the type of risk that is under investigation. 
Rather, how the idea of risk is created, what constitutes risk, and the meaning of risk are 
empirical issues that are discussed in the empirical analysis chapter. 
Management control systems: MCSs have traditionally been studied as (a set of) 
control mechanisms or systems with certain structural forms, properties and presumed 
functions (Bruns & Waterhouse 1975; Chenhall 2003; Shields & Yound 1994; Simons 
1995; Van der Stede 2000). For these researchers, MCSs are passive tools that are 
adopted by organisations to achieve certain managerial purposes. The focus of this 
previous research was on the ‘optimal’ design of the structural forms of MCSs, and the 
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‘appropriate’ use of MCSs to deliver the satisfied outcomes. The structural forms or use 
of MCSs are said to depend on contextual variables, such as the external environment, 
technology, structure, size, task difficulty and uncertainty, strategy and culture. 
Some recent researchers have adopted a practice of understanding MCSs that is 
embedded intimately in the context in which the MCS operates. These researchers 
understand MCSs as a bundle of activities, technology, material devices and inscriptions 
that are systematically applied in practice to generate a certain social order (Ahrens & 
Chapman 2007; Chua 1995; Mouritsen & Thrane 2006). These researchers treat MCSs 
as an ‘actor’ that actively acts on and is simultaneously acted on by other organisational 
practices. The structural forms of the MCS are only the temporary outcome of the 
interplay between the MCS and other organisational practices, which are often 
vulnerable and subject to changes. This thesis adopts the practice view of MCSs. In this 
regard, MCSs are defined in this thesis as a bundle of activities, actions, processes, 
systems, models and technology material devices that are practised in the everyday 
business of inter-firm alliances to achieve a certain managerial intent. 
Risk management models and practices: Risk management models include strategies 
(such as the proposal to form inter-firm alliances) and structural forms of MCSs and 
other functional methods that have the possibility to manage risks. Constructing, 
systematically using and reconstructing these risk management models in organisations’ 
daily operations are risk management practices. 
Inter-firm alliances: Inter-firm alliances are voluntary cooperative relationships 
between two or more independent firms in which joint activities are undertaken to 
achieve common goals. Four characteristics distinguish inter-firm alliances from other 
organisational arrangements. First, partner firms share resources or contribute resources 
to the inter-firm alliance. These resources can be, but are not limited to, brand names, 
knowledge of technology, collaborators, procedures/processes, special services, 
financial assets and employees (Furrer et al. 2008; Hart 1995; Penrose 1959; Wernerfelt 
1984). The combination of resources from partner firms may create synergy or 
competitive advantages that would not be possible if the partner firms operated alone 
(Miller & Friesen 1983; Stevenson & Jarillo 1990; Thornberry 2003). Second, inter-
firm alliances require joint activities between partner firms. That is, all partner firms 
participate in the decision-making process of inter-firm alliances or cooperate with each 
other in undertaking tasks and practices in the daily operations of the alliances. Third, 
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inter-firm alliances are formed by partner firms to achieve mutual objectives (such as 
gaining competitive advantages in the market) or their own strategic goals (such as 
gaining entrance to a particular market). Finally, inter-firm alliances are generally 
formed with a long-term orientation (Mahama 2000). Unlike the one-time discrete 
market transactions between different parties, inter-firm alliances involve repetitive and 
iterative transactional arrangements between partner firms. Often, the benefits of inter-
firm alliances are gradually realised in the long term. 
There are different types of inter-firm alliances, including horizontal strategic alliances, 
vertical strategic alliances, intersectional alliances, JVs, equity alliances and non-equity 
alliances. See Culpan (2002) for a comprehensive review of the different types of inter-
firm alliances. 
Material devices: Material devices are instruments for arranging, processing and 
working on inscriptions. Through material devices, multiple inscriptions may be 
gathered and combined, through which the original content may be translated to 
something new. Material devices include, but are not limited to, equipment, machines, 
accounting formula, accounting technology and software. 
Inscriptions and accounting inscriptions: Inscriptions are textual materials, such as 
reports, memos, numbers, written words, colours, pieces of paper, Microsoft Excel 
spreadsheets, interview scripts, graphs, charts and tables. Accounting inscriptions (such 
as accounting numbers and accounting reports) are one type of inscription that involves 
the mobilisation of accounting information. Given its nature of materiality, inscriptions 
are generally immutable, mobile and combinable (Robson 1992). This equips 
inscriptions with the potential power to stimulate translations and changes, or trigger 
actions (Mahama 2000). Equally possible, the construction or selection of inscriptions 
may be the outcome of certain actions (Callon 1991; Mouritsen et al. 2008). 
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Appendix 2A: Coding Categories and Concepts and Their Descriptions 
Category Description Subcategory 
Matters of concern  Something that occurs in practice 
(the real world) with an initial 
shock, for which there is no 
precise knowledge about the 
nature, causes and consequences 
Risks 
JV’s productivity falling far 
behind demand 
JV’s independence 




Experimentation  The process of tentatively and 
iteratively creating new models or 
developing existing models, with 
the aim of increasing 
understanding and finding 
solutions to matters of concern 
encountered in the macrocosm 
From macrocosm to microcosm 
Research collective in microcosm 
Return from microcosm to 
macrocosm  
From macrocosm to 
microcosm 
The process of reducing matters 
of concern encountered in the 
macrocosm to a set of problems 
at a manageable scale (in the 
microcosm) with available action, 
expertise and knowledge 
Physical inspection 
Using personal feelings and 
experiences 
Reviewing historical documents 
Collecting information from an 
independent third party 
Interviews 
Corroborating information 
collected from different sources  
Calculating accounting indicators  
Categorising 
Meeting 
Informal engagement between 
personnel  
Research collective in 
microcosm 
The tentative list of a variety of 
entities and the simulation of 
possible patterns and effects of 
interactions between these 
entities, through which (i) 
solution(s) to manage problems, 
(ii) potential risks associated with 
the solution(s) and (iii) plausible 
MCSs that are intended to 
manage such risks are 
experimented and hypothesised 
Brainstorming in departments 
Calculating 
Categorising 
Negotiating between partner 
firms 
Drawing on past practice and 
experience 
Goodwill 
Hypothesising potential effects of 
certain actions 
Meeting between director of Cino 
Non–JV related activities 
Open discussion between 
departments  
Estimating probability  
Making assumptions 
Physical inspection 
The object of research 
collective in microcosm  
The items or objects that are 
experimented in the research 
Cino’s own problem  
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collective in the microcosm  Partner firm’s actions  
Partner firm’s culture or customs 
of doing business  
Competitor firm’s actions  
Government intervention  
Market changes  
Return from microcosm to 
macrocosm 
The enactment or 
operationalisation of MCSs 
(hypothesised in the microcosm) 
in the macrocosm, which might 







Setting up  
Adopting 
Forming 
The dynamics of risk In the process of enacting or 
operationalising MCS that are 
supposed to manage certain 
hypothesised risks, new matters 
of concern emerge that lead to the 
articulation of new risks 
Matters of concern  
Experimentation  
Interactions The process of how a variety of 
entities facilitate, constrain or 















Uncertainty encountered in 
interactions 
The emergence of a set of actions 
or entities (such as resistant 
forces) in the interactions 
between different entities in the 
process of experimenting with 
risk and MCS, which were not 
expected prior to such 
interactions 
Competitor actions  
Government intervention  
Market uncertainty 
Controversies  One special case of interactions 
where actors dispute or debate 
with each other, which might 









The object of controversies The items or objects that are 
debated in the research collective 
in the microcosm 
Key management positions 
Supplier of the JV 
Potential value of investments 
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Ownership of intellectual 
property 
Target customer range 
Accounting items 
Qualitative challenges 
Stability of partner firm’s leading 
position  
Inscriptions Textual materials, technical 
software or oral expressions that 
assist actors in the three stages of 










Microsoft Excel  
Accounting inscriptions  Accounting information, 
accounting number or accounting 
technology mobilised in the 
experimentation process  





Sensitivity analysis  
VPI analysis  




A variety of mechanisms, 
processes and practices proposed 
to be used in the risk management 
of inter-firm alliances 
Accounting analysis  
Contract 
Exit strategy 
Organisational restructure  
Partner selection  
Personnel control 
Trust  
Post-contract control  
Relationship control  
Collect alternative information  
control sales channel  
Hiring partner firm’s personnel  
The establishment of 100% 
subsidiary  
Government intervention  The activities undertaken or 
policies released by the Chinese 
central or local government that 
trigger the experimenting and 
hypothesising of risk and MCS, 
and the encountering of matters 
of concern 
Government harmonisation 
Government support  
Policy changes  
Government regulation  
Social consideration  
Competitors’ actions The activities undertaken by JVs’ 
or JV partner firms’ competitors 
that trigger the experimenting and 
hypothesising of risk and MCS, 
and the encountering of matters 
Acquiring a potential partner firm 
and limiting the engine 
penetration rate 
Controlling the market price 
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of concern Cooperating with Cino’s partner 
firm 
Quicker R&D and management 
control process than Cino 
Offering cheaper products 




Working with multiple local 
commercial vehicle companies  
Market changes The activities occurring in the 
market that that trigger the 
experimenting and hypothesising 
of risk and MCS, and the 
encountering of matters of 
concern 
Downward pricing pressure from 
customers 
Low market demand and high 
market competition  
Performance or effectiveness 
lower than expectation  
Unpredictability of the market  
Other intervening 
variables 
The specific conditions based on 
which experimenting and 
hypothesising of risk and MCS 











Appendix 2B: Paradigm Model 
Causal 
Conditions 










Cino  Uncertainty 
encountered 
in interactions 
Inscriptions Risk  



















 Matter of 
concern  









 Controversies      




Appendix 3: Relationship between Risk and MCS* in the Formation of 
the Engine and ATS JV between Cino and Delink 
(*including management control activities, inscriptions and material devices, and 




Inscriptions and Material 
Devices, and How They 
Related to Management 
Control Activities 











financial risks for 
Cino 
Technical inspection 
of partner firm’s 
manufacturing plant  
Inspection report: 
Simplify and depict the 
partner firm’s 
organisational structure 
and operational practice, 
and the inspection team’s 
diagnosis 
Circulate such information 
back to Cino’s head office 
Be the object of discussion 
between executives of 
Cino 
The articulation of an 
engineering problem 
associated with partner 
firm’s manufacturing 
plant 
Relate partner firm’s 
manufacturing 
practices to its own 
practices in US 
 
Sample US 




statistics with the 
results of informal 








Depict and record the 
company’s regular 
customers’ opinions 




The development of a 
hypothesis about the 
possible consequences 
of the engineering 
problem  
Hypothesising 
engine JV as 






competing options  
A piece of paper: 
List the conditions, 
benefits and constraints of 
each option 
Allow comparison of the 
benefits and constraints of 
each option 
The selection of JV as 
the solution to deal with 
risk under the 
technology licensing 
agreement  
Constructing Select partner firm The sales volume of The selection of Delink 
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engine JV model  potential partner firm: 
Screen and target potential 
partner firm  





The sales volume of 
potential partner firm: 
Align company’s business 
philosophy and partner 
selection  
A pre–JV formation 
audit on partner firm 
Audit report: 
Depict information about 
partner firm  
Circulate such information 
back to the company’s 
head office 
Be the object of discussion 
between the company’s 
executives  
The arise of concerns 
about partner firm’s 
organisational structure 
and operating practices 
Relate the 
company’s concerns 
on partner firm’s 
social responsibility 
and operating 
practices to the 
company’s own and 
general corporate 
practices in the US 
Engine production costs 
and legal costs: 
Help hypothesise and 
objectify the potential 
effects of partner firm’s 
organisational structure 
and operating practices on 
the engine JV 
The development of the 
hypothesis of risk 
concerns about Cino’s 
global reputation and 
financial performance 






persuade partner firm 
to change its 
organisational 
structure and 
operating practices  
 The promise of partner 
firm to change its 
organisational structure 
and operating practice  
Draw on the 
company’s past JV 
experience in other 
countries 
Pursue and ‘fight for’ 
key management 
positions in the 
engine JV 
 The dominance of JV 
contract negotiation 
The draft of JV contract 
Rely on executives’ 
personal feelings to 




competitor firm in 
the future and (ii) the 
bargaining power 
between the 
company and partner 
firm 
 The development of the 
hypothesis of potential 
danger of using Booth 
as the competitor firm of 
the engine JV 
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Form a filtration JV 
to remove and 
replace competitor 
firm 
Build trust between 






Propose to pair Cino 
technology–based 
filtration to Cino 
technology–based 
engines  
(Potential reduction of) 
engine production costs: 
Seduce partner firm to 
form a filtration JV 
The construction of a 
proposal to form a 
filtration JV between the 
same partner firms 
Form a filtration JV 
Adapt the contract 
drafted for the engine 
JV 
 The formation of the 
engine JV between 
partner firms 
The arise of new 
matters of concern 
(the failure to 
enlarge the target 
customer range of 
the engine JV) 
when the engine 




cost information  
Expand the engine 
JV’s sales 
(The continuous increase 
of) engine sales for the 
first five years: 
Lead the company to form 
the view that action should 
be taken to expand sales  
The introduction of a B 
series engine to the 
engine JV  
Enlarge the target 
customer range of 
the engine JV 
Seduce partner firm 
by (i) showing 
financial benefits and 




Persuade partner firm to 
accept the company’s 
proposal to enlarge the 
target customer range of 
the engine JV 
The failure to enlarge 
the target customer 
range 
The arise of a new 




Delink in the 







estimate the sales 
growth rate and 
market share of 
partner firm 
Calculate and 
estimate the sales 
growth rate and 
market share of 
partner firm’s 
competitor firms 
Compare the sales 
growth rate and 
market share of 
partner firm and its 
competitor firms 
Interview the sales 
agents of partner 
firm’s commercial 
Accounting numbers 
(sales and market share): 
Allow the company to 
conduct some accounting 
calculations to help the 
company obtain 
information that the 
company needs 
Sales growth rate and 
market share: 
Allow the company to 
compare partner firm’s and 
competitor firms’ future 
performance and market 
share 
Interview scripts: 
Depict and record the 
opinions of sales agents of 
partner firm’s commercial 
vehicles about partner 
firm’s future performance  
Link the interview results 
to the results of accounting 
The conclusion of 
partner firm’s absolute 
leading position in the 
Chinese market 
The formation of the 
view of the company’s 
unaffordability to lose 
the partner firm  
The articulation of the 
problem of the 
company’s exclusive 
dependence on Delink 
in the Chinese market  
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vehicles 




Qualitative cost and 
benefit analysis of 




Allow the company to 
quantify, count, categorise 
and rank different opinions 
Relate the projection 
of partner firm’s 
market share and 
performance to the 
company’s own 
performance  
 The formation of the 
view on the saturation of 
partner firm’s sales in 
the long term  
Analyse the sales 
volume and growth 
rate of other engine 
segments (the light- 
and heavy-duty 
engine) in the 
Chinese market, 
where the company 
has the possibility of 
entering 
Compare the sales 
volume and growth 
rate of Chinese 
engine market to 
those of other 
countries 
Refer Chinese local 
competitor firms’ 
sales behaviour 
The sales growth rate: 
Allow the company to 
quantify and compare the 
performance and growth of 
the Chinese engine market 
to those of other countries  
The potential of China 
becoming the largest 
commercial vehicle 
sales market in the 
world 
The projection of the 
likely loss of the 
opportunity to enlarge 
the company’s sales to 
non–Delink related 
commercial vehicle 
companies in the 
Chinese market 
The articulation of the 
risk of over-dependence 
on Delink in the Chinese 
market  
Exemplify partner 
firm’s past activities 







The articulation of the 
risk of partner firm’s 




model to deal with 
the risk of over-
dependence on 
Delink in the 
Chinese market  




duty engine JV 
model to the heavy- 
and light-duty engine 
JVs 








Draw on past engine 
JV experience 
Draft JV contract  
 The company’s 
dominance in the 
negotiation of heavy- 





Project the effect of 
changing relationship 
between partner firm 
and competitor firm 
on the company 
Draw on personal 
feelings and business 
philosophy 
Competitor firm’s engine 
sales price and cost: 
Enable the projection of 




Engine penetration rate: 
Objectify the potential 
effects of competitor 
firm’s likely action 
Objectify the effects of 
unexpected activity 
Allow executives to attach 
executives’ risk perception 
The articulation of the 
problem of supressed 
engine penetration rate 
The formation of a 
heavy-duty engine JV 




Select partner firm  
Follow company’s 
business philosophy 
Competition analysis  




Refer the company’s 
existing partner 
firm’s leading 
position in a certain 
market to project 
potential partner 
firm’s leading 
position in a different 
market 




Allow the company to 
compare different markets 
Sales volume of existing 
partner firm’s 
commercial vehicles: 
Establish an equivalence 
between the leading 
positions of two partner 
firms, so that the leading 
positions of two partner 
firms can be compared 
Articulation of the 
problem of the stability 
of potential partner 
firm’s leading position 
in the Chinese light-duty 
commercial vehicle 
market 







Draw on personal 
feelings 








Draw on past engine 
JV experience 
Draft contract 
Future sales volume of 
potential partner firm’s 
commercial vehicles: 
Be the object of discussion 
Trigger the joint efforts 
between different 
departments 
Mitigate the Cino 
executives’ perception 
of potential partner 
firm’s unstable leading 
position 
The formation of a light-





Express the intention 
to quit negotiation to 
form a heavy-duty 
engine JV (led to the 
management control 
 The pulling back of the 
negotiation on the 
proposal to form a 
heavy-duty engine JV 
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struggles in partner 
firm) 





The enrolment of 
local provincial 
governor to lobby 
partner firm   
  The company’s 
dominance in the 
negotiation of JV 
contract 
The formation of a 
heavy-duty engine JV 




The arise of new 







 The engine penetration 
rate of the engine JV:  
The decrease of the engine 
penetration rate partially 
led the company’s 










partially led to the 
company’s belief in the 
partner firm’s 
uncooperative behaviour 
The realisation of 
partner firm’s 
uncooperative behaviour  
Articulating the 









in the engine JV 
Talk: 
Provide the intermediary 
for informal engagement 
between partner firm–
appointed personnel in the 
engine JV 
Summary report: 
Depict and record the 
opinions of partner firm–
appointed personnel in the 
engine Delink about 
possible causes of partner 
firm’s uncooperative 
behaviour, which enables 
the reduction of matters of 
concern 
Numbers: 
Help code, group, count 
The projection of 
possible causes of 
partner firm’s 
uncooperative behaviour  
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and rank the number of 
frequencies of opinions 
mentioned by partner 
firm–appointed personnel 
in the engine JV 




 The confirmation of 









 Project Delink’s 
actions against Cino  
Penetration rate of 
engines made in the 
engine JV and revenues: 
Objectify the effects of 
Delink’s likely actions  
The development of the 
hypothesis of the 
existence of risk 
exposure of losing trust 
between Cino and 
Delink 
Hypothesising an 
ATS JV as the 






partner firm from 
partner firm  
Follow a framework  









Rebuild trust with 
partner firm 
A-review document:  
Provide a framework for 
selecting a business model 
among a few alternatives 
Help standardise and 
formalise the processes 
and practices of 
articulating JV model  
Scenario, NPV, break-
even and probability 
analysis: 
Help quantify the 
outcomes of the ATS JV 
model and estimate the 
probability of occurrence 
of the outcomes 
Accounting numbers: 
Be the object of discussion 
between multiple people in 
the company  
Microsoft Excel and 
@risk software: 
Enable the calculation of 
NPV and probability of the 
occurrence of NPV 
The articulation of the 
risk of non-value adding 
of the ATS JV 
The formation of an 
ATS JV under the risk 
of non-value adding  
Constructing the 
ATS JV model 
Follow a framework  
Brainstorming, open 
discussion and 




different departments  





accounting formula and 
calculations, circle, 
colour, mathematic 
numbers, table, charts 
and graphs: 
Draw together people from 
different departments and 
with different background 
Quantify risk and risk 
effects  
Be the object of discussion 
The articulation of risks 
in the ATS JV 
The construction of 
MCS to deal with risks 
in the ATS JV 
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Cost and benefit 
analysis of 
competing options  
Draw on personal 
and corporate past 
experiences  
Construct ATS JV 
contract  





contribution in the 
JV and refer to past 
JV experience 
Make clear the 
company’s attitude  
Put aside disagreed 
items  
JV contract  
Form a procurement 
committee and hire 
partner firm’s 
previous accounting 
manager in the ATS 
JV, based on past 
engine JV experience 
and controversies between 
employees 
Provide a common 
language that allows 
people from different 
departments and with 
different knowledge 
backgrounds to talk 
Accommodate and 
converge different 
qualitative opinions into 
quantitative numbers 
Rank potential challenges 
and allow the articulation 
of risks 
Allow people to situate 
potential challenges within 
their past experience and 
to quantify the probability 
of occurrence and effect of 
the challenges 
Visualise and objectify 
risk perceptions  
Prioritise the time and 
efforts of executing MCS 
Initial term sheet: 
Provide a handy base for 
the company’s discussion 
and negotiation with 
partner firm on the 
possible management 
control mechanisms for the 
ATS JV 
Simulate the potential 
controversies and conflicts 
between partner firms in 
negotiations; MCS to be 
used in the ATS JV 
Distribute efforts in 
preparing the company’s 
negotiations with partner 
firm 
The arise of new 





JV and ATS JV) 
when the ATS JV 
was formed 
 Production cost of the 
engine, ATS and core 
components of ATS: 
The object of shifting 
responsibility for reducing 
cost 
The arise of internal 
conflicts between the 
company, the 
company’s engine JV 
and ATS JV 
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Appendix 4A: Interview Protocol 
A list of interview protocol 
A. Questions about antecedents to the formation of Delink Cino Engine (DECIE) 
1. Could you please explain the reasons for forming DECIE? 
2. How important were risks in your consideration to engage DECIE? 
3. How were these risks identified? 
4. Could you please explain the nature of these risks? 
5. Why these risks were not managed internally through your existing management 
control systems?  
6. Why did you consider international joint venture as a solution for these risks? 
B. Questions about the process of negotiating and forming DECIE 
1. Could you please explain how potential international joint venture partners were 
sought and identified?  
2. Could you please explain the process by which you selected Delink among a set 
of potential partner firms?  
3. Could you please explain how a joint venture agreement was negotiated with a 
selected potential partner? 
4. Could you please explain the challenges and difficulties in negotiating the joint 
venture agreement, and how these challenges and difficulties were managed? 
5. How important were risks and management control system considerations in the 
negotiation of the joint venture relationship? 
6. Could you please explain the details of the joint venture contract, with a specific 
focus on risk and management control system implications? 
7. Could you please explain the management control system design choices that 
you had to make in negotiating the operational form of Delink (and why)? 
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8. Could you please explain why the partner firm’s management control systems 
were used or not used in DECIE? 
C. Questions about the ongoing management of DECIE 
1. Could you please explain the threats you have encountered in the management 
of DECIE? 
2. Could you please explain how these threats are connected or not connected to 
each other? 
3. Could you please explain the process through which risks are identified? 
4. Could you please explain whether you are facing the same or different risk at 
different stages of DECIE? 
5. Could you please explain how risks in DECIE are related or unrelated to risks in 
the focal organisation? 
6. Could you please explain how you track risks at different stages of DECIE? 
7. Could you please explain the process by which the management control systems 
you had designed were enacted in practice? 
8. Could you please explain the challenges and/or opportunities that arose as a 
result of implementing management control systems? 
9. Could you please explain how these management control systems operate in 
relation to risks? 
10.  Could you please explain your level of satisfaction with the management 
control systems in place, and indicate how management control systems have 
performed differently to expectation? 
11. Could you please explain whether and how you implemented the initially 
designed management control systems if they did not perform as expected? 
Note: 
a. The above are just an interview protocol, and not all questions may be asked in 
the real interview. 
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b. Questions may not necessarily be asked following the above order in the real 
interview. 
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Appendix 4B: Invitation Letter and Information Sheet 
28 June 2012 
Dear Sir/Madam, 
A STUDY OF RISKS AND MANAGEMENT CONTROL SYSTEMS IN INTER-
FIRM ALLIANCES 
You are invited to participate in an academic study that examines the uses of 
management control systems in the risk management of international joint ventures. 
THE STUDY 
The aim of this study is to examine how risks are articulated and transformed in 
international joint ventures, and the implications of that on management control systems’ 
design choices and operations. As a manager/key staff member of an international joint 
venture, your participation in this study has a vital role to play in improving our 
understanding of risks in international joint ventures that will better serve the 
management control needs of yourself and other managers. 
This field study will be administered using multiple data collection methods, including 
interviews, observations and archival documents. The interview will last for one hour, 
during which themes around the risk management of international joint ventures will be 
discussed. The researcher would like to review relevant written documents (e.g., joint 
venture contract and company meeting minutes) and observe activities or operations 
(e.g., meetings and similar interactive events) only when the researcher is allowed to do 
so. There will be no interruption during the observation and review of archival 
documents and, therefore, there will be no impacts on your normal business operations. 
Although your response to this study would be greatly valued, your participation is 
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voluntary. You are free to withdraw from the study at any stage and, if you choose to do 
so, all collected data will be destroyed. 
CONFIDENTIALITY AND ETHICS 
Any information obtained from this study will be treated in strict confidence and will be 
used only for the purpose of this study. Data obtained will be stored in a locked filing 
cabinet in the researcher’s office. Electronic copies of transcripts will always be 
password protected. Please be assured that the information you provide in this study 
will not be distributed to any third parties. Your responses to this interview are 
confidential, and the interview is not labelled, so they cannot be traced to any individual. 
The identity of each international joint venture will be kept confidential. All data 
gathered will be destroyed after five years, in accordance with The Australian National 
University’s data management research protocol. 
Should you have questions regarding the study or the content of the interview, or if you 
require summarised results of this study, please do not hesitate to contact: 
Mr Zhichao Wang   or  Dr Habib Mahama 
Telephone: + 61 2 6125 7374    Telephone: + 61 2 6125 4875 
Email: alex.wang@anu.edu.au   Email: habib.mahama@anu.edu.au  
If you have any concerns regarding the way the research was conducted, you can also 
contact: 
Human Research Ethics Committee at The Australian National University 
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Thank you very much for your participation and contribution to this important research. 
Yours sincerely, 





Zhichao (Alex) Wang 
School of Accounting and Business Information Systems T: +61 2 6125 7374 
College of Business and Economics F: +61 2 6125 5005 
CBE Building, Bld. No. 26c, Room 3.14 E: alex.wang@anu.edu.au 




Appendix 4C: Consent Form 
Consent Form 
I …………………………………………… (please print) consent to take part in the 
project Risks and Management Control Systems in Inter-firm Alliances. 
1. I understand that if I agree to participate in the research project, I will be asked to 
participate in interviews and may be observed directly in my work practices by the 
researcher. 
2. I have read and understood the information sheet, and any questions I have asked 
have been answered to my satisfaction. 
3. I agree to participate in the project, realising that I may withdraw at any time and that 
I do not have to provide a reason if I do so, and that there will be no adverse 
consequences to me if I do so. If I request this, any information I have shared will be 
destroyed if I withdraw participation. 
4. I am aware that participation in this study will not be linked to my name. I understand 
the study will not have my name or any other identifying information on it and a 
research code number will be used instead. 
5. I agree that interviews may be audio recorded and transcribed for further analysis. I 
understand that any personal, sensitive or potentially incriminating data will be kept 
confidential as far as the law allows. I understand that this form and other any other 
relevant data will be stored securely by the researcher. Data will be stored on a locked 
computer accessible only by the researcher. 
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6. I agree that research data provided by me or with my permission during the project 
may be included in a thesis, presented at conferences or published in journals on 
condition that neither my name nor any other identifying material is used. 
7. I understand that, although comments will not be attributed to me in any publication 
(unless I specifically request this), it may be possible for third parties to guess the origin 
of data and I should therefore avoid making any defamatory statements or disclosing 
confidential information. 
8. I understand that I may request a copy of the result of the research project.  
Signed ………………………………… Date ………………………………… 
Researcher to complete 
We, ……………………, certify that we have explained the purposes and procedures of 
the research to ………………………………………, and consider that s/he has 
understood these and given informed consent to participate in the interview. 
Signed ………………………………… Date ………………………………… 
